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A B S T R A C T 
This thesis investigates C.S. Lewis as one of the most successful Christian apologists 
of this century. It begins by looking at his influence as part of a movement of lay 
orthodoxy in the twentieth century, and examining some of the reasons for the 
emergence of that movement. In the context of this discussion, several key influences 
are explored. Charles Williams and O.K. Chesterton are examined as contemporaries 
who helped shape Lewis' specifically Christian theology, Edwyn Bevan as an influence 
on his philosophy of God, Baron von Hugel as a beacon of light in the Modernist 
crisis, and Rudolf Otto as the primary source of Lewis' synthesis of the rational and 
the non-rational in his theology. 
The thesis then goes on to explore three areas where Lewis had a distinctive 
contribution to make to modern orthodox belief The first of these is the assertion that 
he was making an attempt to resurrect Romanticism in some form in theology, in 
contrast to such figures as Karl Barth, for whom Romantic philosophy was part of the 
entire problem of the Liberal enterprise. The second area is the regaining of a Christian 
imagination concerning the hfe to come and of the doctrines of Heaven and Hell. It will 
be argued that Lewis' doctrine of Transposition offers suggestions as to an alternative 
to self-defeating reductionism in this area of Christian thought. The third area is Lewis' 
engagement with the ideas and philosophies of his day, and in particular his hostility 
towards Scientific Materialism. This will be examined through his use of the literary 
genre of Utopia/Dystopia to critique materialist and relativist positions. His work will 
be explored alongside two examples of the genre - H.G. Wells and Yevgeny Zamyatin 
- to place him in the context of the discussion of possible human fijtures of his time. 
The thesis will argue that C.S. Lewis was the foremost exponent of a group of lay 
Christians who were concerned to restate orthodox Christian belief in the modem 
context. It will argue that Lewisian orthodoxy was a credible and complex construct 
which encompassed the rational and the non-rational, the moral and the numinous, the 
intellect and the imagination. Ultimately it will argue that Lewis offers theological 
suggestions as to the solution of the lost unity of heart and mind - the "dissociation of 
sensibility" - which the Romantics sought. 
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Introduction 
C .S. LEWIS continues to be one of the most popular and influential Christian writers of the 20th century. In the US, in particular, his apologetic works and fantasy novels attract a wide and enthusiastic audience over 30 years after his 
death. Last year his books sold over 2 million copies to the American market, and he 
attracts devotees as diverse as Peter Mandelson, Hillary Clinton, and Liam Gallagher. 
John Finney, in his extensive survey of Christian belief and practice {Finding Faith 
Today), cites him as an enduring influence on the spirituality of modem British 
Christians. The phenomenal success of Shadowlands, both on stage and screen, is 
indicative of his popular appeal. Attitudes towards Lewis today, as in his own lifetime, 
tend to be polarised between devoted adoration and dismissive contempt. Often 
accused of outdated sexist and racist opinions (with some justification), Lewis was 
never uncontroversial - a highly intelligent and articulate academic who sought to 
defend the Christian Faith in his own inimitable style. 
There are, of course, many reasons for the profound influence of C.S. Lewis as a 
Christian apologist. Naomi Lewis, writing in the Observer, described his appeal as "an 
apparent simplicity, a genial homeliness". For others, his outstanding gift was clarity. 
His friend Owen Barfield described reading Lewis as like opening a window onto a 
stuffy room. For others again, his unique power was an imaginative understanding of 
morality, a faculty through which, as Uie Times observed in his obituary, "he made 
religious books best-sellers, and in a nice sense, fashionable". Perhaps, however, the 
secret thread was the radiant sense of God which many have found in his works, and 
which still resonates with many who read him for the first time. 
Lewis undoubtedly saw himself as a defender of orthodoxy - advocating a return to the 
• historic truths of Christianity as opposed (as he saw it) to the dangerous liberal trends 
in theology of his own time. As such, he belongs to a group of lay Christians of the 
early and mid-20th century which include Charles Williams, Dorothy Sayers, and G.K. 
Chesterton. My purpose in this thesis is to investigate the main tenets of this lay 
discovery of orthodoxy, particularly as it was espoused by Lewis. I will explore C.S. 
Lewis' theology alongside an examination of his theological, literary, and imaginative 
influences, before suggesting areas where his contribution, in the context of this group 
of lay Christians, was distinctive. 
I EWiS, as we have seen, saw himself as a conservative, and much of his writing -/attacks liberal and modem approaches to Christian faith. Nothing articulates his 
own position more, perhaps, than the resentment he felt at those who seemed to want 
to water down the 'old tmths' and accommodate secular ideas into a faith barely 
recognisable as Christianity. The central focus of liberal thought, as Lewis perceived it, 
was the historical-critical approach to the Bible, and the consequent questioning of the 
historicity of the New Testament in particular. "There are two sorts of outsiders", he 
once remarked to a group of ordinands: 
...the uneducated, and those who are educated in some vva)' but not in your way.. How you are 
to deal with the first class, if you hold views like Lois)''s or Schweitzer's or Bultmann's or 
TiUich's or even Alec Vidler's, I simply don't know. I see - and I'm told that you see - that it 
would hardly do to tell them what you really believe. A theology which denies the historicity of 
nearly everything in the Gospels to which Christian life and affections have been fastened for 
nearly two millennia...if offered to the uneducated man can produce only one or other of two 
effects. It will make him a Roman Catholic or an atheist.' 
Later in the same address, Lewis identifies his culprits: 
The undermining of the old orthodoxy has been mainly the work of divines engaged in New 
Testament criticism. The authority of experts in that discipline is the authority' in deference to 
whom we are asked to give up a huge mass of beliefs shared in common by the early Church, 
the Fathers, the Middle Ages, the Reformers, and even the nineteenth century." 
Lewis was deeply distrustful of the theological establishment, and there is a strong 
sense of the wisdom of men being folly in the eyes of God in much of his work. There 
is a prevalent feeling that the study of theology is a dangerous business - divorced fi-om 
a true experience and worship of God, theology can become a blinding, choking affair, 
which dulls the intellect and the emotions in word-games and snobbery. Lewis was 
utterly bemused, for example, by Buhmann's conclusion in his Theology of the New 
Testament that: "The personality of Jesus has no importance for the kerygma either of 
Paul or John...Indeed the tradition of the eariiest Church did not even unconsciously 
preserve a picture of his personality." For Lewis this was evidence not of an ability to 
read between the lines of the biblical texts, but of an inability to read the lines 
themselves. Only a theologian could fail to see something that believers and non-
believers alike could recognise: 
What is gained by trying to evade or dissipate tliis shattering immediacy' of personal contact by 
talk about 'tliat significance wliich tlie early Church found tliat it was impelled to attribute to 
the Master'? This liits us in tlie face. Not what tliey were impelled to do but what impelled 
them. I begin to fear tliat by personality Dr Bultmann means what I should call impersonalitj': 
what you'd get in a Dictionary of National Biography article or an obituarj' or a Victorian Life 
and Letters o/Yeshua Bar-Yosefin tlu-ee volumes with photographs.^  
For Lewis, the basic battleground of theology in his day is perhaps best articulated by 
the following extract from a letter he wrote to the Church Times in 1952: 
...To a layman, is seems obvious that what unites the Evangelical and the Anglo-Catholic 
against tlie "Liberal" or "Modernist" is something verj' clear and momentous, namely, the fact 
tliat both are thoroughgoing supematuralists, who believe in tlie Creation, the Fall, the 
Incarnation, tlie Resurrection, tlie Second Coming, and tlie Four Last Tilings. This unites them 
not only with one another, but witli tlie Christian religion as understood ubique et ab omnibus. 
The point of view from which tliis agreement seems less important tlian tlieir divisions, or the 
guLf which separates botli from any non-miraculous version of Christianity', is to me 
unintelligible. Perhaps the trouble is that as supematuralists, whether "Low" or "High" 
Church, tlius taken togetlier, tliey lack a name. May I suggest "Deep Church"; or, if that fails 
in humilits'. Baxter's "mere Christians"?" 
' F E , p. 105. 
'Ibid., p. 106. 
^ Ibid., p .m. 
' T A H , p.139. 
WE have already observed that Lewis' writing is characterised by a deep hostility towards all 'modernism' in theology. The phenomenon of 'lay orthodoxy' - the 
appearance of a definable group of orthodox lay Christians at a particular time - is to 
some extent illuminated by Lewis' suspicion that many of his clerical contemporaries 
were infected with the modernist disease, and were in effect engaged in a form of 
religious prostitution. He saw himself as representing the fears of the laity, for instance, 
in a response to E.L. Mascall, in which he suggested a confusion had arisen between 
matters of liturgy and matters of doctrine: 
What we laymen fear is that the deepest doctrinal issues should be settled by what seem to be, 
or are avowed to be, merely changes in liturg)'. A man who is wondering whether the fare set 
before him is food or poison is not reassured by being told that this course is now restored to its 
traditional place on the mem or that the tureen is of the sarum pattern. We lajmen are 
ignorant and timid...Can you blame us if the reduction of grave doctrinal issues to merely 
liturgical issues fills us with sometliing like terror? ^ 
The reference to "ignorant and timid" laymen is a false modesty - Lewis and his group 
can be seen as representing a dramatic loss of confidence not just in the clergy, but in 
the entire theological establishment, by educated and intelligent Christians. For 
someone like Lewis, for whom the joumey through atheism, theism, and finally 
Christianity had been a long and difficult one, the attempt to reconcile Christianity to 
the prevailing ideologies of the day represented not simply a misguided intellectual 
enterprise, but a betrayal by those to whom the Faith had been entmsted. 
THE distinction between Nature and Supernature is thus the ground of Lewis' theology. In the religious sphere, the existence of an objective moral law, and the 
assertion of a universal experience of the "Numinous" (to give i t Otto's term) are 
corollaries from it. Another facet of Lewis' approach shared by many of his 
contemporaries is the affirmation of "romantic" experience as religious experience, at 
least potentially. For Charles Williams this was primarily the experience of sexaial love, 
for Tolkien it was faerie ("Whispers from beyond the walls of the world, more 
poignant than grief"), and for Lewis, Sehnsucht, or the immortal longings. As Reilly 
has written, the romanticism of these three men was inseparable from their religion. 
The result of much of their work is a literary and religious construct whose purpose is 
to defend romanticism by showing it to be religious, and to defend religion by 
traditionally romantic means.*" 
This romanticism (thus defined) is at once both scholarly and combative. Its purpose is 
more ideological than literarj' - Reilly goes on to suggest that Tolkien (along with 
another of Lewis' friends, Owen Barfield) revives Coleridge's doctrine of the 
imagination, which for him leads to a state of the soul essentially that of the Christian 
beatitude. Lewis, meanwhile, revives the Kant/Coleridge distinction between practical 
and speculative intellect in order to apprehend and defend the tmths of the Christian 
faith.' 
'Ibid., p. 134. 
^ Reilly, R.J.; Romantic Religion, p.5. 
' Ibid.,' p.6. 
Lewis was also a particularist - of a particular sort. He believed in Christianity 
"because by it I see everything else". I f the Nature/Supemature distinction, the moral 
law, and the numinous and romantic experiences were the foundations of Theism, 
Lewis' specifically Christian beliefs were founded on a particular interpretation of 
history, articulated by G.K. Chesterton's Everlasting Man (one of the most important 
single influences on him). The Incarnation and Resurtection of Christ were objective 
instances of the supernatural activity of God, the Atonement an objective act of 
reconciliation between the Creator and his Creation, and in the Person of Christ, at 
once divine and human, was found the fulfilment of both the religion of Israel and of 
the pre-Christian mythologies. 
Within this framework, Lewis found scope for admitting truth in other faiths and 
creeds, but always incomplete and inferior to the Christian assertions. He also believed 
in Niebuhr's "anonymous Christians" in some form. As to the great paradoxes of the 
Christian faith, Lewis certainly took sides - emotionally, at least. With Hooker, and 
against Calvin, Lewis asserted that God commanded good because goodness was good 
of itself - not that whatever God commanded was by definition good. With regard to 
the Free Will/Predestination issue; he believed that much of the discussion was 
meaningless, and the mystery was best encapsulated by Paul's phrase from Philippians: 
"Work out you salvation in fear and trembling, for it is God who is at work in you for 
his own good purpose" (Phil.2:12-13). In reality, however, the essence of his writing 
points unerringly to the importance of the individual's acts of Will - however feeble 
and conditioned. 
OR C.S. Lewis, as we have seen, the central doctrines of Christianity were founded 
on miraculous events. The sustained attempt, therefore (of 19th century Liberal 
Protestantism in particular), to dismiss the miraculous elements of religion was nothing 
less than a direct attack on the Faith itself A true Christian faith, including a belief in 
the miraculous, thus requires two conditions - a normal stability in Nature, in which the 
data offered to our senses recurs in regular patterns, and a belief in a reality beyond 
Nature.^ A view which accepted no other reality than "Nature" itself was essentially 
democratic in character, A belief in Nature and Supernature was a more monarchical 
picture. Belief in a supernatural reality could not, for Lewis, be proved or disproved by 
experience, but the metaphysical arguments in favour were for him conclusive: 
...They turn on the fact that even to think and act in the natural world we have to assume 
something beyond it and even assume that we partly belong to that something. In order to think 
we must claim for our own reasoning a validity' which is not credible if our tliought is merely a 
function of our brain, and our brains a by-product of irrational physical processes. In order to 
act, above tlie level of mere impulse, we must claim a similar validity' for our judgements of 
good and evil. In both cases we get tlie same disquieting result. The concept of Nature itself is 
one we have reached only tacitly by claiming a sort of w/^er-natural status for ourselves.' 
Lewis suggested that the modem dislike for the miraculous was rooted in two 
erroneous ideas. The first involved a confiision between the laws of thought and the 
laws of nature; with the consequent idea that a miracle represented a contradiction in 
terms. The second was a more aesthetic objection - that miracles were a clumsy 
' G I D , p. 13. 
'ibid., p. 13. 
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violation by God of the laws which he himself had imposed on his creation - a 
"solecism on the grammar of the universe". It is here that Lewis follows Athanasius. 
There are two sorts of miracle - some are reminders, others are prophecies. Both 
exhibit the wholesale activity of God at a different speed and on a smaller scale. The 
miracles spoken of by the Gospels are in fact. 
...a retelling in small letters of the very same story which is written across the whole world in 
letters too large for some of us to see.'° 
LEWIS described the acceptance of an objective moral law as an essential starting point for any discussion of the universe in which we live and our place in i t . " 
Indeed he wrote of his BBC Broadcast Talks (later to appear as Mere Christianity) as 
having the following purpose: 
Mine are preparatio evangelica rather tlian evangelism, an attempt to convince people that 
there is a moral law, that we disobey it, and tliat the existence of a Lawgiver is at least very 
probable and also (unless you add the Christian doctrine of the atonement) that this imports 
despair rather tlian comfort.'^  
Lewis' extreme hostility to "modernism" in theology can perhaps be partly explained 
by the academic debate in which he feh himself engaged with Scientific Materialism. 
The assault on value and values put forward by writers such as Stapledon, Wells, and 
particularly J.B.S. Haldane, were castigated by Lewis as representing a "ghastly 
materialistic philosophy"; but nonetheless a dominant force of his time. Lewis' 
antipathy towards liberal theology, and his suspicion that it conformed or acquiesced in 
twentieth century Zeitgeist is understandable in the light of the rise of totalitarianism of 
many forms, and of the experience of the Nazi experiment. One could conjecture that 
for Lewis, the apparent undermining of the Supernatural, and thus of Christian 
orthodoxy, represented a naive religious validation of the more sinister ideological 
trends of his day. A major tenet of the defence of orthodoxy is thus the defence of an 
absolute moral law, which can be seen in the context of the historical circumstances of 
the time. 
H P H E distinctive feature of Lewis' romanticism is the sense of longing, or 'Sweet 
X Desire', that pervades his thought. He uses it as almost an ontological proof of the 
existence of heaven, and of the temporal nature of our earthly existence. Our 
experience is haunted by ineflFable yearnings, almost too painful to bear, which are 
never quite fulfilled in this life. Earthly experiences suggest them, and are the vehicles 
by which we are transported by desire, but no marriage, employment, or landscape 
ever proves to be the pot of gold at the rainbow's end. Those longings are, as Lewis 
writes: 
...tlie secret signature of each soul, the incommunicable and unappeasable want, the thing we 
desired before we met our wives or made our friends or chose our work, and which we shall 
still desire on our deatlibeds, when the mind no longer knows wife or friend or work. While we 
are, this is. If we lose tliis, we lose all.'^ 
'° Ibid., p. 16. 
" MC, p.l9. 
' ^ L . p.l93. 
'^PP, p. 117. 
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Human desires and appetites were made to be fulfilled, believed Lewis. We feel hunger 
- there is such a thing as food. We feel sexual desire - there is such a thing as sex.'"* We 
sense an unattainable ecstasy hovering just beyond our consciousness - there is such a 
thing as heaven; where "To him that overcometh I will give a white stone, and in the 
stone a new name written, which no man knoweth saving he that receiveth it".'^ 
I EWis was not an advocate of the argument by design, in his advocacy of a -^benevolent, loving God, and certainly did not look to the evolutionary process, or 
to human 'progress', as a means to a Utopian or heavenly end. His writing is often 
characterised by a certain contemptus mundi - in his view, the universe that scientific 
inquiry presents to us is cruel, rapacious, and wastefiil. In all the cold, vast emptiness 
of the cosmos, there arises by blind chance a world in which the forms of life are so 
arranged that they can only live by preying upon each other.'* With Melville we might 
bewail: 
(the) horrible vultureism of the earth! from which not the mightiest whale is free. 
In the higher forms of Hfe arises consciousness, so that they might experience not only 
death, but pain also. In humankind arises reason, so that they might foresee their pain 
and death whilst acutely desiring permanence.'* Whither the Wind dance of formless 
matter might lead us was immaterial in the end, at least so far as the optimistic 
evolutionist was concerned. For undergirding everything was the unalterable second 
law of thermodynamics, condemning the universe to a meaningless entropic death, in 
which all 'progress' must ultimately perish: 
It is the creative evolutionist, the bergsonian or Shavian, or the communist, who should 
tremble when he looks up at Uie night sky. For he really is committed to a sinking ship. He is 
really attempting to ignore the discovered namre of things, as though by concentrating on the 
possibly upward trend in a single planet he could make himself forget tlie inevitable downward 
trend in the universe as a whole, the trend to low temperatures and irrevocable disorganisation. 
For entropy is tlie real cosmic wave, and evolution only a momentan' tellurian ripple within 
it." 
His pessimistic view of the evolutionary process and of the natural order is closely akin 
to that presented in Wells' The Time Machine, and his opposition to the prevalent 
optimism in human scientific, material and cultural progress, as we have seen, is best 
expressed in the third volume of his cosmic trilogy; That Hideous Strength (which will 
be discussed later). The spectacle of the universe as it is experienced could not be the 
ground of reUgion, believed Lewis .Along with the apprehension of numinous awe, 
and of morality ('ought'), the foundations of religious thought were coupled for Lewis 
with this deep sense of eternal longing. 
'"MC,p . I I8 . 
'^Rev. 2:17. 
'^PP,p. lI . 
" Herman Melville; Mo6>'D;c -^, p.317. 
'^PP, p. 12. 
" GID, p.34. 
^"PP, p. 13. 
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o NE of the ways in which a particular group defines itself is by its enmity to what it — is not. For the Oxford Romantics, a uniting characteristic was an antagonism to 
Liberalism and to what it was perceived to believe. One tenet of Liberalism was the 
rejection of traditional ideas of hell or damnation, and, one could argue, of any 
definably orthodox eschatological perspective. The dearth of theological imagination 
concerning heaven and hell was a major preoccupation for Lewis, certainly, and the 
perspective of the eternal is indivisible from his outlook. He wrote of the idea of final 
damnation that: 
There is no doctrine which I would more willingly remove from Christianity than tliis, if it lay 
in my power. But it has the full support of Scripture and, specially, of Our Lord's own words; it 
has always been held by Christendom; and it has tlie support of reason.^ ' 
Lewis sets himself to present the doctrine of Hell afresh - as not contrary to reason, i f 
nevertheless opaque. The realities of Heaven and Hell are explored to a degree in The 
Problem of Pain and Mere Christianity, but Lewis' finest approach is through the 
imaginative and fictional techniques which he had developed in order to present his 
ideas - especially The Great Divorce. 
As with any discussion of theodicy and hell, Lewis takes up the central problem of 
reconciling a genuine freedom and the need for a voluntary response to God, with the 
idea of an omnipotent and all-loving creator. Theologians such as McCord Adams 
have identified the various conceptions of hell as follows:^^ 
• An everlasting torment for those who have been disobedient to God. 
• A succession of light penalties for those who continue to offend after death. 
• A perpetuation by God of whatever (vicious) state of character the soul possesses 
at death. 
• An abandoning of the sinner to his own devices by God; which can also be seen as a 
respect for the sinner's freedom. 
None of these definitions really does justice to Lewis' treatment of the doctrine of 
Hell, and particularly through his imaginative works of fantasy, he presents a 
sophisticated and compelling argument for traditional conception, whilst retaining a 
credible notion of a loving and omnipotent God. In addition to this, he develops the 
idea that Hell, like other theological ideas, can stand for a present phenomenon, and 
can be experienced here and now. In Chapter 4 I will attempt to show that Lewis 
stands with writers such as Moltmann in conceiving of a hell on earth - in, for 
example, the unspeakable absence of God in the senseless suffering and guilt of an 
Auschwitz. 
IN regard to theodicy, Lewis follows the fundamental Augustinian doctrines, which he summarised as follows:'^" 
PP, p.94. 
"^ M. McCord Adams; Hell and the God of Justice, p.433. 
J. Moltmann; Jesus Christ for Today's World, p. 143. 
PPL, pp.65-66. 
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• God created all things good, and because they are good, no nature (i.e. no positive 
reality) is bad and the word Bad denotes merely privation of good.'^ ^ 
• What we call bad things are good things perverted. This perversion arises when a 
conscious creature becomes more interested in itself than God. This is the sin of 
Pride. 
• From this doctrine of good and evil it follows that good can exist without evil, but 
not evil without good. 
• Though God has made all creatures good He foreknows that some will voluntarily 
make themselves bad, and also foreknows the good use which he will then make of 
their badness. Thus complex good is achieved with evil an instrument of that good. 
In terms of imaginative fantasy, these themes in themselves have been dealt with most 
powerfully by Lewis' fellow romantic - J.R.R. Tolkien. The interaction of Divine 
Providence with creaturely Free Will, the nature of evil and evil wills, and complex 
good, are all explored in The Lord of the Rings, but perhaps most explicitly in the 
Silmarillion. In Tolkien's creation myth, Ainulindale (which forms part of that work), 
Iluvatar (God) contends with Melkor, his fallen angel, who attempts to introduce 
themes of his own to the Great Music, in order to increase the power and glory of the 
part assigned to himself The result is discord and rebellion, out of which Iluvatar 
weaves a yet greater and more beautiful harmony: 
Then Iluvatar spoke, and he said...thou, Melkor, shalt see that no theme may be played that 
hath not its uttermost source in me, nor can any alter the music in my despite. For he that 
attempteth this shall prove but mine instrument in the dcNdsing of things more wonderful, 
wliich he himself hath not imagined.^ * 
From all this it is clear that Lewis, Tolkien, and their movement were firmly opposed 
to certain trends of thought in theodicy, such as that articulated by John Hick and the 
'vale of soul-making' school. The idea that moral evil was perhaps not truly at variance 
with the purposes of a sovereign, omni-responsible God, or inimical to all good -
indeed that pain and suffering were necessary to soul-making and thus required by 
God,'^' was utterly ahen to 'Lewisian' orthodox}'. 
WITH regards to spirituality, the efficacy of petitionary prayer was a natural corollary from a belief in a dynamic relationship between God and His creation, 
and in particular those creatures to whom free will had been entrusted. Lewis argued 
with Pascal that prayer was a divine gift allowing creatures "the dignity of causality". 
Not only prayer, however, but physical action as well. It was clear to Lewis that God 
had not chosen to write the whole of human history in His own hand - that He allowed 
us to play some real part in the destiny of the universe.'^ ^ The question of why God 
allows us to ask imperfectly for what He knows Himself to be good, and could very 
well do Himself without our asking, is put into context with all our actions. To ask, 
however, 'does prayer work?', as i f it were a mechanical or magical device, was to 
start in the wrong frame of mind from the outset: 
Dr Trethowan notes tliat moral evil is a refusal to accept God's offer, and as such is a reality, but of 
a peculiar and negative kind {Dr. Hick and the Problem of Evil p.407). 
J.R.R. Tolkien, The Silmarillion, p. 18. 
J. Hick, Evil and the God of Love, p.389. 
EST, p. 42. 
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Prayer is either sheer illusion or a personal contact between embryonic, incomplete persons 
(ourselves) and the utterly concrete Person. Prayer in the sense of petition, asking for things, is 
a small part of it; confession and penitence are its threshold, adoration its sanctuary', the 
presence and vision and enjoyment of God its bread and wine. In it God shows himself to us. 
That he answers prayers is a corollar>' - not necessarily tlie most important one - from tliat 
revelation. What he does is learned from whai he is."' 
Lewis was emphatically not a triumphalist where prayer was concerned. The prevalent 
idea in many Christian circles that enough faith is a guarantee of divine response 
(through one interpretation of the Dominical sayings), is contradicted by the 
experience of Christ in Gethsemane. The blunt refijsal to Jesus' petition that his cup of 
suffering be taken from him - the forsaking of the greatest servant in his greatest need -
represents a mystery which Lewis was loath to explore: 
...Meanwhile, little people like you and me, if our prayers are sometimes granted, beyond hope 
and probabilits', had better not draw hasty conclusions to our own advantage. If we were 
stronger, we might be less tenderly treated. If we were braver, we might be sent, with far less 
help, to defend far more desperate posts in the great battle. 
He did, however tentatively speculate that in the act of creation itself, there may be an 
agony of separation of which the Cry of Dereliction was a echo or symbol - the 
beginnings of an understanding of suffering and the Passion of Christ which saw in 
them something more than the inevitable consequences of sin and the Fall. 
T ^ H E Christian life, for Lewis, was a battle. In Mere Christianity, he analogises our 
J - situation to that of resistance fighters living in enemy-occupied territory - going to 
church is like listening in to the wireless from 'outside'. Christian obedience consists of 
"standing at your post" and "doing your duty". Satan is the ubiquitous prince of this 
worid, who leads the rebellion against the rightful King. Every day of our lives, 
through a multitude of choices, we move closer to one or other of the two camps. 
Many commentators (Richard Harries for example) have been disturbed by Lewis' 
demonology and this stark portrayal of the human situation, yet Lewis' most popular 
adult work was (and continues to be) The Screwtape Letters, in which the battle 
between the divine and the diabolical for human souls is examined in fiction. Our 
everyday indulgences and compromises are suddenly presented in a new light - we see 
ourselves on a knife-edge between glorious and terrible possibilities at every moment. 
The destiny of our souls either in eternal bliss or in self-centred torment is the vision 
which should ultimately direct all our acts and thoughts. 
These key themes undergirding Lewis' spirituality informed all his thinking and 
theology. The stern business of orthodox Christian doctrine and practice was the 
narrow door through which Lewis encountered a clear vision of the infinite bounty and 
glory of God. He believed life was to be lived in the light of the cosmic possibilities, 
both for good or evil, of which he was acutely aware. He believed that human beings 
were made for ineffable joy, plenitude and peace, but that these could only be attained 
by the strife and stmggle of relinquishing the self God is that first desire of our hearts, 
F E , p.lOl. 
°^ Ibid., p. 103, 
15 
both beautiful and terrible, who must be responded to with heart, intellect, will and 
emotion before wholeness can be comprehended. 
H P H E S E , then, are the main features of the lay defence of orthodoxy, of which Lewis 
JL was perhaps the most vocal exponent. A denial of the supernatural was an 
inevitable first step towards a materialist view of "faith" in which "God" could have no 
meaning in the traditional sense, but could only represent a phenomenon of "cosmic 
consciousness", or a sort of sum of our best intentions. The diversity of belief in the 
Church in this regard was a weakness rather than a strength. Lewis and his 
contemporaries saw themselves as representing the fears of the laity - namely that the 
clerical hierarchy and the professional theologians were selling out the Christian faith. 
A Christianity worth the name, for Lewis, believed in a God of the miraculous; a self-
existent Reality beyond "Nature" who was active within human and cosmic history. 
The doctrine of the continuation of the soul after death was not an embarrassing 
anachronism, neither was it secondary to the working out of religious life and duty in 
the present. The ultimate destiny of the soul was a reality which flooded our present 
existence with significance, and without which morality and Christian faith were 
meaningless. 
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Chapter 1 
Influences 
IN a review of Tolkien's The Lord of the Rings, Lewis wrote of his friend's book that it was like "lightning from a clear sky"/ '^ There is, among many of Lewis' admirers, a similar sense about the man himself - that, in an age almost 
pathological in its anti-supematurahsm, with Lewis had returned full-blooded Christian 
orthodoxy, "gorgeous, eloquent, and unashamed". No-one, however, exists in a 
vacuum, and there are certainly those who profoundly influenced Lewis (and indeed 
the group of lay Christians who were his contemporaries). We are here primarily 
concerned with those who affected his theological ideas, but this in itself is a difficult 
task, as hterary and imaginative influences are also bound up here, as we shall see. 
The study of the formation of C.S. Lewis as a theologian or a writer remains sketchy 
and inadequate. This is in spite of both his enormous popularity and influence as a 
Christian apologist; and his expressed and obvious debt to the likes of G.K. 
Chesterton, William Morris, and George MacDonald. Imaginatively, Lewis was shaped 
by an early love for Norse and Celtic mythology, and by works such as Morris' News 
From Nowhere. It was of George MacDonald, however, a relatively obscure Victorian 
writer and preacher, that Lewis could say he owed a debt "as great as any man owed 
another". Lewis said of MacDonald's Phantasies that it represented a "baptism of the 
imagination", and the significance of this will be developed later. For the present 
purposes, we will investigate those figures who shaped Lewis theologically, before 
integrating the rational and imaginative aspects which made up the complex construct 
which was 'Lewisian' orthodoxy. 
We will first concentrate on Charles Williams, who befriended Lewis subsequent to his • 
conversion and influenced the development of his Christianity, and then in addition on 
four works which I believe played a part in shaping him. These are G.K. Chesterton's 
The Everlasting Man, which had a profound effect on the atheist/agnostic Lewis, 
Edwyn Sevan's SymboUsm & BeUef, Baron Friedrich von Hiigel's Essays & Addresses 
on the Philosophy of Religion (in particular "What do we mean by Heaven; what do 
we mean by Hell?"), and Rudolf Otto's Das Heilige. We will inquire into the 
significance of these writers in terms of the history of religious thought, and the 
curtents and trends which were present during the period preceding that in which 
Lewis wrote. The purpose will be to highlight those aspects which Lewis appears to 
have made foundational or significant in his own thought, and to draw these together 
later. 
'^ OTOW, p. 112. 
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^.1 Charles Williams 
Your death blows a strange bugle call, friend, and all is hard 
To see plain or record truly. The new light imposes change, 
Re-adjusts all a life-landscape as it thrusts down its probe from the sky. 
To create shadows, to reveal waters, to erect hills and deepen glens. 
The slant alters. I can't see the old contours. It's a larger world 
Than I once thought it. I wince, caught in the bleak air that blows on the ridge. 
Is it the first sting of the great winter, the world-waning? Or the cold of spring? 
A hard question and worth talking a whole night on. But with whom? 
Of whom now can I ask guidance? With what friend concerning your death 
Is it worth while to exchange thoughts unless - oh unless it were you?^' 
C .S. Lewis, as he himself admitted, was greatly influenced by Charles Williams; and often expressed the hope that this contribution to his own work was reciprocated in that of his fr iend.That Hideous Strength, for example, almost 
certainly borrows from Williams' Arthurian poetry, which develops the contrast 
between an archetypal, ideal England, and empirical Britain.^'' Lewis rather clumsily 
(one might say arbitrarily) inserts this theme into his cosmic trilogy, with somewhat 
unwieldy results. More positive results ensued from the regard in which Lewis held 
Williams as a scholar of Milton. Lewis' Preface to Paradise Lost., one of his finest 
pieces of writing, was dedicated to Williams in respect of the debt which Lewis felt he 
owed to his friend's own Preface, published two years previously. Most important, as 
Chad Walsh suggests, was the deepening of Lewis' psychological and spiritual insights, 
through his association and admiration of Williams work.^^ 
In this section I will attempt to explore Charies Williams' theological positions, and 
particularly those regarding the doctrine of heaven, and where this interacts with or 
influences those of C.S. Lewis. One of Williams' themes, with which I shall later deal, 
concerns, the interdependence of human beings, spiritually and even physically. Lewis 
was greatly attracted to what he saw as a 'magical law of creation' - a doctrine of 
substitution by which one could bear the burdens of another. Lewis was later to 
attribute the relief of some of his wife's sufferings of cancer to this doctrine. In my 
opinion, however, the greatest contribution which Williams made to Lewis concerned 
his notions of'Sweet Desire', and of the elusiveness of God. 
-^ Lewis, C.S.; "To Charles Williams" in P, p. 105. 
Indeed, Lewis' relationship with Williams is unique among 'The Inklings', in that he attributed any 
influence at all to it. Lewis once wrote to an interested author who was proposing a literary' inquirj-
into tlie group of writers: "...I do tJtink you may be chasing after a fox that isn't there. Charles 
Williams certainly influenced me and 1 perhaps influenced him. But after Uiat I tliink you draw a 
blank. No one ever influenced Tolkien - you might as well tr>' to influence a bandersnatch...Dorothy 
Sayers was not living in Oxford at the time and I don't think she ever in her life met Tolkien. She 
knew Charles Williams well, and me much later. I am sure she neitlier exerted nor underwent any 
literary influence at all. Of course it may be that, just because I was in it myself, I don't see 
(objectively) what was really going on. But 1 give my honest opinion for what it is worth." Lewis, 
W.H. (ed.); Letters of C.S. Lewis, (London, 1966). 
Walsh, Chad; The Literary Legacy of C.S. Lewis, p. 13. 
Ibid., p. 13. 
18 
nPhe clearest expression of Charies Williams' conception of Heaven is to be found in 
X his apologetic work; He Came Down from Heaven. As a piece of biblical 
theology, it exhibits many penetrating and illuminating insights; not least in regard to 
the interpretation of meaning in the Lord's prayer. Williams begins by exploring the 
changing perceptions of the word 'heaven', or heavens', both in scripture and in 
modem understanding. He marks its progress in Christian thought to that state of 
spiritual being equivalent to the habitation of divine things - 'a state of being consonant 
with union with God'.''^ He suggested that the meaning of the word tends to sway in 
modern minds between the spiritual and the spatial - with the emphasis being placed on 
the latter, because of the weight of Christian imagination attached both to the Lord's 
prayer and to the credal formulations. 'He came down...', 'He ascended into...'; '.Our 
Father who art in Heaven..'; 'Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven...' - our 
minds cannot but smuggle in spatial pictures of the relationship between Heaven and 
Earth. 
Williams was aware of the theological and philosophical objections to any definition of 
God which implied His nature inhabiting place, but suggested also that to deny that 
'heaven' in some sense could not inhabit space would be to deny the Incarnation.^' Just 
as the nature of God is not primarily paternal - in that He does not exist primarily for 
our sake, but for His, so His nature is not primarily spatial - heaven exists because of 
the nature of God, "and to His existence alone all bliss is related". 
However we define Heaven, Williams suggested, a Christian interpretation of the 
Lord's Prayer must necessarily see its counterpart in both spiritual and spatial terms. 
'Earth', for us, is both the universe and world in which we live, bounded by the 
constraints of time and dimension; and the only spiritual state of being which we know, 
or can know. Here Williams makes a significant contribution to the interpretation of 
the Lord's Prayer. 'Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven' can be understood in 
two ways, he suggests. Normally, we would assume that the fijlfilling of the Divine 
Will in heaven refers to angels or other inhabitants of a realm of perfection outside our 
own. Conversely, we ask for the fulfilling of that Will as it pertains to us and our 
realm. There is, however, a better reading, advanced by WiUiams, which illuminates his 
entire conception of heaven. As he himself puts it: 
The fulfilment of the Will in heaven may relate to us grammatically as well to the angels. The 
events for which we sincerely implore that fiilfilment upon earth are already perfectly 
concluded by it in heaven. Their conclusions have to be known by us on earth, but they already 
exist as events in heaven. Heaven, that is to say, possesses timelessness; it has the qualit\' of 
etemit}', of (in the definition which Boethius passed on to Aquinas) 'the perfect and 
simultaneous possession of everlasting life'. In that simultaneit}' the passion of the prayer is 
aJread.v granted; all that is left for us to do is to discover in the process of time the conclusion 
that we have implored in time. 'Let us', the clause demands, in this understanding, 'know Thy 
will being done upon earth as, in this very event, it is already perfectly done and perfectly 
known in heaven - in the beatitude which is of Thee.' This is the consummation of act in belief 
- in 'faith'^' 
Williams, C ; He Came Down From Heaven, p.9. 
^'Ibid., p. 10. 
Ibid., p. 10. 
Ibid., p. 11. 
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This interpretation touches on the incomprehensibility of eternity (for us), and from it 
Williams develops his ideas on the paradox of free will, on the dual nature of our 
experience ('eternal' and 'actual'), and of the relationship between the two. 
nPhere are clear parallels with Lewis here, both in terms of his view of a timeless 
JL heavenly dimension, and of his speculations concerning the choices of individuals 
and their relationship with eternity. In The Great Divorce, for example, the final 
chapter appears to make a mockery of what has gone before. The majority of the book 
concerns the conversations of Ghosts with the Redeemed - sometimes successful in 
persuading them to truly submit to the Will of God and enter bliss. Finally, however, 
the vision changes - the immortal souls of the participants watch motionless, as their 
inmost natures are portrayed by silver chessmen going to and fro on a board before 
them. The Lewis of the vision asks his guide: 
...is all fliat I have been seeing in this country false? These conversations between the Spirits 
and the Ghosts - were they only the mimicry of choices that had been made long ago? 
MacDonald's answer is ambivalent: 
...or might ye not say, anticipations of a choice to made at tlie end of all things? But ye'd do 
better to say neither. Ye saw tlie choices a bit more clearly flian ye could see them on earth: the 
lens was clearer. But it was still seen through tlie lens. Do not ask of a vision in a dream more 
tlian a vision in a dream can give. 
Clyde Kilby has drawn attention to Williams' articulation of this understanding, 
through the character of Anthony in The Place of the Lion. His (Anthony's) 
observation is that will entails the determination to choose something, but what is 
choice? 
How could there be choice, unless there was preference, and if there was preference there was 
no choice, for it was not possible to choose against that preferring nature which was not his 
being; yet being consisted in choice, for only by taking and doing this and not that could being 
know itself, could it indeed be; to be then consisted precisely in making an inevitable choice."" 
Kilby also suggests a common biblical link between Lewis and Williams in the letter to 
the Hebrews."" This concerns the conception that the earthy tabernacle was no more 
than a copy or a shadow of the 'real' or heavenly one (Hebrews 8:5). Whether this was 
an important or even exclusive source is a matter of conjecture, but the idea itself held 
tremendous sway over the writings of both men. 
Perhaps the most cogent expression in Williams of this idea is to be found in his study 
of Dante, The Figure of Beatrice. Williams asserts that the poet's approach represents 
a 'Way of the Images', following Coleridge's definition of the characteristics of a 
symbol or image as: 
• Existing in itself 
• Deriving from a source greater than itself 
°^ Williams. C : The Place of the Lion, p. 114; quoted in: Kilby, C ; The Christian World of C.S. 
Lewis, p.48. 
Ibid., p.97. 
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• Representing in itself the greatness of the thing from which it derives 
This in itself is a fairiy succinct introduction to Lewis' doctrine of Transposition 
(which we shall discuss later). Williams contends that it represents the basis for 
Dante's poetry - as we observe in the Introduction to the work: 
He (Dante) defined the general kind of experience to which the figure of Beatrice belongs in 
one of his prose books, the Convivio (IV, xw). He says there that the young are subject to a 
'stupor' or astonishment of the mind which falls on them at the awareness of great and 
wonderful things. Such a stupor produces two results - a sense of reverence and a desire to 
know more. A noble awe and a noble curiosity come to life. This is what happened to him at 
the sight of the Florentine girl, and all his work consists, one way or another, in the increase of 
tlial worship and that knowledge."" 
The Image of Beatrice in Dante's thought was, according to Williams, in some sense 
an image of the Redeemed Life or even of God Himself It does not exclude the actual 
or objective Beatrice from his mind, in the same way that the actual, objective Beatrice 
does not exclude the Power which is expressed through her. Beatrice is the only way 
(for Dante) that God can be known - regarding God, his maxim is 'This also is Thou, 
neither is this Thou'.''^ Williams suggests that in being caught up in romantic love for 
Beatrice, Dante sees her as she is 'in heaven' - the unfallen, original (or redeemed, i f 
better) Beatrice as God chose her. The 'actual' Beatrice, complete with the usual 
human shortcomings, is just as real as the image - both are aspects of the one person. 
The revealed virtues are as real as the celestial beauty.'*'' 
The strong neo-Platonic overtones evident here are also present in Lewis' work. 
Lewis, however, lays greater stress on the celestial actuality. It is bur present existence 
which is the diminution or shadow of the greater Reality. In heaven we are to become 
more ourselves than we ever were on earth. It is our 'true' country - death represents a 
farewell to the Shadowlands.'*^ "Further up and further in" is the cry of The Unicom in 
The Last Battle; and it represents Lewis' profoundest statement concerning the nature 
of Heaven and our deepest and truest selves. Meilander has written well on The Last 
Battle, offering it as a story that legitimises and invites our attachment to our present 
'earth', but also our desire for something qualitatively different.** We are creatures of 
dust, who inhabit a temporal realm, and whose affections are rightly attached to finite 
objects and persons. We are also free spirits, made for God and transcending time. 
Death is thus ambivalent for us. 
More evidence of this influence on Lewis is found in his appreciation of The Place of 
the Lion. Lewis himself described it as both based on the Platonic theory of archetypes, 
and a tmly Christian fantasy in a letter to Arthur Greeves."*' The lion of strength who 
appears in the book is an obvious suggestion as the genesis of Lewis' ideas about the 
Williams, C ; ne Image of Beatrice, p. 7. 
Ibid., p.8. 
Ibid., p.27. 
There is here, perhaps, furtlier evidence of tlie influence of tlie letter to tlie Hebrews - tlie sense of 
exile or longing which botli writers describe in their work is well articulated in the great chapter on 
Faith (Heb 11:1-16). 
•"^  Meilander, G.; Faith and Faithfulness, p. 158. 
" TST, p.479. 
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Asian of his Narnia. Caution must be exercised, however, as similar theories have been 
advanced (of influence in both directions) concerning Roger Lancelyn Green's Land of 
the Lord High Tiger, which Lewis himself dismissed."^ Another example is in Lewis' 
appreciation of Spenser's poetry - he uses Charies Williams' phrase - 'illustrious with 
being' - to articulate Spenser's neo-platonic approach and woridview."' Strongest of 
all, perhaps, are the concluding chapters of The Last Battle, which could be described 
as a hymn to neo-platonism. The character of Digory, for example, talks of the 'real' 
Namia opposed to the copy or shadow of it: 
"...of course it is different; as different as a real thing is from a shadow or waking life is from a 
dream." His voice stirred everyone like a trumpet as he spoke these words; but when he added 
under his breath "It's all in Plato, all in Plato: bless me, what do fliey teach them at these 
schools!" flie older ones laughed. 
One of Williams statements which obviously had great meaning for Lewis was made in He Came Down From Heaven, Williams writes that: "Usually the way 
must be made ready for heaven, and then it will come by some other; the sacrifice must 
be made ready, and the fire will strike on another altar."'' Lewis often paraphrased it 
as: " The ahar must often be buih in one place so that the fire may come down in 
another place"." In the context of Williams' work, it comes in a discussion concerning 
the technique of belief Lewis, however, invested it with a myriad of possible 
meanings. One of the great theological themes to which Lewis contributes is the 
elusiveness or unpredictability of God. The biblical expression of .this theme can be 
found in the Song of Songs, for example - many scholars argue that the inclusion of 
this piece of secular love poetry into the Hebrew canon is due precisely to that theme 
conveyed through the lover who cannot be found. In the New Testament Jesus speaks 
of the Spirit 'blowing where it will ' . Lewis used and interpreted this theme heavily in 
his work. 
For Williams, the statement represented an approach to 'the mystery of self-scepticism 
in the divine'. There are allusions in his work to the elusiveness of God - particularly to 
the story of Cain and Abel, and the unpredictability, and seeming arbitrariness of divine 
grace. The main point that Williams is trying to make, however, concerns the 
distinction between 'necessary belief and unnecessary credulity'. He suggests that this 
distinction is as important as belief itself, for without it belief cannot mature or be 
purified." Williams cites the Babel legend as the biblical example of a recurtent 
temptation - the imagination of the orthodox of any creed that all will be well when 
their creed is universal - the attempt at an objective approach to heaven. But, he 
F E , p. 116. 
SMRL,p.l62. 
-"^  L B , p. 161. 
" Williams, C ; He Came Down From Heaven, p.25: 
CRR, p.88. 
Something similar is hinted at in one of Lewis' poems: 
...Only that now you have taught me (but how late) my lack. 
I see the chasm. And everything you are was making 
My heart into a bridge by which I might get hack 
From exile, and grow man. And now the bridge is breaking. 
For this I bless you as the ruin falls. The pains 
You give me are more precious than all other gains. 
Lines from "As the Ruin Falls" in Lewis, C.S.; Poems by C.S. Lewis. 
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suggests, the recurrent opposite is no more true. Unless something is done, nothing 
happens, unless devotion is given to the thing which must prove false in the end, the 
thing that is true in the end cannot enter.''* 
In Lewis, this influence of this statement on his imagination was twofold - both in 
regard to his own peculiar interpretation of'Romanticism', and his own exploration of 
the elusiveness of God. 'He's not a tame Lion' is a common assertion concerning 
Asian, and throughout the Namian chronicles the unpredictability and elusiveness of 
God is hinted at again and again: 
"Then he isn't safe?" said Lucy. 
"Safe?" said Mr Beaver; "don't you hear what Mrs Beaver tells you? Who said anything about 
safe? 'Course he isn't safe. But he's good. He's the King, I tell you."^ ^ 
"Will you promise not to - do anything to me, if I do come?" said Jill. 
"I make no promise," said the Lion. 
Jill was so thirsty now that, without noticing it, she had come a step nearer. 
"Do you eat girls?" she said. 
"I have swallowed up girls and boys, women and men, kings and emperors, cities and realms," 
said the Lion. It didn't say this as if it were boasting, nor as if it were sorry, nor as if it were 
angry. It just said it.^ * 
"I asked, are you ready?" said the lion. 
"Yes" said Digory. He had had for a second some wild idea of saying "I'll try to help you if 
you'll promise to help about my mother", but he realised in time that the Lion was not at all 
the sort of person one could try to make bargains with. But when he had said "Yes", he thought 
of his Mother, and he though of the great hopes he had had, and how they were all dying away, 
and a lump came to his throat and tears in his eyes, and he blurted out: 
"But please, please - won't you - can't you give me something that will cure Mother?" Up till 
then he had been looking at the Lion's great front feet and the huge claws on them; now, in his 
despair, he looked up at its face. What he saw surprised him as much as anything in his whole 
life. For the tawny face was bent down near his own and (wonder of wonders) great shining 
tears stood in the Lion's eyes." 
Williams' statement ("the ahar must be built in one place...") is also used by Lewis to 
articulate what he calls a 'dialectic of desire'. This is concerned with the techniques of 
belief and the life of faith, but also, more importantly, with Lewis' whole 
preoccupation with 'Sweet Desire'. Other scholars have asserted that the particular 
expression of Romanticism which Lewis describes in his conversion process - the 
'Sehnsuchf or immortal longings - are fundamental in the experience of Western 
man.'* Carnell contends (and Lewis suggests), that Sehnsucht is a 'given' in the human 
experience, and Carnell also outlines the importance of the idea in Joy Davidman's 
thought and the influence of this on Lewis' own ideas. Charies WiUiams himself 
suggested that the closest we come to an understanding of the relationship between 
'heaven' and 'earth' is in the 'incredulous joy' of great romantic moments - in love, or 
in poetry, for example.'^ The new 'quality' in the love which Dante has for Beatrice is 
Williams, C ; He Came Down From Heaven, p.24. 
LWW. p.75. 
SC, p.26-27. 
" MN, p. 131. 
Camell, C. quoted in Clyde S. Kilby; The Christian World of C.S Lewis, p.200. 
'^ Williams, C ; He Came Down From Heaven, p.24. 
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an actual joy in which The Lord of Justice has made himself visible in some sense*" -
'this cannot possibly be, and it is'. The inevitable disappearance of this quality, and the 
often too-easy reconcihation to its loss, is the cause of 'age-old imbecilities' - 'young 
love'; 'it won't last'; 'you mustn't expect'; 'a quiet affection': 
What then? Nothing; a particular phenomenon has disappeared. It is for. us to decide whether 
its disappearance makes nonsense of its first appearance.*' 
Lewis' answer is to be found in his three responses: the way of the Foolish; the way of 
the 'Sensible' but disillusioned; and the Christian way - which entails the 'dialectic of 
Desire'. One of the fullest outlines of Lewis' ideas on the subject comes in his Preface 
to the Third Edition of The Pilgrims Regress. Sweet Desire is an experience of intense 
longing, which is distinguished from other longings by two things. The first is that 
although the sense of want is often acute or even painful, the mere wanting itself is 
curiously felt to be a joy in itself The second is the mystery concerning the Object of 
the desire. Every one of the supposed objects which evoke our longing are discovered 
to be inadequate - the object of the desire is like a rainbow's end, forever tantalisingly 
out of reach. Lewis suggests that the experience of sweet desire is a fundamental clue 
to the nature of our existence - resulting in a clear knowledge that the soul was made 
to enjoy some object that is never given or can even be imagined as given in our 
present mode of subjective and spatio-temporal experience." As Lewis puts it: 
The Dialectic of Desire, faithfully followed, would retrieve all mistakes, head you off all false 
paths, and force you not to propound, but to live through, a sort of ontological proof 
The fatal error, Lewis proposed, in his autobiography, was to make the experience of 
this Desire an object in itself By doing so religion would become a self-caressing 
luxury, and having made this mistake, the second would follow - the attempt to 
produce it.*'* The Desire itself is, suggested Lewis, a by-product. Its existence 
presupposes that what is desired is 'other' and 'outer'. It comes unexpectedly, 
unawares. To make the Desire itself an object would be to lose it altogether. The real 
business of Christian life was to steadfastly buckle down to the business of obedience 
to the Will of God - and the Desire would come when it will. The 'building of the altar 
in one place' represented the duty and business of the individual Christian and the 
corporate church. The 'fire falling upon another altar' represented the unpredictable, 
unfathomable, grace and being of God. 
A final observation on Charles Williams' influence on C.S. Lewis' thought concerns the doctrine of substitution, to which I eariier alluded. This doctrine of 
substitution, or 'co-inherence', articulates a vision of human beings as members of 
each other in a more literal way than is commonly believed. Williams uses the idea in 
his novel Descent into Hell, in which a woman takes upon herself the mental anguish 
*° Williams, C ; The Figure of Beatrice, p.34. 
Ibid., p.34. 
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of a distant ancestor, put to death for his religious beliefs, and allows him to die a 
death of great courage. The idea that another's spiritual and physical burdens could be 
taken upon oneself was accepted by Lewis, and characteristically developed to become 
a sort of 'law of creation' which he used to explain certain phenomena in his own 
spiritual experience. This is observed, for example, in one of his many letters to an 
American lady: 
I am V. glad that you have discovered Francois de Sales...how remarkable it is that such a 
man's mere statement that anxiety is a great evil at once helps you to escape from that evil. 
That indeed seems to be one of the magical laws of this very creation in which we live; that the 
thing we know already, the thing we have said to ourselves a hundred times, when said by 
someone else suddenly becomes operative. It is pert of C. Williams' doctrine, isn't it? - that no-
one can paddle his own canoe but everyone can paddle someone else's...*' 
This particular influence of Williams is at its most apparent in what Lewis regarded as 
his own finest piece of writing, Till We Have Faces. Chad Walsh observes how the 
character of Psyche is enabled to undertake her trials because her sister Orual helps to 
bear the burden and anguish of them, although unknowingly.** The character of the 
Fox explains to Orual how humans flow in and out of each other, and even merge with 
the gods - "We're all limbs and part of one Whole"." 
As I hope can be observed from this short study, there is considerable overiap in the theologies of Williams and Lewis concerning not only heaven. There is 
certainly the potential to explore the links further, perhaps with regard to a common 
Platonic source. The extent to which Williams influenced Lewis, or vice versa, will 
always be difficult to gauge accurately, but I believe there are direct connections with 
regard to the formation of Lewis' ideas concerning the heavenly community, and the 
role and meaning of Sehnsucht in his theology. 
..2 Edwyn Bevan 
A work which C.S. Lewis often cited in his writings, and which he recommended to those pursuing the Christian faith, was Edwyn Bevan's Symbolism and Belief. The influence of these Giffbrd lectures can be seen 
throughout Lewis' writings, primarily as a basis for his philosophy of God's existence. 
Bevan explores the uses of symbols employed in the expression of religious beliefs, and 
their value in extending and revealing human knowledge in terms of an understanding 
of a transcendent God. He cites the central question of the Lectures as the search for 
the Grounds of Belief** Essentially, it is a search for grounds for theistic, not 
necessarily specifically Christian belief -although Bevan alludes to Christian faith 
throughout the lectures. I will attempt to summarise Bevan's lectures, pointing out 
where they appear to represent a basis for Lewis' ideas of God; and where they shed 
light on Lewis' definition of human beings as: 
L, p.236. 
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...rational but also animate, amphibians who start from the world of sense and proceed through 
myth and metaphor to the world of spirit*^ 
BEVAN distinguishes as the outset between two different kinds of symbol. Those that stand for something of which we already have direct knowledge, but do not 
purport to give direct information about the things they symbolise include, for 
example, national flags, or the tolling of funeral bells. Those which Bevan concems 
himself with, and which are different in character, are those that are intending to 
convey knowledge of the nature of things which we do have direct knowledge, and this 
is the category into which religious symbols fall. It is with Plato, he contends, that 
there first cleariy appears the idea of a tmly real, non-material and eternal world, of 
which we can only speak of in language that is groping and inadequate.™ The history 
of thought alluded to in Chesterton and Lewis is outlined here as the congenial fiising 
of the Jewish and Platonic traditions - of a belief in the impossibility of 'seeing' God, 
and the impiety of attributing to him any material form in the one, and the essential 
incomprehensibility of God in human thought of the other. Bevan states: 
In Christian theology it becomes a fixed dogma that God is incomprehensible, that all human 
language applied to Him tries by figures and parables to state truth about a Reality which 
infinitely exceeds all man's powers of understanding or imagination...The classical expression 
of this conviction was given in the great phrase of St. Paul. "For now we see through a glass 
darkly," "through a mirror or in a riddle."" 
The extreme of this position is, of course, the via negativa - that God is reached by 
stripping off all the human qualities which have been attributed to Him. Bevan 
contends that this extreme position is, ultimately, indistinguishable fi'om agnosticism, 
and that the problem for any theistic belief (including Christianity) is to make sense of 
the simuhaneous claim or paradox that God is in some sense knowable. 
T^HE first religious symbol dealt with is that of 'Height'. The development in 
JL religious thought is traced of an anthropological to a more spiritual conception of 
God as existing enthroned in the sky; as in some sense 'above' the earth. Bevan also 
notes the breach in religious thought implied in the first verse of Genesis: 'In the 
beginning God created the heavens' - implying that God must have existed in 
omnipotence before the existence of any heaven at all.'^ This is curious in the light of 
the subsequent identification of the Divine with the word 'Heaven', which often 
becomes a verbal substitute for God. 
Ultimately, however, the cmde symbolism leads to a dividing in the ways of religious 
thought - between polytheism or monism (the identity of God and man), and the 
Hebraic conception of God as essentially other, as transcendent - the infinite difference 
of God as uhimate tmth. This is a cmcial point of departure one way or the other: 
The attempt to amalgamate Christianity with a Monist view - to suppose that one can hold a 
Christian view of the universe and go on talking about the human soul as a portion of God, a 
GID, p.32. 
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little pool in the one Divine ocean, and so on - surely shows an undiscriminating wooliness of 
thought which blurs the real alternatives in religion...The Christian doctrine of the Incarnation 
is not another way of saying what the Indian means when he asserts the essential identity of 
man and God. The doctrine of the Incarnation has its point solely in the Hebraic presupposition 
in the otherness, the transcendence of God. It is because God is infinitely above the world that 
His coming down into the world is wonderfiil.'^ 
Bevan notes the strong movement of Christian thinkers within his own time to 
repudiating a nineteenth century tendency towards the identification of man and God 
with a reassertion of transcendence. Lewis, in his characteristic way, continues this: 
...Pantheists usually believe that God, so to speak, animates the universe as you animate your 
body: that the universe almost is God, so that if it did not exist He would not exist either, and 
anything you find in the universe is a part of God. The Christian idea is quite different. They 
think God invented and made the universe - like a man making a picture or composing a time. 
A painter is not a picture, and he does not die if his picture is destroyed...Confronted with a 
cancer or a slum the Pantheist can say, 'if you could only see it from the divine point of view, 
you would realise that this also is God.' The Christian replies 'Don't talk danmed nonsense'. 
Bevan cites Barth as the religious thinker of his day in whom the transcendence of God 
is most strongly propounded. He also, however, identifies it in an earlier Protestant 
figure who opposes Barth on many points - Rudolf Otto. Otto's Das Heilige was a 
major influence on C.S. Lewis' thinking, which articulates the essential quality of 
religion as 'numinous' awe - the prostration of the soiil before a Being conceived of as 
being incomprehensibly great. We shall examine Otto in greater detail in the final 
section of the chapter. The existence of the Tao (the moral law), and the sense of the 
numinous, are the two planks upon which Lewis builds his conception of God. 
The character of 'transcendent' religion, then, is of worship, adoration, prostration, 
confession of unworthiness - things which are servile or ignoble if given to that which 
is unworthy, rather than 'the right recognition of consummate worth'. The primitive 
tendency to regard the sky as the domain of God is, then, an anticipation of the truth: 
...in die higher starry region primitive man saw the revelation of perfect order, unvarying law, 
and Christians today face the spiritual disorders of the worlds about tliem with the belief that 
there is a sphere of being in which there is no disharmony and no evil."' 
BEVAN'S next considerations are given to the symbols of time and eteriiity. He accedes to the general agreement that the application of temporal measures to 
God is no more appropriate than the attributing of spatial characteristics - that the 
divine mode of Being is Eternity - not time prolonged to infinity, but the eternal Now. 
This conception of the relationship of time and God, suggests Bevan, did not enter 
religious thought until the influence of Neo-Platonism. The biblical conception of 
eternity does not suggest anything other than a mere prolongation of time, rather than 
something of a different quality altogether. Questions of foreknowledge, and of free 
will and predestination are illumined by this approach, and it becomes possible to 
reconcile the ideas that future choices are not yet determined, with the idea that God 
nevertheless foreknows what those choices will be. Lewis certainly adhered to this 
conception of the Divine Now, and used the picture of time as a line drawn on a piece 
" Ibid., p.67. 
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of paper, with God being represented by the page itself - and thus watching events as 
they happen at all points along the line. 
More importantly, Bevan's reflections on time and eternity lead him into conflict with 
the philosophy of Bosanquet, that "to throw our ideals into the future is the death of all 
sane ideahsm". He counters with the sort of ontological argument of a future bliss 
which contains hints of Lewis' own approach: 
If ever the exigencies of the human spirit are to be satisfied, it cannot be in life under earthly 
conditions. If God does mean them to find fruition at all, it would obviously be absurd to say 
that they have already been satisfied at some past time: it would be equally absurd to say that 
they are being satisfied at the present moment; we know only too well they are not: their 
satisfaction then can only be, if at all, in the future.'' 
This leads Bevan to derive a fundamental principle for any spiritual theism that the 
potential being of man extends beyond the worid. 
'• I ''HE two main properties of light as a symbol are firstly that darkness is 
J - representative of concealment, and thus as a moral metaphor, represents deeds 
which we would not have known - 'Men preferred darkness to light'. The other 
property is that luminous bodies appear to send forth, without loss being suffered, 
emanations of substance, which remain one with the body, by a continuous mode of 
derivation. The religious idea associated with this symbol is that of the Logos. 
In speaking of the Wrath of God, Bevan suggest that it is felt that there are grades of 
reality in the metaphors which we use to speak of God - it is recognised that all modes 
of speaking about the divine which infer material or local attributes are merely poetical 
- yet characteristics attributed of the human mind or spirit are nevertheless much closer 
to the reality. Lewis himself was cautious in dealing with the inherited metaphors 
concerning God. In particular, he believed the biblical imagery to be inspired in some 
way, and thus was loath to discard with patriarchal notions of God or male-oriented 
perceptions of the Divine Nature. Thus in his response to the Bishop of Woolwich; 
"Must our Image of God go?": 
...If I were briefed to defend his position I should say 'The Image of the Earth-Mother gets in 
something which that of the Sky-Father leaves out. Religions of the Earth-Mother have 
hitherto been spiritually inferior to tliose of the Sky-Father, but, perhaps, it is now time to 
readmit some of their elements..' I shouldn't believe it very strongly, but some sort of case 
could be made out.'* 
And more clearly in "priestesses in the Church?": 
...Christians think that God Himself has taught us how to speak of Him. To say that it does not 
matter is to say that either all the masculine imagery is not inspired, is merely human in origin, 
or else that, though inspired, it is quite arbitrary and unessential. And tliis is surely 
intolerable...It is also surely based on a shallow view of imagery. Without drawing upon 
religion, we know from our poetical experience that image and apprehension cleave closer 
togetlier than common sense is here prepared to admit; that a child who had been taught to 
pray to a Mother in Heaven would have a religious life radically different from that of a 
Ibid., p. 105. 
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Christian child. And as image and apprehension are in organic unity, so, for a Christian, are 
human body and human soul.'' 
BEVAN discusses the nature of dogma in relation to the 'numinous'. By dogma he implies McTaggart's sense: "A proposition having metaphysical significance".^* 
Bevan contends that religion cannot be undogmatic if it combines any belief in the real 
existence of a Divine Being with the apprehension of that Being in the numinous 
experience. To have purely undogmatic religion the meaning which the numinous sense 
attaches to particular objects or experiences must be void of conceptual content. To 
rule out the belief that the Ground of the Universe is spiritual (that would be a dogma) 
is to rule out any meaning in, for example, the sense of the beautifijl, as anything but 
illusory. However, whilst a religion which consisted in merely attempting to grasp the 
enjoyment of numinous feelings without attempting to engage the Reality with 
intellectual conceptions may be erroneous; so to would be one which professed to have 
encompassed God within a set of dogmatic formulas. 
Thus dogma seems to be one of tliose things wliich exist in order to be transcended and 
negated, which yet must be there in order that the act of transcending and negating can take 
place." ("The altar must be built in one place, so tliat tlie fire may fall in another place"?) 
This position seems to accord well with Lewis, who defended the idea of unchanging, 
dogmas in the face of the progress of human knowledge in "Dogma and the Universe". 
Christian dogma, or the laws of Morality, he believed, were on a similar level to such 
things as the alphabet or the laws of mathematics - immutable (in our present state) 
building blocks of our knowledge of the universe; and yet: 
Morality is a mountain which we cannot climb by our own efforts; and if we could we should 
only perish in the ice and unbreathable air of the summit, lacking those wings with which the 
rest of the journey has to be accomplished. For it is from there that the real ascent begins. The 
ropes and axes are 'done away' and the rest is a matter of flying.^" 
BEVAN specifically discusses the nature of Truth in two of his lectures, as a more fundamental concern to the question of whether religious conceptions are true in 
any sense. He offers three different and conflicting theories of Truth to the discussion. 
The first of these is the Correspondence theory - i.e. truth equals the correspondence 
between a belief in someone's mind, and a objective fact or event independent of that 
mind. The theory opposing this view is the coherence theory - a belief is true "when it 
coheres logically with the whole system of experience which constitutes the 
universe".*' Another system of thought, suggests Bevan, is offered by the Pragmatist 
school. I f desirous results are achieved from acting on a particular belief, then that 
belief is true. 
Bevan contends that theories opposed to the correspondence theory may work well, 
for example, in the fields of mathematics or of science - in dealing with inanimate 
nature; but when applied to the worid of conscious Spirit they become absurd. The 
" Ibid., p.91. 
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desire to know tmth in the sense of its extemal fact is raised to its greatest intensity in 
love. Thus, for a religious person, it is not enough to act as if his beliefs were tme - as 
i f they were helpflil myths by which to live one's life, so to speak. Religion is not 
concerned with the conception of mind as an extension of material processes, but with 
Spirit, which is conceived of as : 
...extending beyond the worid we feel and see, extending, according to Christian theology, 
infinitely beyond it; it is concerned with the relation of my individual spirit to that all-
encompassing Spirit and to other human spirits included, with me, in His embrace.^ ^ 
The problem for specifically Christian theology is the reconciliation of the Neo-
Platonic doctrine of the supreme One, with Christian doctrine concerning God. The 
two opposite dangers are, according to Bevan, those of Agnosticism and 
Anthropomorphism. The one tendency emphasises the via negativa - that nothing 
positive can be known of God at all; the other falls into idolatry. Between these two 
errors the Church has traditionally followed the Scholastic doctrine of Analogy. In 
Aristotelian terms, one cannot attribute qualities to God either univoce or aequivoce -
the resemblance is one of "proportionality". 
Bevan goes on to suggest that there is a better way between the two pitfalls of 
anthropomorphism and agnosticism, articulated to a degree by the writings of Dean 
Mansel. Bevan describes his understanding of Mansel's philosophy as this: 
When we think of God as just or loving, we attribute to Him something which we know as the 
manifestation of the spirit of man. But whereas we have an imaginative realisation of what love 
means when we think of it in our human friend, we can have no such imaginative realisafion of 
what love is in the life of God. Yet we must believe that to think of God as loving is not only 
the best way of making our conduct and temper what they ought to be, but also the nearest 
approximation to the truth of which the human mind is capable, a much nearer approximation 
than to think of God, for instance, as the Infinite or the Absolute. If we could know the life of 
God we should see in it something which human love really resembled, so tliat to call it love 
would be tlie best way of saying what it is in human language. Thus conduct which flows from 
the belief that God is love is not only the best kind of conduct, judged by the scale of human 
etliical values, but is also the kind of conduct which corresponds best with Reality. If you are 
unable to imagine what the Reality is, you can know at any rate that it is of such a character 
that the right reaction to it in conduct and feeling is the reaction which follows upon your 
thinking of the Ground of the Universe as a loving God.^ ^ 
Bevan concluded that i f this was an accurate description of Mansel's fundamental 
position, then it was one which any philosophical Theism must closely resemble. 
' I ""HE final lecture of Bevan's series deals most directly with the question of why we 
J L should believe that 'all these various conceptions, adumbrating various kinds of 
perfection in a supreme degree, point to any real spiritual self-existent Being.' He deals 
with the suggestions of Freud and Feuerbach, that, for example, all such ideas are the 
projections of wish-fulfilment upon an empty universe. Fundamentally, Bevan appears 
to believe that the whole argument turns on the question of whether we believe in 
rationality at all - such a belief must be an act of faith, unprovable by any argument 
which is not circular. 
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1.3 Baron Friedrich von Hiigel 
IN the light of Lewis' Christian position, articulated throughout his work, the attraction of von Hiigel is obvious. Here was a theological thinker who had emerged from the Modernist controversy cleariy advocating the essential 
'otherness' and Transcendence of God; and who drew Lewisian distinctions between a 
'thorough-going supematuralism', and a liberalism which 'watered down' the essential 
Christian truths. Von Hugel himself wrote: 
The capital and decisive difference, therefore, now appears to be the difference between 
Religion conceived as a purely intra-human phenomenon; without evidence beyond the 
aspirations of the human race; and Religion conceived as essentially evidential, metaphysical, 
the effects in us of more than us - of more than any purely human facts and desires.*'' 
Heaney describes the Baron as being in search not of the God we would like to have, 
but of the God who loves us. He was a man who accused his fellows of 'trying to carry 
the good God in their pocket'*' 
Lewis' antipathy to 'modernism' and 'liberalism' runs throughout all his work. He 
castigated Loisy (along with others) for holding views not consonant with a 
Christianity worth the name. He cleariy saw himself as standing for a restatement of 
orthodox belief and practice against a tide of undermining influences. Chief of the these 
was the work of New Testament scholars, who Lewis saw as abandoning the great 
central beliefs (the 'mere' Christianity) shared by Christendom until the 19th century.*^ 
Indeed, it is fair comment to say that the entire thrust of his critical writings, in a 
negative sense, is towards the discrediting of sixteenth century Humanism and 
twentieth century Modernism. This is in spite of what Watson describes as Lewis' 
essential modernity. 
The liberal bishop in the Great Divorce is one example of Lewis conception of liberals 
as having committed 'sins of the intellect', rendering them incapable of seeing Reality 
as it actually is. Another (early) instance of his abhorrence of liberalism comes in a 
discussion of ecumenism: 
...it seems to me that the "extreme" elements in every Church are nearest one another, and the 
liberal and "broad-minded" people in each Body could never be united at all. The world of 
dogmatic Christianity is a place in which thousands of people of quite different types keep on 
saying the same thing, and the world of "broad-mindedness" and watered-down "religion" is a 
world where a small number of people (all of the same type) say totally different things and 
change tlieir minds every few minutes. We shall never get re-union from tlieni.'* 
V: ON Hugel in fact was much more sympathetic to Loisy than was Lewis. He worked to prevent the rejection of his friend by the papal authorities, believing 
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that intellectual horizons of the Church should be broader than those of scholasticism -
even i f he did not agree with Loisy's critical conclusions.*^ Lewis was much more 
scathing. Here, again, in a discussion of the potency of'myth': 
...the extreme modernist, infidel in all but name - need not be called a fool or hypocrite because 
he retains, even in the midst of his intellectual atheism, the language, rites, and story of the 
Christians. The poor man may be clinging (with a wisdom he himself by no means 
understands) to that which is his life. It would have been better that Loisy should have 
remained a Christian: it would not necessarily have been better that he purged his thought of 
vestigial Christianity.'*' 
There is certainly good evidence that Lewis' conception of heaven and hell owed much 
to von Hiigel. His discussion of hell, particularly, in the Problem of Pain, follows 
Essays and Addresses to a large degree.^ ' In the following, I shall draw some of the 
threads from von Hiigel's work which appear to have influenced Lewis. 
ONE such theme is Purgatory, which Lewis certainly believed in some sense, and which von Hiigel wrote was a 'sheer fact' for the soul in its relation to God in this 
life. Lewis never fully articulated his views concerning Purgatory, but his suggestions 
in The Great Divorce, and in his letters, are reminiscent of von Hiigel's views.The 
Baron suggested that a belief in Purgatory of some kind (and also of Limbo) is 
inescapable i f we hold a belief in Heaven and Hell.^^ The only evidence for the 
workings of divine grace that we have are the experiences we have in our temporal 
state, and we have no grounds for assuming a radical change at death. Even a deep and 
sincere repentance of sins in this life does not remove the inward effects - a repentance 
of gambUng does not remove the propensity to gamble, for instance. The gradual 
operation of divine grace and mercy in eradicating sinful tendencies in this life is one 
we must assume takes place in some respects after our death. ^ '' 
Von Hugel's interpretations of the gospel teachings on the reality and finality of 
heaven and hell certainly accord also with those of Lewis. He rejected the thesis that 
the Dominical utterances concerning hell are later interpolations or amplifications of 
his followers; or that they had no organic relation with Jesus' central message, and 
were merely an inevitable insertion stemming from his cultural background.^' For von 
Hugel, the inevitable conviction is that the spiritual life is: 
...a great all-important alternative and choice, a choice once and for all, with consequences 
final and immense.'* 
In The Problem of Pain, Lewis directs us to von Hugel's assertion that we must not 
confuse the doctrine of hell with the imagery with which it is presented to us. The 
essence of hell in the New Testament teachings is its unendingness - the nature of 
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which Lewis goes on to speculate." The emotional force of this conviction is evident 
in most, i f not all, of Lewis' writings: The Great Divorce, The Weight of Glory, and 
Till We Have Faces are obvious examples. 
OTHER themes which Lewis picks up in the Problem of Pain include the nature of lost souls - von Hugel describes the lost as stunted, self-occupied, jealously 
evading all realities which are not simply themselves. They are persistent in envious 
self-isolation, and suffer "niggardly pain" at the sight or thought of the unmatchable 
greatness or goodness of other souls.'* Compare this with the 'fountain' in The Great 
Divorce, which cures the 'inflammation' of self-regard and introspection: 
When you have drunk of it you forget forever all proprietorship in your own works. You enjoy 
them just as if they were someone else's: without pride and without modesty.'' 
The deepest sins, according to von Hugel, are the sins of thought, self idolisation and 
arrogant revolt against the truth as perceived by "the soul in its depths". Lewis himself 
drew a distinction between sins resulting from our animal nature (lust, greed, etc.) and 
the sins of pride, which were essentially diabolical, and came to us "directly from hell". 
Thus, according to von Hiigel: 
...it matters not so much what a man thinks he thinks, as what he thinks in actual reality. 
This emphasis on our capacity for self-deception is strikingly apparent in Till We Have 
Faces. Orual, the central character of the book, in making her accusations against the 
Gods, makes discoveries about herself 
The complaint was the answer. To have heard myself making it was to be answered. Lightly 
men talk of saying what they mean...Wlien tlie time comes to you at which you will be forced 
at last to utter the speech which has lain at the centre of your soul for years, which you have, 
all that time, idiot-like, been saying over and over, you'll not talk about tlie joy of words. I saw 
well why the gods do not speak to us openly, nor let us answer. Till that word can be dug out of 
us, why should they hear the babble that we tliink we mean? How can thev meet us face to face 
till we have faces?'"' 
1.4 G.K. Chesterton 
G .K. Chesterton belongs to a group of conscious influences on Lewis who pre-date his conversion to Christianity, and which included MacDonald, Spenser, Mihon, and Dr. Johnson. The significance of their Christian outlook did not, 
surprisingly, dawn on him until the beginning of his association with Neville Coghill. 
Along with the 'religious Pagans' (Plato, Aeschylus, and Virgil), they were 
characterised, for Lewis, by a "roughness and density of life".'"^ 
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No admirer of Lewis can fail, on reading Chesterton, to note the striking similarities of 
style and approach. The combative polemic, the good-humoured, but heavy sarcasm, 
the distaste for puritanism, the 'port-sipping, nut cracking bonhomie 'are evident in 
both. Chesterton, for example, said of Grant Allen, a contemporary who had written a 
book about the Evolution of the Idea of God: 
...it would be much more interesting if God wrote a book about the Evolution of the idea of 
Grant Allen. 
The same phraseology is employed by Lewis in an essay he wrote for Asking Them 
Questions: 
"What Are We To Make of Jesus Christ?" This is a question which has, in a sense, a 
frantically comic side. For the real question is not what we are to make of Christ, but what is 
Hetomakeofus?'^^ 
In addition to this, a great deal of the content of Chesterton's outlook also appears to 
have been taken up by C.S. Lewis. One of the more obvious examples of this is a 
shared, innate distrust of 'progress', and of the 'nanny-state'. For Lewis, the power 
over the modem imagination of the machine - the constant improving or replacing of 
new for old; had engendered the common perception that 'goodness = what comes 
next'.'*'^  Similarly, he was acutely aware of semantic changes - for instance 
'permanence' had come to be spoken of as 'stagnation'.'"^ 
Chesterton's writing is characterised by a nostalgia for a medieval 'Merrie England', 
and there are certainly traces of this in Lewis. J.A.W. Bennett wrote of him that: 
In our time it was Lewis who turned men's minds to the Middle Ages and so stimulated our 
mental thirst. Admittedly the influence of a remote don - especially of a don who in 
unpropitious times dared defend his Chesterton - cannot be compared with a great novelist's, 
even allowing for Lewis' unique blend of imaginative and expository gifts. Yet it may be fairly 
urged that for multitudes who find Scott unpalatable Lewis was the first to reveal the 
fascination of the Middle Ages and, what is much more, to reveal what Gustave Cohen has 
called \he.ir grand clarte}^^ 
J.R.R. Tolkien, in a letter to his son, once wrote: 'Lewis is as energetic and jolly as ever, but 
getting too much publicity for his or any of our tastes. "Peterborough" did him the doubtful honour of 
a peculiarly misrepresentative and asinine paragraph in the Daily Telegraph. It began "Ascetic Mr 
Lewis"...!!! I ask you! He put away three pints in a very short session we had this morning, and said 
he was "going short for Lent".' 
G.K. Chesterton; The Everlasting Man, p.24. 
GID, p.79. 
'°*P, p,55. 
'"^  In reply to an invitation to membership of the Society for the Prevention of Progress, of Walnut 
Creek, CA; Lewis wrote: "while feeling that I was born a member of your Society, I am nevertheless 
honoured to receive tlie outward seal of membership. I shall hope by continued orthodoxy and the 
uiu-emitting practice of Reaction, Obstruction, and Stagnation to give you no reason for repenting 
your favour. I humbly submit that in...The Abolition of Man you will find another work not all 
unworthy of consideration for admission to tlie canon." 
Watson, G. (ed.); Critical Thought Series I: C.S. Lewis, p.58. 
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Lewis appears to have taken much of Chesterton's ideas concerning economics and the 
social order to heart. Chesterton, like Lewis, was indebted to WiUiam Morris in this 
regard, and was a proponent of the Roman Catholic social philosophy known as 
'Distributism' - the redistribution of property without the normal kinds of state 
interference.'"^ Evidence of Lewis' adherence to these ideas (in some form) can be 
found, for example, in That Hideous Strength. The community of St. Aime's could be 
said to be a model of Distributism, and indeed, the slighting remark that Denniston (a 
member of the community) "has become a Distributivist""" seems reasonably 
conclusive. In Mere Christianity Lewis offers hints of what he thinks a Christian 
society would be hke. He suggests that its economic life would strike us as rather 
socialistic, but that its family life would appear quite old-fashioned. Meilander suggests 
that the combination of these two examples points not towards socialism in the 
conventional sense, but to the widest possible distribution of private property. Each 
person would own their own small plot, factory, farm or shop.'" Add to this Lewis' 
assertion of the New Testament's distaste for 'busybodies', and one can well 
understand the sources of his outraged remark that: 
...I read the other day that a man could not, without a government permit, chop down a tree in 
his own garden, with his own axe, and make it into planks to build his own shed. 
In addition to this, the basis for many of Lewis' literary ideas and imaginative themes 
can be found in Chesterton. The introduction to The Everlasting Man begins: 
There are two ways of getting home; and one of tliem is to stay there. Tlie other is to walk 
round the whole world till we come back to the same place."" 
A more succinct statement of the theme of Lewis' spiritual autobiography {The 
Pilgrim's Regress) would be difficult to find. Reilly remarks on Lewis' use of a 
Chestertonian device throughout his space trilogy - that of making something seem 
marvellous by describing it in terms that we would never use for it."^ Another example 
is Chesterton's remark that: 
One should never invoke the Gods unless vou really want them to appear; it annoys them very 
, 1 1 4 
much. 
This provides an instance of Lewis' habit of extracting a phrase from another author 
and investing it with an imaginative force of his own. The demonic character of Tash in 
the Chronicles immediately springs to mind, but Lewis also used the theme to describe 
God's dealings with us. 'Getting more than we bargained for' is a common theme of 
his writings on prayer and the spiritual life. We may go to God because of some 
specific request or failing, and find that once that is dealt with (if at all), we find that it 
is ourselves in entirety which God requires. Similarly, in his response to modem 
scepticism concerning the devil: 
'°' G.K. Chesterton; The Works of G.K. Chesterton, p.vi. 
"°THS,p . l9 . 
"' Meilander, G.; The Taste for the Other, p.41. 
G.K. Chesterton; The Everlasting Man, p.9. 
"^R.J . Reilly; Op. Cit , p.l34. 
Humphrey Carpenter; The Inklings, p. 135. 
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...I know someone will ask me, 'Do you really mean, at this time of day, to re-introduce our old 
friend the devil - hoofs and horns and all?' Well, what the time of day has to do with it, I do 
not know. And I am not particular about the hoofs and horns. But in all other respects my 
answer is 'Yes, I do.' I do not claim to know anything about his personal appearance. If 
anybody really wants to know him better I would say to that person, 'Don't worry. If you really 
want to, you will. Whether you'll like it when you do is another question.'"^ 
One purely literary example is the wild ride of Jadis in the Magician's Nephew, which 
seems clearly modelled on the similar scene in the Man Who Was Thursday. 
It was not only Lewis that Chesterton appears to have influenced. Tolkien seems to 
have made much of his interpretation of the Incarnation, as a divine irruption into an 
enemy stronghold: 
...It is not only that the very horse-hoofs of Herod might in that sense have passed like thunder 
over the sunken head of Christ. It is also that there is in that image a true idea of an outpost, of 
a piercing through the rock and an entrance into an enemy territory. There is in this buried 
divinity an idea of undermining the world; of shaking the towers and palaces from below; even 
as Herod the great king felt that earthquake under him and swayed with his swaying palace.'" 
Compare this with Tolkien's account of the undermining of Sauron's evil kingdom 
"from below", as it were, by the subterfuge of Providence: 
...far away, as Frodo put on the Ring,...in the very heart of his realm, the Power in Barad-dur 
was shaken, and the Tower trembled from its foundations to its proud and bitter crown. The 
Dark Lord was suddenly aware of him...he knew his deadly peril and the thread upon which 
his doom now hung...and llu-oughout his realm a tremor ran, liis slaves quailed, and his 
armies halted, and his captains suddenly steerless, bereft of will, wavered and despaired. For 
they were forgotten. 
...Towers fell and mountains slid; walls crumbled and melted, crashing down; vast spires of 
smoke and spouting steams went billowing up, until they toppled like an overwhelming wave, 
and its wild crest curied and came foaming down upon the land. 
...And as the Captains gazed south to the Land of Mordor, it seemed to them that, black 
against the pall of cloud, there rose a huge shape of shadow... and stretched out towards them a 
vast threatening hand, terrible but impotent: for even as it leaned over them, a great wind took 
it, and it was all blown away, and passed; and then a hush fell."^ 
Another example of Chesterton's influence is in apologetic approach. Lewis is 
renowned for his 'Mad, Bad, or God' treatment of the phenomenon of Jesus Christ 
and his teaching. Contrast this with Chesterton: 
No modem critic in his five wits thinks that the preacher of the Sermon on the Mount was a 
horrible half-witted imbecile that might be scrawling stars on the walls of a cell. No atheist or 
blasphemer believes that the author of the Parable of the Prodigal Son was a monster with one 
mad idea like cyclops with one eye. Upon any possible historical criticism he must be put 
higher in the scale of human beings than tliat. Yet by analogy we have really to put him there 
or else in the highest place of all.'" 
"^MC, p. 47. 
See Clyde S. Kilby; The Christian World of C.S Lewis, p.m. 
'" G.K. Chesterton; The Everlasting Man, pp.209-210. 
J.R.R. Tolkien; The Lord of the Rings, pp.98I-985. 
G.K. Chesterton, The Everlasting Man, p.236. 
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ALL of the above gives an insight into the extent to which Chesterton informed Lewis' literary and apologetic sympathies, but the single greatest influence on him 
of Chesterton's work was The Everlasting Man. Lewis first came upon this book 
before his re-conversion to Christianity, and later described how for the first time, the 
Christian interpretation of history began to be a credible alternative for him. From the 
outset, the book is shot through with scepticism of the sort of fashionable 'guesswork' 
about history which Lewis was later to pillory in The Pilgrim's Regress and Fern-seed 
andElephants.^^^ There, also, is Chesterton's assertion (found also in Orthodoxy) that 
what is striking about mankind and the rest of the animal kingdom is not their 
similarity, but essential diflference.We diflfer from the 'brutes' not only in degree but 
in kind - distinguished by, among other things, our capacities for art, morality, and the 
'beautiful madness of laughter'.'^^ Lewis reworked the theme into his imaginative 
works first as a distinction between the hnau and the ordinary animals of his planetary 
books; and later between the ordinary and talking beasts of Namia. 
Chesterton goes on to highlight what he sees as a fundamental human concern - that, 
bluntly, there is 'something the matter' with mankind.'^ The consciousness of the Fall, 
or the awareness of a universal moral law and our shortcomings before it, is the only 
basis from which Lewis believed one could sensibly begin to talk about anything (it 
forms the introduction to Mere Christianity). Also evident are Chesterton's deep 
sympathies with Pagan myths and culture - he talks of the 'Presence of the Absence' of 
God in the unfathomable sadness of Pagan poetry, and of 'fore-shadowings' of 
Christ.'^'* Lewis' central thesis concerning Christianity as a historical faith was that it 
was myth become fact, and the roots of this belief are found clearly in Chesterton's 
book. Mythology is not a religion, it is essentially a search - since the birth of Christ no 
mythologies have been written, for what was sought has been found. Mythology 
satisfied some of man's needs before the arrival of Christianity - primarily the intuitive 
and deep felt need for sacrifice; but until their meeting in the 'sea of Christendom', the 
rivers of mythology and philosophy run parallel. '^ ^ Lewis himself was later to write: 
We must not be nervous about 'parallels' and 'Pagan Cluists': tliey ought to be tliere- it would 
be a stumbling block if they weren't. We must not, in false spirimality, witliliold our 
imaginative welcome. If God chooses to be mythopoeic - and is not tlie sky itself a myth? -
shall we refuse to be mythopathic? 
This scepticism centres on the foundation of much of our knowledge on hypothesis - Chesterton 
remarked that the dogmatism of the Danvinians has been mucii too strong for tlie essential 
agnosticism of Danvin - echoes of Calvin & Calvinism and other such examples. G.K. Chesterton; 
The Everlasting Man, pp.45-51. See also The Pilgrim's Regress: 'Hypothesis, my dear young friend, 
establishes itself by a cumulative process. Or, to use popular language, if you make the same guess 
often enough it ceases to be a guess and becomes a Scientific Fact." 
'-' G.K. Chesterton; The Everlasting Man, p.36. 
'^ ^ Ibid., p.39. 
'-'Ibid.„p.60. 
'^''Ibid., pp. 105-107. 
'^' Ibid., p. 128. 
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1.5 Rudolf Otto 
ONE of the most important sources for C.S. Lewis' ideas was Rudolf Otto's Das Heilige. A central tenet of Lewis' orthodoxy is the assertion that the 'numinous' is a fundamental of human experience, and it is from Otto's work 
that Lewas draws much of his thought. Otto, for me encapsulates the whole temper of 
Lewis' miiid in his forward to the English translation of Das Heilige: 
In this book I have ventured to write of that which may be called 'non-rational' or 'supra-
rational' in the depths of the divine nature. I do not thereby want to promote in any way the 
tendency of our time towards an extravagant and fantastic 'irrationalism', but rather to join 
issue with it in its morbid form. The 'irrational' is today a favourite theme of all who are too 
lazy to think or too ready to evade the arduous duty of clarifying their ideas and grounding 
their convictions on a basis of coherent thought...! feel that no one should concern himself with 
the 'Niunen ineflfabile' who has not already devoted assiduous and serious study to the 'Ratio 
aetema'.'^^ 
Otto's thesis in Das Heilige is that the experience of the 'Holy' is the real innermost 
core of every religion. It contains an element or 'moment' which sets it apart from the 
Rational - it remains ineffable, beyond expression or apprehension in terms of 
concepts. In the understanding of his day, Otto argued that the word 'holy' had 
become imbued with the idea of moral goodness - a holy will was a perfectly moral 
will. This idea, he argued, we owed to the Judaic tradition. The ethical element, 
however, was neither original nor did it constitute the whole meaning of the word. 
OTTO cited Schleiermacher as a significant figure in the development of thought concerning religious feeling, in response to the rationalist emphasis of the 
Enlightenment. However, he identified what he saw as two fundamental errors in his 
approach which he sought to correct. The first of these was Schleiermacher's 
conception of the feeling of dependence in religious experience. According to Otto, it 
was an error to conceive of this by distinguishing merely between absolute and relative 
dependence. The idea of dependence could only be used as a close analogy - the 
difference was one of intrinsic quality and not only of degree. Otto preferred to 
recharacterise the feeling of dependence as 'creature-consciousness' - the abasement 
and overwhelming emotion of nothingness of a creature before that which is supreme 
above all creatures. 
Schleiermacher's second defect was in his formulation of the religious category itself -
which Otto saw as primarily a category of self-valuation, religious emotion being a sort 
of self-consciousness, concerning one's dependence. 
...Thus, according to Schleiermacher, I can only come upon the fact of God as the result of an 
inference, that is, by reasoning to a cause beyond myself to account for my 'feeling of 
dependence'. But this is entirely opposed to the psychological facts of the case. Rather, the 
'creature-feeling' is itself a first subjective concomitant and effect of another feeling-element, 
which casts it like a shadow, but which in itself indubitably has immediate and primary 
reference to an object outside the self'"' 
'^ ^ Rudolf Otto; The Idea of the Holy (Translated by John W. Harvev), p.vii. 
'^'Rudolf Otto; Op. Cit., p. 10. 
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The numinous, concludes Otto, is thus felt as objective and outside of the self He the 
turned to inquire into its nature and modes of manifestation. 
THE only appropriate expression, suggested Otto, for the deepest and most fimdamental element in all strong and sincerely felt emotion, was mysterium 
tremendum: 
The feeling of it may at times come sweeping like a gentle tide, pervading the mind with a 
tranquil mood of deepest worship. It may pass over into a more set and lasting attitude of the 
soul, continuing, as it were, thrillingly vibrant and resonant, until at last it dies away and the 
soul resumes its 'profane', non-religious mood of everyday experience. It may burst in sudden 
eruption up from the depths of the soul with spasms and convulsions, or lead to the strangest 
excitements, to intoxicated frenzy, to transport and to ecstasy. It has its wild demonic forms 
and can sink to an almost grisly horror and shuddering. It has its crude, barbaric antecedents 
and early manifestations, and again it may be developed into something beautiful and pure and 
glorious. It may become the hushed, trembling, and speechless humility of the creature in the 
presence of- whom or what? In the presence of that which is a Mystery inexpressible and above 
all creatures.'^* 
Otto identified three elements of the adjective 'tremendum'. The first of these was the 
sense of'awe-fiillness' or 'peculiar dread'. Again, this element of'fear' is distinct in 
character as well as degree from the ordinary sense of'afraid'. The antecedent stage of 
religious fear is seen in queer perversions of 'daemonic dread' - the fear of ghosts, or 
the 'horror of Pan'. The physical reaction to an apprehension of the numinous is the 
'shudder' or the creeping of the flesh. In its ennobled state, suggested Otto, this is 
transformed, in the adoration of God into the 'Holy, Holy, Holy' of worship - it has 
lost the crazy and bewildering note of the daemonic experience but not the ineffable 
'something'. In the same way. Otto approached the biblical concept of the Wrath of 
God by suggesting that the opyr| 9sou differed in quality as well as degree from 
ordinary analogies of the passions. What at first sight appeared to be an Old Testament 
vision of a capricious and wilful divine anger, with no concern for moral qualities, was 
suggested Otto, nothing other than an apprehension of the tremendum itself, expressed 
by the aid of a naive analogy. 
The second element, which as already been noted to a degree, concerned the 
'overpowering' or 'majesty' of the experience. 'Creature-consciousness' appears as a 
sort of shadow or pale, subjective, reflection of the overwhelming apprehension. 
Finally, Otto described the third element of the tremendum as being that of 'urgency' 
or 'energy', which clothed itself in symbolical expressions, such as vitality, passion, 
emotional temper, will, force, movement, excitement, activity, impetus. Otto argued 
that these features were typical of all levels of religious emotion - from the daemonic 
up to the idea of the 'living God': 
We have here the factor that has everywhere more than any other prompted the fiercest 
opposition to the 'philosophic God of mere rational speculation, who can be put into a 
definition. And for their part the philosophers have condemned these expressions of the 
energy of the numen, whenever they are brought on to the scene, as sheer anthropomorphism. 
In so far as their opponents have for the most part themselves failed to recognise that the terms 
they have borrowed from the sphere of human conative and affective life have merely value as 
'^ ^ Ibid., pp. 12-13. 
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analogies, the philosophers are right to condemn them. But they are wrong, in so far as, this 
error notwithstanding, these terms stood for a genuine aspect of the divine nature - its non-
rational aspect - a due consciousness of which served to protect religion itself fi-om being 
'rationalised' away.'^' 
Otto cited Luther's controversy with Erasmus as a prime example of this conflict in 
religious thought - of the conflict between those contending for a 'living God' and for 
voluntarism against rationalism and rationalists. 
C.S. Lewis' fictional treatment of this theme can be found in his retelling of the myth 
of Cupid and Psyche - Till We Have Faces (a novel which he regarded as his finest 
piece of work - despite a lukewarm critical reception). The principal theme of the 
book is concerned with the corruption of natural loves, left to themselves. Alongside 
this, however, there is a profound exploration of the differing approaches to reality 
offered by 'the Fox' (a personification of Greek philosophy) and the dark, bloody and 
superstitious religion of Ungit worship. Lewis gave a crude description of the division 
of rational and non-rational elements of the religious experience in an address 
originally published as Undeceptions: 
We may salva reverentia divide religions, as we do soups, into "thick" and "clear". By Thick I 
mean those which have orgies and ecstasies and mysteries and local attachments: Africa is fiill 
of Thick religions. By Clear I mean those which are philosophical, ethical and universalising: 
Stoicism, Buddhism and the Ethical Church are Clear religions. Now if there is a true religion 
it must be both Thick and Clear: for the true God must have made both the child and the man, 
both the savage and the citizen, both the head and the belly. And the only two religions that 
fiilfil this condition, are Hinduism and Christianity. But Hinduism fulfils it imperfectly. The 
Clear religion of the Brahmin hermit in the jungle and the Thick religion of the neighbouring 
temple go on side by side. The Brahmin hermit doesn't bother about the temple prostitution, 
nor the worshipper in the temple about the hermit's metaphysic. But Christianity really breaks 
down the middle wall of the partition. It takes a convert from central Africa and tells him to 
obey an enlightened universalist ethic: it takes a twentieth centtuy academic prig like me and 
tells me to go fasting to a Mystery, to drink the blood of the Lord. The savage convert has to be 
Clear: 1 have to be Thick. That is how one knows one has come to the real religion.'^" 
Having found the adjective 'tremendum' to be justified only by analogy, Otto then 
turns to the substantive idea 'mysterium'. He cites Augustine's Confessions as a 
striking example of the "stiffening, benumbing" character of the "wholly other", and its 
contrast to the rational element of the numen. He suggests that the mysterious is not 
simply that which is absolutely and invariably beyond our understanding, but that: 
The truly mysterious object is beyond our apprehension and comprehension, not only because 
our knowledge has certain irremovable limits, but because in it we come upon something 
inherently 'wholly other', whose kind and character are incommensurable to our own, and 
before which we therefore recoil in a wonder that strikes us chill and numb.''" 
The fear of ghosts is a caricature, or off-shoot of the daemonic experience itself, and 
Otto analyses this "positive feeling-content" of the religious experience to suggest that 
Ibid., pp.23-24. 
"° TAH, p.29. 
'^'Rudolf Otto; Op. Cit., p.28. 
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concepts of the 'transcendent' and 'supernatural' become designations for a unique 
character we can feel, without being able to give it conceptual expression. '^ ^ 
HAVING analysed the of 'dreadful' and 'awful' character of the numinous experience, Otto then turns to the element of fascination. The numinous 
consciousness, he suggests, has a dual character, to which the entire religious 
development of humanity bears witness. On the rational side of the non-rational 
fascination are the 'natural' elements of the psychical life - Love, Mercy, Pity, 
Comfort. On the non-rational side is the 'Dionysiac' element of the numen. Ultimately, 
suggests Otto, there is above and beyond our rational being the hidden and highest part 
of our nature, which can find no satisfaction in the mere allaying of the needs of our 
sensuous, physical or intellectual needs or cravings. This is the mystics 'ground of our 
being' which expresses itself in Augustine as that central part of us which "finds no rest 
until it rests in thee". 
Otto's interpretation of the religious history of humanity is one which accords with 
that of Lewis and Chesterton. The first stage, he conjectures, begins with one 'pole' of 
the numinous experience - the daunting aspect of daemonic dread. The practices of 
expiation or propitiation are attempts to appease the wrath of the numen. The 
phenomenon of shamanism is an attempt to appropriate the 'prodigious force' of the 
numen for the natural ends of humanity. 
One of the most surprising aspects of religious history is then this association of the 
numinous with moral goodness, and Otto argues that both are a priori human 'givens'. 
The argument of evolutionists that moral obligation evolves fi"om restraint by custom 
to the idea of a universal moral 'ought' is dismissed. Such a theory does not take into 
account the character of moral obligation, which is qualitatively different from such a 
restraint by custom. It is just the same, argues Otto, with the sense of the numinous - it 
is not to be derived from any other feeling; it is "unevolvable".'^ ^ The Holy is not 
simply awe, but a conscious recognition of value, precious beyond conceiving, which 
finds its expression biblically in such examples as Isaiah's vision of the heavenly throne 
("I am a man of unclean lips.." Is.6:l-9), or St. Peter's "Depart from me, for I am a 
sinful man, O Lord". In this context also, Otto observes that mere 'unlawfulness' only 
becomes impiety,' sin, or sacrilege when numinous unworthiness is translated to and 
centred in moral dehnquency. Thus the meaning of sin is not understood by natural or 
merely moral man. As Otto writes: 
The morally robust older Rationalism was lacking neither in a sincere and respectful 
recognition of the moral law nor in honest endeavour to conform to it...But no 'downfall' or 
'collapse' and no 'need of redemption' came within its scheme, because the objection brought 
against it by its opponents was in fact just; Rationalism lacked understanding of what sin is. 
Mere morality is not the soil from which grows either the need of 'redemption' and deliverance 
or the need for that other unique good which is likewise altogether and specifically numinous 
in character, 'covering', and 'atonement'.'^ '' 
'^' Ibid., p.30. 
'" Ibid., pp.44-45. 
'^ ^ Ibid., pp.55-56. 
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Lewis, as we shall see, respected the 'morally robust' older Rationalism, but he too 
believed that it was operating on an incomplete appreciation of human spiritual 
experience. 
Modem antipathy towards theologies of Atonement are due to a misunderstanding of 
the numinous character, suggests Otto. The picture of an angry deity demanding blood 
sacrifice for wrongs committed against him represents a parody of the truth, or at least 
a regression to a more primitive religious consciousness. Atonement has more to do 
with heightened sense of the numinous, in its dual character - both the unspeakable 
attraction of the Holy, and the desire to transcend a felt sundering unworthiness. Here 
Otto uses the 38th chapter of Job as the supreme biblical example of such a 
consciousness. Where Paul renounces theodicy (Rom. 9:20, for example). Job, rather, 
puts forward a theodicy of its own - the element of the mysterious is displayed in a rare 
purity and completeness. Job's repentance in dust and ashes does not represent an 
impotent collapse to superior strength, but an admission of inner convincement and 
conviction: 
This chapter...aims at putting forward a real theodicy of its own, and a better one than that of 
Job's friends; a tlieodicy able to convict even a Job, and not only to convict him, but utterly to 
still every inward doubt that assailed his soul. For latent in the weird experience that Job 
underwent in the revelation of Elohim is at once a relaxing of his soul's anguish and an 
appeasement, an appeasement which would alone and in itself perfectly suffice as the solution 
of the problem of the Book of Job, even without Job's rehabilitation in chapter 42.'^ ^ 
The case is then made for the superiority of the Christian religion, (in the orthodox 
sense as Lewis would have seen it), as the culmination of a process in which the 
'numinous' is rationalised and moralised until it becomes 'the holy' in the fullest sense 
of the word. In the Islamic experience, for example. Otto suggests that Allah 
represents mere Numen - Yahweh in pre-Mosaic form on a larger scale. Christianity, 
by contrast, requires of us both to escape our mental atmosphere - to recapture the 
awe of the Jew towards Yahweh, the hellenistic Greek towards Destiny, or of primitive 
man towards the anger of the gods, and to embrace the prodigious paradox of the 
same God admitting access to himself - not a mere matter of course, but a grace 
beyond our power to comprehend. 
C .S. LEWIS explicitly deals with the numinous most fully in the introductory to TTie Problem of Pain. In all developed religion, he argues, we find three strands or 
elements, and in Christianity one more. The first of these is the Numinous. Lewis in his 
"genial homeliness" uses an example from The Wind in the Willows ("if we are not too 
proud to seek it there") to illustrate the numinous experience, when Rat and Mole 
approach Pan on the island: 
"'Rat,' he found breath to whisper, shaking, 'Are you afraid?' 'Afraid?' murmured the Rat, his 
eyes shining with unutterable love. 'Afraid? Of Him? 0, never, never. And yet - and yet - O, 
Mole, I am afraid.'"''" 
' " Rudolf Otto; Op. Cit., pp. 80-81 
"*PP,pp.I l -I5. 
" 'PP, p. 15. 
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There are, argues Lewis, only two views that we can hold about numinous awe. The 
first is that it is a mere twist in the human mind, corresponding to nothing objective 
and serving no biological function, but with no tendency to disappear at the point of 
highest spiritual development from poet, philosopher or saint. The second is that it is a 
direct experience of the supernatural, to which the name Revelation might be given. 
The second strand is the sense of the Moral Law. Echoing Otto, Lewis suggests that " I 
want", " I am forced", or " I should be well advised" bear no resemblance to "ought" or 
"ought not". The Moral Law, like the sense of the Numinous, is either inexplicable 
illusion or revelation. 
The third element is the identification of the numinous with the moral. Only those who 
take it are safe fi"om the obscenities and barbarities of unmoralised worship or the cold 
sad self-righteousness of sheer moralism. It was the Jews who fully and unambiguously 
identified the awful Presence haunting black mountain tops and thunderclouds with 
"the righteous Lord" who "loveth righteousness" (Ps. 11:8) 
Lewis concludes his interpretation of Otto with the assertion of the fourth strand which 
defines Christianity as unique - the historical event of Jesus Christ. The distinctive 
Christian claim is that of the paradox of a Man who claimed to be Son of, or one with 
the "awful haunter of nature and the giver of the moral law", and that the death and 
new life of this man effected a real change in our relations with the "awful" and 
"righteous" Lord. 
As has been noted, these themes are developed imaginatively in Lewis' novel Till We 
Have Faces. The story is seen through the eyes of Orual, the ugly sister of Psyche, and 
is set in an ambiguous, feudal period of Mediterranean history. The conflict between 
"thick" and "clear" religion is personified in the antagonism of the Fox, a Greek 
rationalist who serves the King - the father of Psyche and her sisters, and the Priest -
the high cleric of the superstitious and bloody "Ungit - worship" of the nation. The 
land is beset by famine, pestilence, drought, and the barrenness of sons of the King. 
The Priest decrees that 'The Accursed' must be found, and must be offered up by 
death as 'The Great Offering' to the anger of Ungit - to the Brute which is her son: 
"The victim must be given to the Brute. For the Brute is, in a mystery, Ungit herself or Ungit's 
son, the god of the Mountain; or both. The victim is led up the mountain to the Holy Tree, and 
bound to the Tree and left. Then the Brute comes. That is why you angered Ungit just now. 
King, when you spoke of offering a tliief In the Great Offering the victim must be perfect. For 
in holy language a man so offered is said to be Ungit's husband, and a woman is said to be the 
bride of Ungit's son. And both are called the Brute's supper."'^ ^ 
The Fox has no patience with what he sees as the nonsense and the superstitions of the 
Priest's religion: 
"Do you not see, Master," said the Fox, "tliat the Priest is talking nonsense? A shadow is to be 
an animal which is also a goddess which is also a god, and loving is to be eating - a child of six 
would talk more sense. And a moment ago the victim of this abominable sacrifice was to be the 
Accursed, the wickedest person in the whole land, offered as a punishment. And now it is to be 
138 TWHF, pp.56-57. 
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the best person in the whole land - the perfect victim - married to the god as a reward. Ask him 
which it means. It can't be both."'^ ' 
To which the Priest gives his contemptuous view of'Greek wisdom' - of the rationalist 
view of the world: 
"...Much less does it give them understanding of holy things. They demand to see such things 
clearly, as if the gods were no more than letters written in a book. I, King, have dealt with the 
gods for three generations of men, and I know that they dazzle our eyes and flow in and out of 
one another like eddies on a river, and nothing that is said clearly can be said truly about them. 
Holy places are dark places. It is life and strength, not knowledge and words, that we get in 
them. Holy wisdom is not clear and thin like water, but thick and dark like blood. Why should 
not the Accursed not be both the best and the worst?"""' 
In the denouement, the divine character is brought into focus. The Fox, seeing how his 
one-sided perception of Reality has affected Orual, abases himself before the heavenly 
court: 
"The priest knew at least that there must be sacrifices. They will have sacrifices; will have 
man. Yes, and the very heart, centre, ground, roots of a man; dark and sU-ong and costly as 
blood. Send me away, Minos, even to Tartarus, if Tartarus can cure glibness. I made her think 
that a prattle of maxims would do, all thin and clear as water. For of course water's good; and 
it didn't cost much, not where I grew up. So I fed her on words.""'" 
Finally the god himself comes, and Lewis attempts his own portrayal of the approach 
of'the holy' in Omal's response: 
The earth and stars and sun, all that was or will be, existed for his sake. And he was coming. 
The most dreadful, the most beautifiil, the only dread and beauty there is, was coming. The 
pillars on the far side of the pool flushed with his approach. I cast down my eyes. 
There are echoes of Otto's 'theodicy of Job' in Orual's dawning self-knowledge in the 
presence of holiness: 
I know now. Lord, why you utter no answer. You are yourself the answer. Before your face 
questions die away. What other answer would suffice?'''^  
TWHF, p.57. 
"° TWHF, p.58. 
'" TWHF, p.306. 
" ' T W H F , pp.318-319. 
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Chapter 2 
Romantic Theology 
WHAT was distinctive about the way in which C.S. Lewis defended Christian orthodoxy? His clarity of thought, savage (and sometimes unkind) vAt, and lucidity of expression are all reasons for his enduring popular appeal. These, 
however, are not attributes which he could claim as exclusively his own. A clue to the 
characteristic contribution of Lewis and his fellows to the defence of Christian belief 
can be elicited fi-om a letter he wrote to the Milton Society of America in 1955. Lewis 
was concerned to explain the connection between the diverse forms of literature which 
he had published: 
The list of books which I send...will 1 fear strike you as a very mixed bag...(but) there is a 
guiding thread. The imaginative man in me is much older, more continuously operative, and in 
that sense more basic then either the religious writer or the critic. It was he who made me first 
attempt (with little success) to be a poet. It was he who, in response to the poetry of others, 
made me a critic, and, in defence of that response, sometimes a critic controversialist. It was he 
who after my conversion led me to embody my religious belief in symbolical or mythopoeic 
forms, ranging from Screwtape to a kind of theologised science-fiction. And it was of course he 
who has brought me, in the last few years, to write the series of Namian stories for children; 
not asking what children want and then endeavouring to adapt myself (this was not needed) 
but because the fairy tale was the genre best fitted for what I wanted to say..,'"*^  
In the twentieth century, the defence of orthodox belief in Protestant contexts has been 
greatly influenced by Karl Barth, centred on a return to Reformation principles, and a 
rejection of modem philosophy, including the entire Romantic enterprise. In radical 
contrast, Lewis believed Romanticism not to be part of the problem (for modem 
orthodox Christianity), but part of the answer. Louth has characterised the Romantic 
movement as acutely conscious of what T.S. Eliot called the 'dissociation of 
sensibility' of modernity, and with the purpose of groping after a lost unity of mind and 
heart.''*" He contends, however, that Romanticism is merely another example of that 
dissociation of sensibility, rather than the beginnings of a cure. I will here briefly 
outline the currents of thought which have shaped modem theology, and attempt to 
place Lewis and his group within them. My aim is to show that Lewis stood 
passionately against what he described as the 'pathological anti-romanticism''''^ of his 
age, in defence of a view of epistemology which encompassed both the rational and the 
imaginative. Ultimately I will argue that Lewis was endeavouring to address the 
division between theology and spirituality (between thought about God and the 
movement of the heart towards God) by reviving certain aspects of Romanticism and 
attempting to integrate them into a coherent theological construct. 
C 13 O M A N T I C I S M ' is a notoriously difficult term to define, but broadly speaking, it 
X\.can be seen as an intellectual and artistic reaction to the Enlightenment 
inheritance. In theology; for example, Schleiermacher's legacy can certainly be viewed 
L , p.260. 
'•^ ^ Andrew Louth; Discerning the Mystery, p. 1: 
'"^  TAH,p . l l 2 . 
45 
as an attempt to rescue religion fi-om intellectual discredit. The Enlightenment, 
developing Reformation and Renaissance emphases, ushered in an 'Age of Reason', in 
which the 'Academy' (as opposed to the Church) was the prime arbiter of truth. All 
human traditions and beliefs were to submit to the universal light of Reason - true 
religion must be clearly true to all, and not dependent on doctrines inaccessible to 
rational inquiry. The result in terms of spiritual belief was a simple, ideal abstract -
'Natural Religion', of which Voltaire's 'true' religion of Christ is an example. 
Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason questioned the very possibility of rational 
metaphysics, by asserting that human knowledge is the knowledge of phenomena and 
appearances, rather than noumena or 'things-in-themselves'. Kant vindicated religious 
belief by analysing the moral consciousness - to assume morality or to behave in a 
moral way we must postulate three things - God, fi-ee will, and immortality 
(interestingly this argument develops along roughly similar lines as the foundation of 
Lewis' Mere Christianity. 
The central thesis of the Romantic Movement was roughly the assertion that human 
beings are creatures of emotion and feeling, as well as thought and will. The irrational 
way of apprehending reality, which was taken to be the mode of understanding of 
children, savages, and peasants, was reassessed as valid - feeling was a way of 
knowing. Intellectuals, dissatisfied by a culture which appeared to be losing its faith, 
embraced these ideas in various ways. Some, as Halsted puts it: 
...envied and aped children, primitives (and) those supposedly happy irrational 
peasants...Others, such as Schleiermacher, sought to express the important truths implicit in 
these views.'"* , 
Schleiermacher's Speeches on Religion to its Cultured Despisers addressed an 
imaginary audience of Enlightenment proponents of Natural Religion, rejecting the 
importance of dogma, and advocating a relativist approach that advocated religion as a 
form of private, individual feeling as opposed to discursive knowledge. At the same 
time, a revival in liturgy was taking place, in reaction to the sterile rationalism of 
worship in the aftermath of the Aufklarung.^'^^ The Romantic emphases can be 
characterised as elevating the content above the form, the concrete over the abstract, 
and the aesthetic before the moral. 
T^HE most important artistic factor of the movement was surely the new conception 
JL of the imagination - as a creative, transforming force.'""^ It was Coleridge's 
assertion that the creative imagination was superior to reason in apprehending reality, 
and could create art in accord with that reality.'^" The objective of Romantic art was to 
express the Ideal in the Real - to make the transcendent apparent. As Schlegel 
contended, this was only possible through symbol - through images and signs. Note, 
for example, Coleridge's defence of symbol as opposed to allegory as a means of 
expressing tmth: 
John B. Halsted (ed.); Romanticism, p.21 
Ibid., p.139. 
'"^  K.S. Latourette; Christianity in a Revolutionary Age II, p.77. 
Furst, Lflian R ; ;?oma«//mm, p.53. 
150 Jolm B. Halsted; Op. Cit., p. 13. 
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Allegory is but a translation of absfract notions into a picture-language which is itself nothing 
but an abstraction of objects of the senses; the principle being more worthless even than its 
phantom proxy, both alike insubstantial, and the former shapeless to boot. On the other hand a 
Symbol (o eoxiv oei raux-nyopiKov) is characterised by a translucence of the Special in the 
Individual or of the Universal in the General. Above all by the translucence of the Eternal 
through and in the Temporal. It always partakes of the Reality which it renders intelligible; 
and while it enunciates the whole, abides itself as a living part in that Unity, of which it is the 
representative.'^' 
In passing, it is worth remarking that a more concise summary of Lewis' doctrine of 
transposition would be hard to find! (Or indeed a more compelling clue as to the 
vigour with which both Lewis and especially Tolkien distinguished between allegory 
and other forms in their work). With regard to the Romantic Movement, the function 
of the Image in poetry thus changes radically firom one of peripheral and decorative 
adornment (its 18th century role) to the status of the operative carrier of meaning.'" 
IN theology, one of the most significant developments of the Romantic movement was the notion of Historicism, or Historical Consciousness, as a way of 
understanding the past and interpreting the biblical texts. This hermeneutical approach 
also had its roots in the Enlightenment, and is a clear example of the failure of 
Romanticism to achieve its goals. As Louth has noted, it was writers such as Descartes 
and Locke who influenced the modem idea that there is a method by which we may 
attain knowledge or truth. According to Descartes there are no such things as 'innate 
understandings'. These must be seen as prejudices, in the pejorative sense of the word 
- unfounded judgements to be discarded. Humanity begins in ignorance and confusion, 
yet with the appHcation of the correct method, may discover knowledge.'" Thus the 
notion of tradition is destroyed altogether. 
Historical criticism, as a discipline, tended to be sceptical about the transcendent,"'* 
and was used to explain away that which is not encompassed within its own particular, 
rationalistic basis. The process was initially used as a method to rationalise the 
miraculous elements of the religious tradition, which otherwise violated premises 
concerning the laws of nature. Voltaire advocated the criterion of experience, in terms 
of modem understanding, to determine what was to be rejected or accepted of the 
tradition. That which was incongruent with contemporary perceptions was simply 
discarded as false. '^ ^ Spinoza, instead of rejecting the miraculous as plainly incredible, 
suggested that imaginative conjecture was required to view the world through the eyes 
of the ancients, and thus explain away the stories by 'natural causes'. The position of 
the Romantics, who inherited the Enlightenment legacy, was to generalise this 
principle. Instead of restricting this method of understanding to incongruous texts, the 
notion of 'historical consciousness' was developed as a way of explaining away the 
.past altogether."* 
'^ ' John Spencer Hill; The Romantic Imagination, p,42. 
'^ ^ Furst, Lilian R.; Op. Cit., p.56. 
' " Andrew Louth; Op. Cit., p.7. 
Brown, Raymond E . ; The Critical Meaning of the Bible, p.25, 
'" Andrew Louth; Op. Cit., p. 12. 
Ibid., p. 13. 
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THE curious distinctiveness of Lewis, Tolkien, Williams, and before them Chesterton, lies in the double-edged nature of their philosophy, and the way in 
which they communicated Christianity. On the one hand they were vehemently 
opposed to the Romantic legacy in theology - to all forms of historicism, modernism 
and liberalism, to the divinising of the human and the humanising of the divine, and to 
the emphasis on an immanent faith in accord with the Spirit of the Age. In that sense 
they stood with Barth and the orthodox reaction in condemning the inadequacy, 
sentimentality, and intellectual bankruptcy of the liberal inheritance of the nineteenth 
century. In stark contrast, however, to Earth's attempt to lead theology away from 
erroneous modem philosophy and return it to Reformation principles, Lewis and his 
group were attempting to correct, and not reject the errors of their predecessors. 
Emil Brunner, in his response to Barth's criticisms of him (in Nature and Grace)., 
suggested that the search for a true theologia naturalis should be the task of twentieth 
century theology. Without denying the damage of false natural theologies both to 19th 
and 20th century Protestantism, he contended that the Church could bear the rejection 
of theologia naturalis as little as its misuse.'" Evangelical Theology, and Barth in 
particular had, concluded Brunner, missed a vital opportunity in rejecting theologia 
naturalis entirely, in favour of a theology solely of Revelation.'^* 
It was in addressing this very 'missed opportunity', perhaps, in which we can place 
C.S. Le'wis and his school, and evaluate their contribution. Fascinating in particular is 
the contribution of Lewis, the Ulster Protestant, to an orthodoxy which embraced 
natural theology, and even (after Schleiermacher and Hegel) a religion grounded in 
experience. For Lewis, the yearnings of the Romantics after lost unity, expressed in 
Romantic Love, Longing, Inwardness, Music and Poetry, were religious experiences -
no less vaHd for being misinterpreted or misdirected. 
I E WIS described the experience of reading George MacDonald's Phantasies as the -/'baptism' of his imagination, which had earlier been shaped by the music of 
Wagner, and by Norse and Teutonic mythology. Reilly has indicated nineteenth 
century romanticism as the 'ultimate source' of the Inklings' ideas,and with Lewis 
one could certainly trace a line of inheritance from Spenser through to his immediate 
predecessor, G.K. Chesterton. Reilly goes on to characterise the romantic identity as 
seeking inward in the conscious or subconscious mind for the meaning of the worid 
outside it. Coleridge, for example, suggests: 
In looking at objects of nature, I seem rather to be seeking, as it were asking for, a symbolical 
language for something within me that, already and forever exists, than observing anything 
new.'*° 
Compare this with Lewis in his famous sermon. The Weight of Glory (in which he 
describes Wordsworth's interpretation of romantic experience as a 'cheat'): 
157 
158 
E . Brunner; Natural Theology, p.59. 
Ibid., p,60. 
'^' R J . Reilly; Op. Cit., p,9. 
"°Ibid.,p.7.' 
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We want something else which can hardly be put into words - to be united with the beauty we 
see, to pass into it, to receive it into ourselves, to bathe in it, to become part of it. That is why 
we have peopled air and earth and water with gods and goddesses and nymphs and elves - that, 
though we caimot, yet these projections can, enjoy in themselves that beauty, grace, and power 
of which Nature is the image. 
As Thorlby asserts, the essential weakness of the Romantic movement lay in this very 
inwardness - in the instability and insubstantiality of the subjective realm it attempted 
to make its own. Lewis' grappling with this essential problem, and with the attempt to 
reconcile the rational and irrational sides of human nature, are evident in his poem 
Reason: 
Oh who will reconcile in me both maid and mother, 
Who make in me a concord of depth and height? 
Who make imagination's dim exploring touch 
Ever report the same as intellectual sight? 
Then could I truly say, and not deceive. 
Then wholly say, that I BELIEVE.'*^ 
It was T.E. Hulme who defined Romanticism as 'spilt religion'.'*^ Lewis' response 
appears in the Preface to the Third Edition of The Pilgrim's Regress: 
I accept the description. And I agree that he who has religion ought not to spill it. But does it 
follow that he who finds it spilled should avert his eyes? How if there is a man to whom those 
bright drops on the floor are the beginning of a trail which duly followed, will lead him in the 
end to taste the cup itself? How if no otlier trail, humanly speaking, were possible? Seen in this 
light my ten years' old quarrel both with the coimter-Romantics on the one hand and with the 
sub-Romantics on tlie other (the apostles of instinct and even of gibberish) assumes, I trust, a 
certain permanent interest. Out of this double quarrel came the dominant image of my allegory 
- the barren, aching rocks of its 'North', the foetid swamps of its 'South', and between them 
the Road on which alone mankind can safely walk.'^ 
For Lewis, WiHiams, and Tolkien, those 'bright drops on the floor' were romantic 
experiences of different forms. Charles Williams' preoccupation, as we have seen, was 
with romantic love. For Tolkien it was to be found in Faerie and myth, and for Lewis it 
was evoked by Sehnsucht, or the eternal longings. 
The sort of 'Argument from Desire', which Lewis used as a kind of ontological proof 
of God's existence, was certainly not an innovation. It finds its expression first in 
Plato, who argued that our earthly attachments provide 'inklings' of an uhimate good 
which we really desire. St Augustine later gave it Christian validity - "Thou hast 
created us for Thyself, and our hearts are restless until they find their rest in Thee". 
Like the writer to the Hebrews, Augustine identifies a sense of exile and longing in the 
human heart which cannot find satisfaction in things temporal. In the Romantic period, 
the idea of Joy which Lewis sought to express appears in Schlegel: 
''^SPT, p. 107, 
"Reason" inP, p.81. 
'^ ^ M.H. Abrams; Natural Supernaturalism, p.68. 
PR, p. 16. Interestingly Lewis places Barth among his 'Pale Men' of the North - as a species of 
Negativist. 
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Only in longing do we find our rest. Indeed, such spirimal calm comes only when our mind is 
free to indulge its longing undisturbed, and to seek, where no higher goal may be attained than 
longing itself.'*^ 
Another good example is this poem of Lermontov: 
In the arms of an angel a young soul was bom 
To this world of sorrow and tears, 
And the soul kept the sound of that angel's song 
Deep within, without words, but alive. 
How weary the time that the soul spent on earth, 
By a wondrous longing consumed; 
But the heavenly echoes could not be replaced 
By the tedious times of the world.'** 
The embodiment of religious truth in works of imaginative fantasy can thus be seen as 
a very deliberate strategy by the 'Oxford Romantics'. Behind Screwtape, Namia, or 
Middle-Earth in the case of Tolkien, there is a definite and highly developed 
philosophy of meaning, imagination, and communication. In eulogising his fiiend 
Charles Williams, Lewis here outlines a perspective which applied equally to himself 
and Tolkien: 
A romantic theologian does not mean one who is romantic about theology but one who is 
theological about romance, one who considers the theological implications of those experiences 
which are called romantic. The belief that the most serious and ecstatic e.xperiences either of 
human love or of imaginative literature have such theological implications and that they can be 
healthy and fruitful only if the implications are diligently thought out and severely lived, is the 
root principle of all his (Williams') work.'*' 
LEWIS drew a sharp distinction between Reason, as the organ of truth, and Imagination, as the organ of meaning - meaning which "is the antecedent condition 
of both truth and falsehood, whose antithesis is not error but nonsense". He set out his 
key ideas concerning the imagination in an essay entitled "Bluspels and Flanasferes", 
which were later refined in An Experiment in Criticism. Colin Duriez attempts a 
1 
summary as follows 
1. ) There is a distinction between reason and imagination as regards roles - reason has 
to do with theoretical or conceptual truths, imagination has to do with the very 
conditions of truth. 
2. ) There are standards of correctness, or norms, for the imagination, held tacitly and 
universally by human beings, just as there are for the mind. 
3. ) There was originally a unity between image and reality which reflects an objective 
state of affairs. The idea of an ancient unity of consciousness is relevant here - what 
Barfield called 'original participation'. 
4. ) The framing of truths in propositions necessitates the employment of metaphors 
supplied by the imagination. Language and thought necessarily rely upon metaphor. 
165 F.F. Schlegel, Lucinde (1799) in Thorlby, A.K.; The Romantic Movement, p. 149. 
'** M. Lermontov, The Angel (1931) in Thorlby, A.K.; Op. Cit., p. 150. 
'*' Colin Duriez; "The Theology of Fantasy in Lewis and Tolkien" in Themelios vol. 23 no. 2, p.40. 
'*' Ibid., p.50. 
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This is true in scientific as in religious or in ordinary discourse. Imagination is a maker 
of meaning, a definer of terms in a proposition, and as such is a condition of truth. 
It is in the relationship between the conceptual and the imaginative that Lewis makes 
his distinctive contribution, suggests Duriez. I f we 'win' truth by employing metaphors 
or models, then good imagining is as vital as good thinking (if not more so), and each 
is impoverished without the other. '^ ^ Thus imaginative fiction for Lewis is concerned 
with the making of meaning rather than the literal restating of truths - with going 
'further up and further in'. 
H P H E relationship between the concrete and the abstract is explored by Lewis in his 
J L essay Myth became Fact. The human intellect, he contends, is incurably abstract -
yet the only realities we experience are concrete. Our dilemma is that as thinkers we 
are cut off from that which we think about, and conversely, the more deeply we enter 
into reality, the less we can think. We cannot study Pleasure, for instance, in the 
moment of nuptial embrace, or analyse the nature of humour whilst laughing. Lewis 
contends that to this problem Myth is the partial solution - only in the enjoyment of a 
great myth do we come nearest to "experiencing as a concrete what can otherwise be 
understood only as an abstraction".'™ 
Lewis defines myth (in his sense) as having an 'extra-literary' quality to it - of being 
the kind of story which has a value in itself, independent of its embodiment in a 
particular literary form, or by the employment of literary devices. Lewis illustrates this 
by comparing bare synopses of the story of Orpheus, and the epic of the Odyssey- the 
first affects us in its own right, the second requires the narrative genius of Homer to be 
compelhng.'^' Other characteristics include gravity (there is no such thing as 'Comic 
myth'), the 'fantastic', and the awe-inspiring. As Lewis puts it: 
We feel it to be numinous. It is as if something of great moment had been communicated to us. 
The recurrent efforts of Uie mind to grasp - we mean, chiefly, to conceptualise - this something, 
are seen in the persistent tendency of humanity to provide myths with allegorical explanations. 
And after all the allegories have been tried, the myth itself continues to feel more important 
than they. '^ ^ 
As myth transcends thought, so the Incarnation transcends Myth - Lewis' conversion 
and subsequent profession of faith rested on a realisation that Christianity was a myth 
which was also a historical fact; as the completion, the actualisation, the entelechy, of 
something which had never been wholly absent from the mind of man.'" To be truly 
Christian was to assent to the historical fact whilst imaginatively embracing the myth. 
Babbitt's denigration of Romanticism captures precisely that attitude of mind which 
Lewis believed had 'lost its tap-root to Eden': 
In general a thing is romantic when, as Aristotle would say, it is wonderful rather than 
probable; in other words, when it violates the normal sequence of cause and effect in favour of 
'*' Ibid., p.38. 
'™ GID, p.42. 
'" E I C , p.40. 
' " Ibid.,p.44. 
' " TAH, p.88. 
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adventure. The whole movement is filled with the praise of ignorance, and of those who still 
enjoy its inappreciable advantages - the savage, the peasant, and above all the child."'' 
The Incarnation, for Lewis, was the marriage of heaven and earth - of Perfect Myth 
and Perfect Fact, and therefore was addressed not only to the moralist, the scholar, and 
the philosopher, but also no less to the savage, the poet, and the child. Thus in Lewis' 
allegory. The Pilgrim's Regress, his antagonism towards T.S. EHot expresses itself in 
satire - Eliot is portrayed as Neo-Angular, a character comprised entirely of 
intelligence, without room for emotion or desire. Those who preach against the 
romantic experience (Sweet Desire), whether Stoic, Ascetic, Rigourist, Realist or 
Classicist, are on the Enemy's side 'whether they know it or not'. Conscience and 
Sweet Desire (or Sehnsucht) must come together to create a complete man. This 
Romantic vision of individual unity was also a microcosm, Lewis believed, of the 
divine action in human history (a perspective he had inherited fi-om Chesterton's 77?^  
Everlasting Man). The moral conscience, represented by the Jews, and the romantic 
imagination, represented by Pagan myth, came together to find their fulfilment in 
Christianity. 
I EWis is, of course, not unaware of the pitfalls of Romanticism, or of the Freudian -/critique, which for writers such as F.L. Lucas links together all its characteristics, 
whether morbid or healthy. Lucas suggests that Goethe's assessment that 
"Romanticism is disease" is too often proved right: 
Again and again the Romantic who drinks too deep, who surrenders too much to the 
Unconscious, who becomes too completely a child once more, has fallen a victim to the 
neurotic maladies that beset the childish adult who cannot cope with life but falls between Uvo 
ages. Then the 'clouds of glory' have changed to the nightmares of ego-maniac perversion; to 
the love of sensation even in torture; to the pursuit of strange frmt even in the Garden of 
Prosperpine, whose beauty is Death. 
Lewis would dispute none of this, and indeed would probably agree with Lucas' 
assessment of such a writer as D.H. Lawrence, in whom Lucas saw an 'hysterical over-
stimulation' of emotions normal in themselves - using the analogy of the healthy and 
unhealthy use of alcohol. D.H. Lawrence represented, for Lewis, possibly the most 
unbalanced expression of the irrational in modern literature.'" What was important for 
human unity was a balance between the 'Northern' and 'Southern' types. In theology 
the Northern tendency was to exaggerate the distinctness between Grace and Nature 
into sheer opposition, and to vilify the higher levels of Nature. The Southern tendency 
was to blur the distinction altogether - so that mere kindliness is perceived as charity, 
or vague optimisms or pantheisms are seen as faith. '^ ^ 
L EWIS has been described as a twentieth century Milton, but this is not an entirely accurate description. Milton simply retold the Christian myth, but, as Reilly 
"•^  Furst, Lilian R.; Romanticism, p.3. T.S. Eliot described himself as 'having begun as a disciple of 
Mr Babbitt', and was prominent in the critical attack upon Romanticism in the 1920s and 30s 
(particularly against Shelley). In this light it is not hard to understand Lewis' antipathy towards him. 
R.J, Reiilv; Op. Cit.,p.l08. 
Thorlby, A.K.; Op. Cit.,p.63. 
'"PR, p. 18. 
Ibid., p. 18. 
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observes, Lewis saw it as no longer sufficient to carry the 'tenor' of religious truth.'^^ 
Though this is the very premise firom which Bultmann and the demythologisers began, 
Lewis' purpose, as well as to defend orthodox Christianity, was to mythologise it. 
Lewis and Tolkien especially of the Oxford Romantics were Christian myth-makers, 
using the fairy-tale form to communicate truths about God and humanity. 
It is here that we can see the immense influence of Tolkien as a creator of fairy tales, 
and a co-conspirator with Lewis in 'smuggling' Christian truth past the modernist 
prejudices of their reading audiences. The 'Perilous Realm' of Faerie was his especial 
concern, and his philosophy of the fairy story can be found in his essay 'On Fairy 
Stories'. The qualities of Faerie are such that it is elusive by its very nature - it cannot 
be caught in a net of words. Faerie is indescribable, but not imperceptible, and may 
most nearly be translated by Magic, though of a very particular mood and power. '^ ° 
Tolkien refutes the suggestion that there is any organic connection between fairy 
stories and children - the association is a purely cultural one. Tolkien uses the 
metaphor of old-fashioned furniture which has been relegated to the play-room, which 
the adults do not want, or mind being misused, to describe the place of fairy stories in 
modem literature.'*' A good story-teller should, he contends, be capable of producing 
literary belief in both children and adults by his skill in sub-creation - as opposed to 
the idea of a 'willing suspension of disbehef, which Tolkien thought more accurately 
described the somewhat sentimental reception of fairy tales by most modem adults. 
Tolkien, Hke Lewis, found the scomfiil or pitying accusations of'escapism' particularly 
irritating in regard to the fairy story. "Why should a man be scorned," he asks, "if, 
finding himself in prison, he tries to get out and go home? Or if, when he cannot do so, 
he thinks about other topics than jailers and prison-walls?" The modern worid confiases 
the escape of the prisoner with the flight of the deserter as a sort of intellectual 
treachery against the Spirit of the Age. This appears to have been the inspiration for 
Lewis'poem The Prudent Jailer: 
Always the old nostalgia? Yes. 
We still remember times before 
We had learned to wear the prison dress 
Or steel rings rubbed our ankles sore. 
Escapists? Yes. Looking at bars 
And chains, we think of files; and then 
Of black nights without moon or stars 
And luck befriending hunted men. 
Still when we hear the trains at night 
We envy the free travellers, whirled 
In how few moments past the sight 
Of the blind wall that bounds our world. 
Our Jailer (well he may) prefers 
Our thoughts should keep a narrower range. 
'The proper study of prisoners 
' " R . J . Reilly;Op. Cit., p.223. 
'^° J.R.R. Tolkien; Tree and Leaf, p. 17. 
'" Ibid., p.38. 
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Is prison,' he tells us. Is it strange? 
And if old freedom in our glance 
Betrays itself, he calls it names 
'Dope' - 'Wishful thinking' - or 'Romance', 
Till tireless propaganda tames. 
All but the strong whose hearts they break, 
All but the few whose faith is whole. 
Stone walls caimot a prison make 
Half so secure as rigmarole.'^^ 
Tolkien viewed Christianity as the ultimate fairy tale - 'true' in the Primary World as 
well as the Secondary (in the same sense as Lewis' 'true myth'). The consolation of 
fairy tales was in the sudden turn - the eucatastrophe, or 'happy ending'. Tolkien 
contends that: 
...this joyous 'turn'...which is one of the things which fairy-stories can produce supremely well, 
is not essentially 'escapist', nor 'fiigitive'. In its fairy-tale - or otherworid setting, it is a sudden 
and miraculous grace: never to be counted on to recur. It does not deny the existence of 
dyscatastrophe, of sorrow and failure: the possibility of these is necessary to the joy of 
deliverance; it denies (in the face of much evidence, if you will) universal final defeat and in so 
far is evangelium, giving a fleeting glimpse of Joy, Joy beyond the walls of the world, poignant 
as grief. 
The Birth of Christ is thus, according to Tolkien, the eucatastrophe of Man's history, 
and the Resurrection is the eucatastrophe of the story of the Incarnation. Tolkien 
concludes his essay with the contention that advent of the Kingdom of God has 
hallowed, rather than abrogated legends. In the creation of good Fantasy, the Christian 
is using God-given faculties to assist in the 'effoliation and multiple-enrichment' of 
creation. 
AS we have already seen, Lewis regarded fairy tale as the Form best fitted for communicating what he wanted to say. His own assessment included the 
observations that fairy tale, as a form, excluded love interest and close psychology, and 
that it was characterised by brevity, severe restraints on description, a 'flexible 
traditionalism', and an inflexible hostility to analysis.'^' Again, as a form, fairy tale was 
particularly well suited to performing certain tasks. Essentially, for Lewis, this was the 
communication, in as concrete a fashion as possible, of certain theological emphases -
Transcendence, The Numinous, and Joy. In addition, Lewis was an adherent of 
Tolkien's doctrine of Recovery - the idea that myth or fantasy could restore things to 
their rich significance by removing the 'veil of familiarity'. Thus for a child who has 
enjoyed stories of enchanted forests, all 'real' forests thereafter become a little 
enchanted. A boy enjoys his otherwise dull dinner by imagining it is a buffalo he has 
shot with his own bow and arrow. Why (Lewis asks) does one need to talk about a 
'phantasmagoric never-never land' in order to make a serious comment on 'real life'? 
Because (in the case of The Lord of the Rings) the author wants to say that the real life 
'^ ^ P, pp.77-78. 
J.R.R. Tolkien; Tree and Leaf, p.68. 
Ibid., p.72. 
'^^OTOW, p. 73. 
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of men and women has a mythic and heroic quality.'** Chesterton's comment is a 
good summary of Tolkien's approach: 
It is not earth that judges heaven, but heaven that judges earth; so for me at least it was not 
earth that criticised eifland, but elfland that criticised the earth. 
C.S. Lewis wrote in the way he did because he extends this idea of Recovery to the 
Christian myth itself The real business of Narnia was in 'stealing past watchful 
dragons' - in stripping Christian tmths of cultural associations and presenting them in 
their true power. The following passage fi-om The Dawn Treader encapsulates the 
entire approach: 
"Dearest," said Asian very gently, "you and your brother will never come back to Namia." 
"Oh, AslanW" said Edmund and Lucy both together in despairing voices. 
"You are too old, children," said Asian, "and you must begin to come close to your own world 
now." 
"It isn't Namia, you know," sobbed Lucy. "It's you. We shan't meetyow there. And how can 
we live, never meeting you?" 
"But you shall meet me, dear one," said Asian. 
"Are - are you there too, Sir?" said Edmund. 
"I am," said Asian. "But there I have another name. You must leam to know me by that name. 
This was the very reason why you were brought to Namia, that by knowing me here for a little, 
you may know me better there. "'^ ^ 
In tracing this strategy to its roots in the Romantic movement, we observe with 
Abrams the Romantic tendency to revert to the 'stark drama' and suprarational 
mysteries of the Christian story, after the rationahsm and 'decorum' of the 
Enlightenment.'*^ However, in a post-Enlightenment context, the revival of Christian 
doctrine is now a different matter: 
Romantic writers...undertook to save tlie overview of human history and destiny, the 
experiential paradigms, and the cardinal values of their religious heritage, by reconstituting 
them in a way that would make them intellectually acceptable, as well as emotionally pertinent, 
for the time being."° 
Coleridge, for example, was motivated by the task of maintaining an irreducible 
minimum of Christian dogma within an essentially secular metaphysical system 191 
As to the business of sub-creation in fantasy, Lewis wrote in On Stories that the worid 
of the spirit is the only source upon which we can draw to construct plausible and 
moving 'other worlds'. Thus, according to Duriez, the very well of fantasy and 
imaginative invention is every person's direct knowledge of the ultimate Other - God 
himself'^^ The experience of the Numinous (in Otto's sense) is captured best by 
suggestion and allusion rather than analysis, and its appeal, when encountered in 
literature, is primarily to the imagination. Of Joy, we have already spoken, and thus it 
'^ * Ibid., p. 120. 
'^' G.K. Chesterton; Orthodoxy, p.49. 
'^ ^ VDT, p. 188. 
189 M.H. Abrams; Op. Cit., p.66. 
"° Ibid., p.66. 
'^ ' Ibid., p.67. 
Colin Duriez; Op. Cit., pp.40,41. 
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is straightforward to deduce the appeal to Lewis of fantasy, as a vehicle for 
communicating his own apprehension of Christian orthodoxy. 
AT first glance, C.S. Lewis appears as simply another conservative preserver of traditional Christianity. This is true to an extent (he certainly saw himself as 
ftilfilling this role to some degree), but perhaps his phenomenal popularity is due more 
to his very distinctive approach to orthodoxy, and the way in which he presented it. As 
we have seen, Lewis was a Romantic by his very nature, and certainly owed much, 
consciously or unconsciously, to the nineteenth century movement and to Coleridge in 
particular. 
It seems clear that Lewis was indeed in the business of reviving the distinction between 
the Practical and the Speculative Intellect, in order to apprehend and defend Christian 
truth. Romantic experience in its various forms was not escapism, but the truest 
indicator of our 'real' position. Glimpses of joy, the pangs of longing, the apprehension 
of the 'holy' - all pointed towards a Reality of which we grasp only partially, i f at all. 
In the same way that writers often speak of the 'religious genius' of the Jews in 
associating the universal experiences of the numinous and of the moral law in one and 
the same Being, so Lewis saw in Christianity the source also of these most intense of 
human experiences. 
In the modem situation, the tired familiarity of 'stained-glass' and 'Sunday-school' 
associations required a new and radical approach to the transmission of Christian truth. 
Theology had largely failed to address the new situation because, though it defended 
something which was conceptually 'true', had starved its audience of 'imaginative' or 
'emotional' Christian truth. Note Coleridge, for example: 
Evidences of Christianity! I an weary of the word. Make a man feel the want of it; rouse him, if 
you can, to the self-knowledge of his need of it; and you may safely trust to its own 
Evidence.'^^ 
Lewis put his belief in the importance of good imagination into practice in embodying 
Christianity in new myths or fantasies of his own creation. Narnia is categorically not 
an allegory, but an imagination exploration of what would happen if the Word of God 
became incarnate in such a worid. By casting Christian truth into imaginary worlds, 
Lewis believed it would appear, to modem ears, in its real potency for the first time. In 
enjoying Tolkien's Ainulindale, for example, we are experiencing the 'truth' of the 
myths of Creation, Fall, and Divine Love much more deeply than had we gone to an 
analytical discussion of them. In a post-modern context, Lewis' fresh approach to the 
medieval pattern of nature and grace may have more to say to us than we may have 
thought on first impression. 
Coleridge, Samuel T. in Thorlby, A.K.; Op. Cit., p. 146 
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Chapter 3 
Heaven & Hell 
r I I H E imagination of heaven is a much neglected area of modem Christian 
I theology. The Pauline assertion that "the sufferings of this present time are not 
A worthy to be compared to the glory that shall be revealed to us"'^'' was an 
important perspective on theodicy in the medieval period, for example. Traditionally 
heaven has been conceived of as a place of perfect supematural happiness, where the 
saved enjoy an immediate vision and love of God.'^' C.S. Lewis represents a strand of 
twentieth century Christian thought for whom that perspective is all-pervasive and all-
encompassing; and oflfers much to the problems of pain and of suffering in creation. 
The denial of Hell, in addition, was a dangerous error of the Liberal movement for the 
group of lay orthodox Christians to which Lewis belonged. There is a school of 
thought which sees the First Worid War as an historical denial of Liberal optimisms 
concerning the human condition, and Lewis was certainly conducive to this. 
As a natural and indispensable part of Lewis' spirituality and outlook, I will here 
attempt to outline the most important features of his doctrines of heaven and of hell. 
These are characterised, I believe, by three principal themes - the Fulfilment of Sweet 
Desire, Holiness, or God-centredness; and Hierarchy. In addition, a distinctive and 
creative feature of Lewis' writing concerning heaven is the idea of Transposition, as a 
way of imagining greater realities than our own. 
C .S. LEWIS offers an insight into the paucity of our imagination about heaven, in the context of a discussion of the Satanic predicament in Milton's Paradise Lost. 
Satan is the best drawn of Milton's characters, he contends, not because he is intended 
to be the 'hero' of the poem, but because he is the easiest to draw. To create a 'bad' 
character we have only to release imaginatively fi-om control the bad passions which 
are at work in each of us. To create a character better than ourselves we are 
attempting to portray virtues which we do not possess, and are thus forced to depict 
prolonged and consistent expressions of our own best moments: 
We do not really know what it feels like to be man much better than ourselves. His whole inner 
landscape is one we have never seen, and when we guess it we blunder...Heaven understands 
Hell and Hell does not understand Heaven, and all of us, in our own measure, share the 
Satanic, or at least the Napoleonic blindness."* 
Our imagination concerning heaven is similariy stunted. To try to picture that which is 
eternal and inexpressible we are limited to symbolic representations drawn from our 
temporal and spatial experience. The Bible itself does not describe heaven except in 
terms of parable and allegory, using the symbols of a dinner party, a wedding, a 
concert and a city to picture the life to come. Lewis believed that a faith mistaking 
symbol for reality was not mistaken in apprehending heaven in terms of joy, plenitude 
"'Romans 8:18. 
" ' Adels, J.H.; The Wisdom of the Saints, p. 199. 
'^*PPL, p.98. 
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and love. The problem in speaking about heaven philosophically, however, is that we 
are continually engaged in negations - there will be no food, no drink, no sex, no 
events, no time - as we now understand them. There will be the vision and enjoyment 
of God; but deprived of meaningful analogy it is almost impossible for the believer to 
desire or even to comprehend such a state - we carmot hope , for what we cannot 
desire. 
Lewis advanced the doctrine of transposition, in the sense of a higher medium 
expressing itself in a lower, as a way of better imagining heaven. To take the simplest 
example; the relation between writing and speech, or between musical notation and 
music itself, is a purely symbolic one. The relation between a painting and the reality it 
represents is a more complicated, for both share the same visibility. The reality of the 
higher medium floods the representation with meaning, and thus the relationship is 
more sacramental than symbolical. To take a higher instance still; the subtlety and 
complexity of our emotional life is played out in the more limited notation of our 
sensory experience. To put it more simply, the same physical sensations often 
accompany conflicting emotional responses. A flutter of nerves, for example, may 
indicate great fear, or the state of being in love. The same physical sensation is in the 
one case highly desired, in the other avoided at all costs. In this case, the higher 
medium of the emotional life enters into the lower, and transforms and 
transubstantiates it so that the physical sensation w joy, or is anguish. 
The idea of transposition, Lewis believed, was an effective answer to. self-defeating 
reductionism. The cynic might suggest that love and lust, since they end in the same 
physical act, are one and the same. Similarly, human rationality can be seen as a mere 
by-product of material and biological processes, since thought is physiologically only a 
movement of the grey matter. In our spiritual life, all the natural elements of our life 
seem to recur, but this is what we should expect if a higher medium is flooding and 
transforming our present experience with a greater reality. We cannot comprehend 
what we shall be, but we know that it will be infinitely greater than that which we have 
now. Our sensory, emotional and imaginative experience is like the lead marks on 
paper which will disappear as a drawing disappears in the presence of the reality which 
it represents: 
Heavenly bounties are embodied in this life in our temporal experience. Present life is the 
diminution, the symbol, the etiolated substitute. If flesh and blood cannot inherit the Kingdom, 
that is not because they are too solid, too gross, too distinct, too 'illustrious with being', it is 
because they are too flimsy, too transitory, too phantasmal. 
Thus in Lewis' meditation on the afterlife. The Great Divorce, the day-tripping spirits 
visiting heaven from hell are represented as ghostly and indistinct. Heaven is too solid, 
too real for them to inhabit until they have submitted to the death of the natural self A 
similar speculation has been made concerning the appearances of the risen Christ. It is 
not that the resurrection body, in appearing and disappearing, or in passing through 
locked doors, is ghostly or unreal. It has a new quality, particulariy with regard to time 
and space, and it is rather that the door itself is 'too flimsy, too transitory, too 
phantasmal'. 
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FO R Lewis, the surrender of self is a fundamental key to the understanding of the awful mysteries of heaven and hell. Human integrity and wholeness of being entails 
the passions subject to the will, and the will obediently offered up to God. This system 
of self-giving, he believed, was central not only to the created order, but to the Divine 
Nature itself 
...in self-giving, if anywhere, we touch a rhythm not only of all creation but of all being. For 
the Eternal Word also gives himself in sacrifice; and that not only on Calvary. For when he 
was cmcified He "did that in the wild weather of His outlying provinces what He had done at 
home in glory and gladness". From before the foundation of the worid He surrenders begotten 
deity back to begetting deity in obedience. And as the Son glorifies the Father, so also the 
Father glorifies the Son."' 
The characteristic of lost souls, therefore, is the rejection of all that is outside of the 
self The cardinal sin, through which Satan was expelled from heaven, and through 
which humanity fell, is pride. Lewis uses the word not in the sense of pleasure in being 
praised (in which the pleasure lies in pleasing another), nor in admiration, but in its 
traditional sense. Pride is by its nature competitive, it is the placing of the self at the 
centre rather than the periphery. Thus pride is enmity, it is the complete anti-God state 
of mind. The mystery of free will allows the possibility that the self may be elevated 
above its proper place, it may in effect take the place of God. The damned are those in 
whom the taste for the other (and thus the capacity to enjoy good) has been 
quenched.'^ * Thus damnation is not simply a sentence imposed by God, but an 
inevitable consequence of the rejection of God. The unrepentant egoist wishes to "lie 
wholly within the self and make the best of what he finds there. And what he finds 
there is hell". 
Heaven, by contrast, is not a bribe: 
Heaven offers nothing that a mercenary soul can desire. It is safe to tell the pure in heart that 
they shall see God, for only the pure in heart want to. There are rewards which do not sully 
motives."' 
The idea of holiness as a prerequisite to the ability to enjoy or even to comprehend the 
Divine is prevalent in Lewis' thought. There are strong links here with the biblical idea 
that one needs "eyes to see and ears to hear" in order to perceive deeper realities than 
the material world. This occurs throughout his imaginative w o r k s . I n his Narnia 
stories, for example, the unrepentant dwarves of The Last Battle are unable to perceive 
'^'PP,p.l21. 
"^ Ibid.; p.98, 
" ' Ibid.; p. 116. 
There are many examples of this in Lewis' children's books. Uncle Andrew, the pseudo-magician, 
hears the speech of the Talking Beasts of Namia as a cacophony of unintelligible noise, ironically 
because of his rationalistic prejudices (The Magician's Nephew). Only Lucy, of tlie four Pevensie 
children, can initially see Asian (a Christ figure) in Prince Caspian; the others are only able to do so 
as their faith increases. The dwarves of The Last Battle, who could be described as religious sceptics, 
have so hardened their minds that they are unable to perceive heaven. Another example is found in 
Lewis' meditation on the afterlife - The Great Divorce. The liberal bishop has committed "sins of the 
intellect", which render him incapable of distinguishing between religious jargon and realities which 
theological language can only hint at. 
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the beauty and bounty of heaven other than in terms of the drab contents of a dingy 
stable. This idea of holiness finds a clear echo in a saying of Catherine of Genoa: 
I see that the Being of God is so pure (far more than one can imagine) that should a soul see in 
itself the least mote of imperfection, it would rather cast itself into a thousand hells than go 
into the presence of that Divine Majesty. 
Lewis illustrates this central theme with great potency in 77?^  Great Divorce. The 
visitors to heaven from the city of endless twilight have in common one fatal failing -
the enthronement of the self at the centre of consciousness. The Tousle-headed Poet 
has conrniitted suicide after a life in which his talent and temperament were repeatedly 
'misunderstood'. He hopes to find in heaven 'Recognition', 'Appreciation' and a 
congenial environment for his finely critical spirit.^ "^ The Intelligent Man bewails the 
fact that none of the city's souls have any Needs (You get everything you want (not 
very good quality of course) by just imagining it). Without dependency upon one 
another, the self-centred gravitate fiarther and further apart (the passengers on the bus 
are perpetually quarrelling). The town will go on spreading indefinitely, unless 
someone "can do something about it".'^"^ It is here that the necessity of self-giving for 
the existence of a heavenly community is perhaps best illustrated. 
Lewis' cosmology included a belief in devils and the devil, and was a famous 
proponent of their activity and evil influence on the created order. He did not, 
however, (as he is often accused) subscribe to a dualistic notion of good and evil, but 
to an Augustinian view of the universe, which conceived of them as fallen angels. Thus 
God created all things good, and accordingly, no Nature (i.e. positive reality) is evil. 
An evil thing is a good thing which has become perverted, through a conscious self-
centredness. The good and bad angels in Milton's Paradise Lost have the same Nature; 
"happy when it adheres to God and miserable when it adheres to itself. The excellence 
of Satan's Nature is insisted upon in contrast to the perversion of his will. Evil, 
therefore, is essentially parasitic. It cannot exist in and of itself, but requires existence, 
intelhgence and a will, which are of themselves good. 
Richard Harries provides a critique of this kind of demonology, on philosophical, 
theological and moral grounds. He argues that such a view in no way reconciles a 
belief in a God of love with the existence of evil in the worid. Further, he advances the 
objection that the fall of a perfect being in a perfect environment is fijndamentally 
contradictory. Lastly he suggests the idea of hordes of evil spirits hovering over us, 
and ready to lead us astray is morally intolerable. 
The first two of these objections are really non-arguments. The essential problem of 
evil remains where it is, whether or not one believes in the devil. I f the problem of the 
fall of a perfect being is removed by doing away with a belief in devils, it only 
reappears again with Adam and Eve. As to how a perfect being in a perfect 
environment could go wrong, Lewis thought this must remain a mystery of free will. 
Rather than a worid of automata, he believed that a goodness or love worth the name 
Adels, J.H.; Op. Cit.. p.200. 
-°'GD, p. 18. 
'°'lbid.;p.2I. 
Harries, R.; C.S. Lewis: The Man and his God, p.38. 
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required the risk of allowing the possibility of evil^°^ With this in mind, Lewis felt that 
the difficulty became less problematic - the facts of experience showed that the better, 
more intelligent, and freer a being was, the greater scope for good and evil existed. In 
foreknowing that some creatures will make themselves bad, God also foreknows what 
use he will make of their badness. Thus His benevolence is shown in creating good 
Natures, His justice in exploiting evil wills.'^ "* 
The angelic guide in the Valley of Life is a portrayal of Lewis' great inspiration, the 
Scottish preacher George MacDonald, who reiterates Lewis' core belief 
'Milton was right,' said my Teacher. 'The choice of every lost soul can be expressed in the 
words "Better to reign in Hell than serve in Heaven'"^"' 
That which will not be given up, even at the price of misery, has its adult names -
Achilles' wrath, Coriolanus' grandeur, self-respect and tragic greatness - but in 
children it is imply called the Sulks.^ "* In the end there are only two sorts of people. 
Those who say to God 'Thy will be done'; and those to whom God ultimately says 
'77rv will be done'. 
Many have criticised Lewis for an over-simplistic view of human nature and of good 
and evil. A common criticism is that he draws too sharp a distinction between the 
righteous and the unrighteous, and that his literary characters are caricatures. Harries, 
for instance, writes: 
...The honest thief, the tender murderer. I don't think Lewis would have denied the possibility 
of such people. But his calling as a combative Christian apologist, and his chosen weapon of 
myth and allegory, hardly allowed for the public recognition of such ambiguities. In his world 
black needed to be black and white white.""' 
Yet this is hardly fair. The tender murderer, for one, appears in the Great Divorce. For 
Lewis it was the little marks on the soul, the infinitesimal choices of day to day life, 
that moved a soul towards one of two awesome possibilities - an everlasting splendour 
or a horror and a corruption.^'" The act of murder, in the sense of a crime of passion, is 
counted much less than the systematic murder by hatred (There is a resonance here 
with Jesus' teaching on 'murder' as an attitude of the heart, as well as a physical act). 
His allegories gain their imaginative power and emotional potency from the depiction 
of evil and goodness which exists in each of us taken to its logical extreme. We 
shudder at the pitiful depravities of the Great Divorce because we feel the danger 
ourselves-. We are transported by hope by the Ghost who is saved because we too 
acknowledge the poverty of our lusts and vain attachments 
A fiindamental tenet of Lewis' woridview was the idea of the Hierarchical conception. He defines this in the following way: 
MC, p.48. 
'°* PPL, P.66. 
GD, p.64. 
Ibid.; p.64. 
^"'Harries, R.; Op. Cit., p.42. 
^'°SPT, p. 109. 
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According to this conception degrees of value are objectively present in the universe. 
Everything except God has some natural superior; everything except unformed matter has 
some natural inferior. The goodness, happiness, and dignity of every being consists in obeying 
its natural superior and ruling its natural inferiors. When it fails in either part of this twofold 
task we have disease or monstrosity in the scheme of things until the peccant being is either 
destroyed or corrected. One or other it will certainly be; for by stepping put of its place in the 
system it has made the very nature of things its enemy. It caimot succeed.'^ " 
Lewis' sharp antipathy to 'modernity' is derived primarily from this source. He was 
deeply suspicious of the contemporary Zeitgeist - in particular modem understandings 
of human nature and relationships. 
Lewis uses his Screwtape character, for instance, to critique the modem understanding 
of'Democracy'. This has only a tenuous connection with that system of government 
whose principle was that all should be treated equally. Screwtape's aim is to engineer 
the subtle progression to the tacit belief that all were equal. The word democracy thus 
comes to sanction the most degrading and least enjoyable of human feelings, which 
articulates itself as "I 'm as good as you".^'^ For Lewis, this statement represented the 
outward expression of a seething inner resentment of a perceived inferiority, which 
ultimately suspects mere difference to be a claim to superiority. The Hellish tendency 
is towards a homogenous conformity in which human excellence, or differences in 
clothes, manners or recreation are denigrated and resented. The Heavenly tendency is 
towards a joyous acceptance of diversity and place - the man who does not delight to 
bow the knee is no more than a prosaic barbarian. As Screwtape puts it: 
I'm as good as you is a usefiil means for the destruction of democratic societies. But it has a far 
deeper value as an end in itself, as a state of mind, which necessarily excluding humility, 
charity, contentment, and all the pleasures of gratitude or admirafion, turns a human being 
away from almost every road which might finally lead him to Heaven.^" 
For Lewis, there was something profoundly heavenly in the sort of harmonious union 
portrayed in Kenneth Graham's Wind in the Willows. In Mole, Ratty, Badger and Toad 
there is a diversity of character which he felt "we know intuitively to be our reflige 
both from solitude and the collective"^". 
'Membership' was, for Lewis, a word emptied of meaning by the modern worid. 
Instead of the Pauline \izXr[, implying organs or interdependency; it had come to mean 
items or particulars of a homogenous class. For Lewis, true 'membership' was best 
analogised by the family. Grandfather, parents, grown-up son, child, dog, cat - these 
are not interchangeables. By subtracting a member the family is not only reduced in 
number, but has suffered an injury upon its stmcture. It is a unity of unlikes or 
incommensurables.'^ '^  For Lewis the modern legal fiction of equality was just that - a 
medicine to remedy the effects of the Fall. There was also to be no question of God as 
a kind of employment committee - finding souls a place in the temple which would do 
•justice to their inherent value or natural idiosyncrasy: 
-" PPL, p.72. 
' ' 'SPT, p. 18. 
'^^  Ibid.; p.26. 
' • ' F E , p. 16. 
'''Ibid.; p. 16. 
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Christianity cuts across the antithesis of individualism and collectivism. It sets its face 
relentlessly against natural individualism, but gives back to those who abandon it etemal 
possession of their own being. As separate wills we are of no account, but as stone and pillars 
in the temple we are assured of etemal self-identity. Individualism is a parody or shadow of 
this.^'* 
One of the problems of Lewis' approach has been highlighted by Chad Walsh. He 
makes the fairly just accusation that Lewis was overiy anthropocentric in his 
cosmology - he seems to suggest, for instance, that animals will only be saved through 
the quality of their relationships with human beings, rather than as having a distinctive 
God-given value of their own.^'^ 
T ^ H E S E then, are some of the themes and ideas which underiay Lewis' thinking 
JL concerning the life to come and of the Divine Nature. For many, perhaps, the 
deepest problems with his cosmology lie with the belief in Hell as a place of final 
damnation - in the inconceivability of a perfect happiness in heaven which admitted the 
final loss and deprivation of even one soul. I think Lewis would have much to say here 
concerning the nature of Time and of Eternity which could fiuitfully be explored 
further. In addition he strongly believed that evil could not be allowed to blackmail 
good forever - lest "a dog in a manger" become the tyrant of the universe. Again, there 
is more to be said here upon the mystery of fi-ee will and the Fall, and of the 
interrelationship between Justice and Mercy, which could be further developed. 
^'*Ibid.; p. 22. 
i n . _ 
I i .; . . 
Walsh, C.;Op. Cit., p. 119. 
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Chapter 4 
The Abolition of Man 
WE have observed the main tenets of Lewisian orthodoxy, and the features which made it distinctive. By his own estimation, Lewis saw himself as 'merely' restating timeless Christian tmths. This was genuinely his attempt, 
I believe, but it is also fair to see in him a reaction and interaction with the ideologies 
and trends of his day, both secular and sacred. Principally among these, Lewis saw the 
greatest challenge to humanity as Scientific Materialism ('scientism', as he termed it), 
and the negation of absolute value which it appeared to champion. Lewis attacked this 
perceived assault on value and values in his Abolition of Man. This treatise provided 
moral and philosophical themes for his cosmic trilogy, particulariy his "fairy-tale for 
grown-ups" That Hideous Strength. In this chapter I will examine the attempt by 
Lewis to contextualise his version of Christian orthodoxy to what he saw as this major 
modem threat to human beings and human society. The idolatry of science, and the 
confidence in human ability to bring about 'progress', were to a large degree 
propagated and critiqued by a literary genre - that of Utopia and dystopia. Given 
Lewis' gifts as a writer of fiction, and his ability to use this medium as a vehicle for his 
theology of orthodoxy, it seemed an ideal arena for his talents. 
I believe that many of the preoccupations of this genre of writers were central to Lewis 
also, and to which he brings a unique and compelling approach. Not least of these is 
the tension between the rational and irrational sides of human nature, which are seen 
polarised in Huxley's Brave New World, for example. In addition to this there are 
recurring themes such as cosmic futility, the^  dangers of totalitarianism, the literary 
conflict between City and Country, and the crisis of morality, all of which were of deep 
concern to Lewis. I will examine two examples of the genre, which I believe between 
them raise all the pertinent ideological issues, and will then turn to Lewis' own 
distinctive contribution, seen in the context of his argument with Scientific 
Materialism. These examples are H.G. Wells' The Time Machine, and Zamyatin's We, 
which was the source of George Orwell's later 1984. Lewis himself considered 1984 
to be an indifferent work (much inferior to Animal Farm, for example), considering its 
major fault to be the over-indulgence of the author's own psychology, to the detriment 
of the main themes of the book.^'^ 
='8 0T0W, pp. 133-137. 
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4.1 H.G. Wells 
LiLiTH, C R E A T O R OF ADAM AND EVE: 
"Let them dread, of all things, stagnation. Of life only there is no end. My seed shall 
one day master its matter to its uttermost confines. " 
Back to Methuselah 
George Bernard Shaw 
SC I E N C E plays a prominent role in the Utopian or dystopian visions of many writers, and is seen in both positive and negative terms. It is rarely viewed, however, as anything less than a powerful and dominant force, i f not the 
dominant force, in shaping a future of misery or ideal happiness for humanity.'^ '^  It was 
against a nineteenth century background of optimism and faith in science that writers 
such as Wells and Huxley conceived their Utopian and dystopian creations. Science 
was seen by many to have superseded religion as the authority in all affairs of human 
knowledge, and was the tool with which an ever-improving, ever-evolving humanity 
would finally subjugate the material universe to its purpose and general good.^ ^^ 
Scientists, as the high priests of the new faith, have been represented in a variety of 
ways by Utopian writers. At one extreme they are the willing fijnctionaries of a 
totalitarian elite; single-mindedly pursuing, formulating and applying human knowledge 
in the interests of those who wield power. At the other, they are the prophets and the 
visionaries of a new, dawn; the harbingers of the long-awaited triumph of Humanity. 
The portrayal of scientists in the genre of dystopia is in itself illuminating. The Time 
Traveller of H.G. Wells' The Time Machine,' and D-503 (the mathematician of 
Zamyatin's We) give an interesting contrast. Wells' inventor is an Empiricist and a 
Natural Scientist; observing, experimenting and inferring, in a disinterested pursuit of 
the advancement of human understanding. The Mathematician of We, on the other 
hand, is a Pure Scientist, who attempts to apply the self-evident truths of his field of 
expertise to the much more ambiguous nature of his human experience. 
WELLS, himself a trained scientist, attempted to convey scientific concepts and their import for society through the medium of narrative fiction (in much the 
same way as Lewis used fiction as a vehicle for romantic theology). The Time 
Machine, in its essentials, is a forceful presentation of the possible consequences of 
Natural Selection and the Second Law of Thermodynamics. His inheritance in this 
regard was the intellectual climate of the late nineteenth century, which was, to quote 
Zahmt: 
...an age of bourgeois idealism, an age which was inspired by an optimistic faith in the human 
mind and in progress in histor>'.""' 
As J.B.S. Haidane has argued, it is scientific advances that have enduring and fundamental 
significance for the human fiiture, above achievement in any other sphere (such as military conquest 
or political change). Cited in: O'Neill, Gerard K.; 208J: A Hopeful View of the Human Future, p.23. 
Huxley himself stated categorically that: "It is only by means of the sciences that life can be 
radically altered." Quoted in: O'Neill, Gerard K.; 2081: ^ Hopeful View of the Human Future, p.30. 
Zahmt, H.; The Question of God, p. 15. 
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Moral and spiritual consciousness were viewed as the development of an inevitable 
evolutionary process, and the dominant characteristic of the age was a pervasive 
optimism in an ever-improving human race progressively attaining new heights of 
morality and civilisation.'^ ^^ In contrast, Wells paints a bleak future picture of a species 
divided, and the stagnation and redundancy of all that his contemporaries valued. As a 
final denial of nineteenth century Zeitgeist, he introduces an apocalyptic vision of the 
outworking of Entropy and the death-throes of the universe. 
The Time Traveller is introduced by means of a framing narrative - a storyteller telling 
the story of a storyteller. This effect is used by Wells to lend credulity to the incredible 
idea of Time Travel. The Time Traveller demonstrates, in argument with a group of 
rational sceptics, the theoretical possibility at least of Time as a Fourth Dimension: 
Clearly, any real body must have extension in four directions: it must have Length, Breadth, 
Thickness, and - Duration...Space, as our mathematicians have it, is spoken of as having three 
dimensions - why not another at right angles to the other three? 
Wells' intention is to 'domesticate the impossible hypothesis'; to trick the reader into 
an unwary concession of a plausible assumption and get on with the story while the 
illusion holds .Having established The Time Machine as a dramatic device, Wells can 
proceed with the main business of the book, which, as we shall see, is to speculate 
upon the destiny of the human race. 
The Time Traveller himself is presented as an idealistic inventor, caught up in the spirit 
of his age. As time goes by, however, he is forced to revise continually his optimistic 
assumptions. His first expectation, in common with his contemporaries, is that the 
humanity of futurity must naturally be immeasurably advanced in art, knowledge and 
technological sophistication.^^' His belief in the perfect conquest of Nature by 
humanity is not something which he will readily discard. He holds fast to it in his initial 
speculations upon the intellectual demise to 'indolent serenity' of the Eloi, through the 
lack of the stimuli of hardship and freedom: 
Nature...is shy and slow in our clumsy hands. Some day all this will be better organised, and 
better...The whole world will be intelligent, educated, and co-operating; things will move faster 
and faster towards the subjugation of Nature.'^ ^ 
Finally, however, the true consequences of Natural Selection become unavoidably 
evident. It is the 'inhuman' Moriocks who are the inheritors of humanity - the 
dominant society of the two sub-species. Better adapted to their environment, they 
exist in a ruthless, functionalist, supremacy over the Eloi, whom they tend and cultivate 
as food. 
The assumptions of his age are evident in the Time Traveller's evaluation of this 
scenario. " I tried to face the thing in a scientific spirit"; he says, yet his conclusion is 
Dunn, J.D.G.; 2H New Testament Theology Lecture Notes, (1994). 
Wells, H.G.; "The Time Machine", in The Science Fiction, pp.3-7. 
Wells, H. G. Quoted in Hillegas, M.R.; The Future as Nightmare: H. G. Wells and the Anti-
utopians, p.lS. 
Wells, H.G.; "The Time Machine", in The Science Fiction, pp.20,41. 
Ibid. p.24. 
66 
not purely Darwinian. He first regards the degradation of the Elpi as a moral fault - a 
'rigorous punishment for human selfishness': 
Man had been content to live in ease and delight upon the labour's of his fellow-man, had 
taken necessity as his watchword and excuse, and in the fullness of time necessity had come 
home to him. I even tried a Carlyle-like scorn of this wretched aristocracy in decay."' 
It is here that the Time Traveller displays an underlying emotive irrationality. With his 
mind revolting against a logical acceptance of this state of affairs, he protests: 
...this attitude of mind was impossible. However great their degradation, the Eloi had kept too 
much of their human form not to claim my sympathy, and to make me perforce a sharer in 
their degradation and fear."^ * 
Ultimately, the Time Traveller cannot disengage himself from a sentimental 
identification with the Eloi, even after their aesthetic and familiar qualities prove to be 
hollow illusions. He carmot view natural selection without colouring it with his own 
prejudices and cultural values. The science itself emerges not as a tool with which 
humanity may master and control "Nature"; but as a ruthless and capricious force, with 
humanity at its whim. 
The senselessness of existence is fijrther reinforced by the penultimate chapter. The 
Time Traveller is afforded a brief glimpse of another inescapable force of Nature - that 
of Entropy. The sun is dying, and the energy of the earth is ebbing away into a 
desolate, lifeless senility. Evolution's final offering is a regression to a primitive, 
crustacean form of life; which itself is doomed. Bright dawTis for humanity here are 
fanciful pipe-dreams. The Second Law of Thermodynamics (the dissipation of energy 
into equilibrium) spells the slow death and stagnation of the universe into 'eternal 
sunset'. 
It is the naked reality of the dynamic of Evolution that Wells lays bare, stripping it of 
its rose-tinted nineteenth century hue. Art, beauty, civilisation, culture - these highly 
prized abstracts count for nothing in the struggle to survive and adapt, and are 
portrayed as ultimately meaningless in the light of Entropy. In doing so. Wells strikes 
at the very heart of the optimism of his age. There is no Ideal to which humanity can 
aspire - progress itself is an empty word. History is marching inexorably to a final, 
apocalyptic conclusion, in which humanity is an accident, a random chapter in the 
formless dance of blind matter. C.S. Lewis' 'Evolutionary Hymn' makes for pungent 
satire on the Time Traveller's Utopian hopes: 
To whatever variation 
Our posterity may turn 
Hairy, squashy, or crustacean, 
Bulbous-eyed or square of stem. 
Tusked or toothless, mild or ruthless, 
Towards that unknown god we yeam. 
Ibid. p.48. 
Ibid. p.48. 
Ibid. p.64. 
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Far too long have sages vainly 
Glossed great Nature's simple text; 
He who runs can read it plainly, 
'Goodness = what comes next.' 
By evolving. Life is solving 
All the questions we perplexed.'^ " 
4.2 Yevgeny Zamyatin 
My love 
she said 
that when all's 
considered 
we 're only 
machines. 
I chained 
her to my 
bedroom wall 
for future use 
and she cried. 
STEVE TURNER 
IN common with The Brothers Karamazov, and the tradition of many Russian novels, Zamyatin's We represents conflict not so much between individuals as between the 
ideas they embody.^ '^ The work shares with Orwell's 1984, and Bellamy's Looking 
Backward, the identical assumption that socialism would sweep humanity to a 
universal, irreversibly static condition.^^ OneState is ruled on the absolute principle 
that Freedom and Happiness are opposites - every particular of human existence is 
regulated, including waking, sex, and sleep. 
Zamyatin's major theme is the struggle between Energy and Entropy - between the 
OneState ideal of absolute 'happiness' in final and irreversible equilibrium,'"^ and the 
'torment of perpetual movement'^ "* to which the revolutionary Mephis strive. He 
associates this theme with another, characteristic of his work - that of the City and the 
Country.'"' OneState is symbolic of decrepitude, obsolescence, and entropic death. 
Beyond the Green Wall lies vitality, life and energy. The distinctive and pervasive 
imagery of We is mathematical, which Zamyatin uses as a medium to examine this 
ongoing struggle, and to evaluate the dangers posed to humanity by totalitarianism.^^^ 
p.55. 
Brown, C ; Introduction to: Zamyatin, Yevgeny; PFe, p..xxiii. 
-^ ^ O'Neill, Gerard K.; Op. Cit., p . 3 0 . 
-^ ^ Zamyatin, Yevgeny, fVe, p. 176. 
Ibid. p. 159. 
-^ ^ Brown, E.J . ; "Brave.New World, 1984, and We: An Essay in Anti-Utopia" in; Kern, G. (Ed.); 
Zamyatin's We: A Collection of Critical Essays, p.213. 
Cooke, L.B. ; "Ancient and Modem Mathematics in Zamyalin's We" in: Kern, G.; op. cit. p. 149. 
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We should not be seen as a simple opposition between the rational and the irrational; 
between scientific and unscientific conceptions of life and society. Rather, it is a 
criticism of a closed and limiting woridview. As Habgood puts it: 
It is the perennial temptation of scientists to become immersed in some tiny fraction of the 
whole field of knowledge, and then to derive all their criteria of judgement from this one 
fraction...the narrowing down of the quest to one particular kind of truth, the abstract, 
impersonal, mathematical kind of tmth found at one end of the scientific spectrum.^' 
Zamyatin does not use mathematical imagery to denigrate mathematicians, but to 
demonstrate that OneState is naive, ignorant and incomplete in its understanding of the 
science, with consequent implications for the society which this mindset evolves. There 
are several significant clues indicating this in the text itself 
Firstly, the names of the mathematicians revered by OneState are very telling. 
Pythagoras, Euclid, Newton and Maclaurin are all, from the point of view of the 
narrator, names from the distant past. There is the suggestion of a void of millennia in 
which no progress in the field of science has taken place. Secondly, there is the 
suggestion that the leaders of OneState are uncomfortable with advanced mathematical 
notions. The mathematician and narrator, D-503, expresses himself to.be familiar with 
concepts such as calculus asymptotes, n-dimensional spaces, and muUiple 
unknowns.^* The ideologists of OneState seem comfortable only with the simplest 
ideas of arithmetic and geometry - the city is composed of squares, circles and other 
such forms, and personal names are replaced with alphanumerics.^ ^^ 
The sense of naivete permeating OneState is reinforced by D-503's lapses into gross 
mathematical error. On three occasions this is quite blatant: he miscalculates both the 
probability of receiving an order to attend a particular auditorium, and the net effect of 
ten deaths upon OneState. Furthermore, the disturbing association of the idea of V-1 
with his irrational leads him to use incorrect mathematical terminology.^'*' 
It is this personal association of the concept of V-1 that is perhaps Zamyatin's most 
brilliant piece of analogy. The imaginary root takes on an emotional quality, 
symbolising D-503's irrational behaviour,and the unchartable domain of his 'soul'. 
The mathematical ideology of OneState is governed by integers, by real numbers that 
can be grasped, comprehended and manipulated. It is simple mathematical fact, 
however, that this class of numbers represents only a subset of the whole.'^ '*^  D-503's 
Habgood, J.; Soundings, pp.38-41. 
Cooke, L.B.;Op. Cit.,p.l51. 
Ibid. p. 150. 
'^'"Zamyatin, Yevgeny; We, pp. 14,104. Assuming, given the symmetrical design of OneState, that 
auditoriums are of identical size, the conect probability is simply 1/1500 (1500 = The number of 
auditoriums). Secondly, the population of OneState is given as 10 million {fVe, p. 16). The fraction of 
the population that 10 deaths represents is therefore 1 millionth and not 100 millionth. 
The correct term for V-1 is imaginary. An irrational number is simply one which cannot be given a 
precise mathematical ratio, such as 7t or V2 (and therefore may be real). 
'^'^  White, J.J.; "Mathematical Imagery in Musil's Young Torless and Zamyatin's We" in Kem, G.; 
Op. Cit,p.230. 
•"^  Churchill, R.V. & Brown J.W.; Complex Variables & Applications, (New York, 1990). In 
mathematical terms, the complete set of numbers is described as z = (x,y), where x and y are the real 
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dawning realisation that there is a worid of experience and truth beyond the confines of 
OneState is analogised by his meditation on complex numbers: 
For every equation, every formula in the superficial world, there is a corresponding curve or 
solid. For irrational formulas, for my V-1, we know of no corresponding solids, we've never 
seen them...But that's just the whole horror - that these solids, invisible, exist. They absolutely, 
inescapably must exist. Because in mathematics their eccentric prickly shadows, the irrational 
formulas, parade in front of our eyes as if they were on a screen. And if we don't see these 
solids in our surface world, there is for them, there inevitably must be, as whole immense 
world there, beneath the surface."'"' 
The 'Numbers' of OneState are thus stunted and incomplete - the assigning of integers 
as monikers indicates an ideology which views human beings in rational, mechanistic 
terms. The reduction of humanity to the level of machinery is indicated by D-503's 
machine-like conception of himself He speaks of the "fly-wheel of logic humming 
contentedly in me"^*' and of his brain as a machine requiring the lubrication of logic ^ ''^  
He finds 'innumerate pity' over the deaths of the workers humorous and irrational 
As physicist Walter Heitler warns: 
When once we have got to the stage of seeing in man merely a complex machine, what does it 
matter if we destroy 
Just as every mathematical number is complex - possessing 'real' and 'imaginary' 
parts; Zamyatin makes the case by analogy that in reality, humans possess both reason 
and the irrational. The mysterious, incomprehensible side of human nature, evoked by 
D-503's 'worid beneath the surface' (strongly reminiscent of Plato's Cave), and its 
rational and logical counterpart, are thesis and antithesis, which must be synthesised to 
produce a properly, integrated humanity.^ '*' As 1-330 appeals to D503: 
You grew numbers all over your body, numbers that crawled about on you like lice. You have 
to be stripped naked and driven into the forest. You should learn to tremble with fear, with joy, 
insane rage, cold - you should learn to pray to the fire.^^° 
1-330, and the Mephis organisation, are not advocating an anti-mathematical or even 
an anti-rational revolution. Cooke has observed that the statements of 1-330 
- demonstrate a much deeper understanding of mathematics than the supporters and 
ideologists of OneState. The aim of the revolutionaries can be seen as wishing to 
liberate mathematical thought from the bonds placed upon it by the obscurantist 
totalitarians.^^' Through his conversations with the 'heretic' 1-330, D-503 develops an 
and imaginary parts of the complex number z. The set of real numbers, z = (x,0) (having no 
imaginary part), is therefore merely a subset of the whole set of complex numbers. 
Zamyatin, Yevgeny; We, p.98. 
'^'^  Collins, C ; Evgenij Zamjatin: An Interpretative Study, p.65. 
Zamyatin, Yevgeny; We, p.31. 
'^^  Ibid. p. 104. 
Cited by Wink, W.; Unmasking the Powers, p.29. 
Cooke, L.B. ; Op. Cit., p.l65. 
Zamyatin, Yevgeny; We, p. 158. 
Cooke, L .B . ; Op. Cit., pp. 150-152. 
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awareness of the implications of knowledge he has always possessed.^" She appeals to 
him first as a mathematician to reflate the idea of a final revolution: 
My dear, you are a mathematician. You're even more, you're a philosopher of mathematics. So 
do this for me: tell me the final number. 
When D-503 protests that the number of numbers is infinite, 1-330 responds: 
254 
And how can there be a final revolution? The number of revolution is infinite. 
The revolt of Mephis is against the idea of Entropy. The very name of the spaceship 
that D-503 has designed suggests an attempt to quantify the universe - to 'put a little 
wall around infinity'.^" The aim of OneState is to bring a final equilibrium to all 
humanity. Again, I-330's appeal against this is based on scientific reason: 
That is precisely what we are talking about - entropy, physiological entropy. You're a 
mathematician. Surely you can see that only differences, differences of temperature, only 
contrasts in the degree of heat, only that makes for life? 
We is the diary of a fanatic, whose dogmatic belief system is hammered into pieces by 
the growing and unwelcome recognition of truths beyond his comfortable vision of 
reality. His psychological conditioning has prepared him for a completely knowable 
universe,^ ^* yet the very form of the book itself reflects the mental turmoil in which D-
503 finds himself Ostensibly a scientific journal of events, the 'Records' become 
increasingly disconnected, chaotic, and incoherent - the account of a zealot reluctant to 
surrender cherished ideas. The focus of attention within We shifts rapidly, with wildly 
fluctuating changes of mood.^" The effect is to give the impression of a true believer 
'losing his religion'. This is strikingly pictured by such outbursts as his first encounter 
with the imaginary root: 
...I remember how I cried, I beat my fists on the table and bawled: "I don't want V-1! Take it 
out of me, this V-1!" That irrational root grew in me like some alien thing, strange and 
terrifying...and you couldn't make anv sense of it or neutralise it because it was completely 
beyond ratio. 
It is this attitude which Zamyatin links with the idea of Entropy - a scientific small-
mindedness, terrified to venture beyond the bounds of that which may be rationally 
understood. Science is the infallible religion of OneState, yet it is revealed to be a 
stunted, incomplete, pseudo-science, which in the hands of a totalitarian state contrives 
to enslave humanity.'^ ^^ 
Ibid. p. 151. 
^^ •^  Zamvatin, Yevgeny; We, p. 167. 
'''Ibid.'p.l67. 
Ibid. p.40. 
'^ ^ Edwards, T.R.N.; Three Russian writers and the irrational, p.58. 
Proffer, C.R.; "Notes on the Imager)' in Zamyatin's We" in Kem, G.; Op. CiL, p.95. 
Zamyatin, Yevgeny; We, p.39. 
Edwards, T.R.N.; Op. Cit., p.52. 
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We ends inconclusively, with D-503 too weak to resist a return to scientific 
fiindamentalism, through the operation to remove his imagination. The final Record 
hints at an ongoing struggle between the totalitarians and the revolutionaries. In this 
way Zamyatin suggests a Hegelian 'dialectic of progression'^ *** - the ceaseless battle 
between the forces of energy against the stagnation of entropy, embodied in 1-330's 
idea of infinite revolutions. 
WE is a vastly contrasting portrait of science and scientists, in the context of human destiny, to Wells' The Time Machine. We is generally classed with that 
genre of dystopias which parodied Wells as naively optimistic. This includes the 
writings of Huxley, Orwell, Forster and C.S. Lewis. Lewis himself characterises Wells 
in That Hideous Strength, as a conceited and dangerous fool who does not realise 
where the science he champions is taking humanity.'^ *' Zamyatin himself, however, 
admired Wells as a writer of'social-scientific' fantasy, and saw his purpose as: 
...almost exclusively to uncover the defects in the existing social order, not to create a picture 
of some paradise to come.'*^ 
H.G. Wells, in Zamyatin's eyes, belonged to the 'finy band of heretics', whose function 
was to lead the world into the next stage of the dialectical process, and who were to be 
understood as combating the chronic disease of humanity - Entropy.'^ *^ Science is not 
necessarily a negative force, therefore - the possibilities of reason and mathematics as 
tools for productive and creative thought are suggested in We. Zamyatin warns, 
however, that in the wrong hands science can be misused to subjugate humanity into 
machine-like nonentity - the price to be paid for a world view in which all human 
experience is lawful and orderly. 
Against this valuation it must be remembered that the works which Zamyatin most 
admired were among Wells' eariiest {The Time Machine was his first scientific 
romance). As Hillegas suggests: 
Zamyatin probably did not understand the drift of Wells' work well enough to see that the 
rationalism and regimentation he opposed in We was at least a strong element in Wells' 
thought.-*' 
The Time Traveller is a novel permeated with deep disillusionment in the ideals of 
science and progress in history, which preceded Wells' later optimism in such works as 
A Modern Utopia. Science here can barely influence human destiny, let alone control 
it. There is an undergirding 'cosmic pessimism', motivated by the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics, which suggests that any endeavour will be finally negated by the 
demise of the universe into entropic death. 
In conclusion, it seems to me that whilst the energy/entropy conflict is skilflilly 
explored by Zamyatin as an analogy of the scientific task, the full implications of 
Wliite, J.J.;Op. Cit.,p.232. 
Hillegas, M.R.; Op. Cit.,p.l38. 
'^ ^ Zamyatin, Yevgeny; quoted in: Hillegas, M.R.; Op. Cit, p. 103. 
Hillegas, M.R.; Op. Cit., p. 104. 
264 Ibid. p. 105. 
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entropy as a scientific concept are most forcefully expounded in The Time Traveller. 
Zamyatin's mathematician is a pawn in the ideological struggle between the forces of 
Energy and Entropy. We is a passionate attempt to present the case for the fi"eedom of 
scientific enquiry and humanity itself, against the possibilities of stagnation and death 
imposed by .a rigid and limited understanding of the universe. Wells' Time Traveller, by 
contrast, is an optimist motivated by those very notions, whose optimism is finally 
confounded by the realisation that Entropy is the more potent of the two forces, and 
that ultimately its victory is inescapable. 
4.3 That Hideous Strength 
"There was a thing called the soul and a thing called immortality. " 
Brave New World (Aldous Huxley) 
C C A NTI-UTOPLA assumes a new and different appearance in C.S. Lewis' cosmic 
x \ . t r i l o g y " (Out of the Silent Planet, Perelandra, That Hideous Strength), 
writes Mark Hillegas. Instead of a reaction to Utopia from a "disillusioned left", the 
trilogy represents an attack from a conservative Christian right.'^*^ In this chapter we 
will investigate the clash of two fundamentally opposing Utopian positions that these 
novels represent. Lewis was inspired to write in response to what he saw as a "ghastly 
materialistic philosophy", present in the works of H.G. Wells, Olaf Stapledon and 
J.B.S. Haidane particularly. He castigated these writers for championing an ethic of 
'survivalism' - the perpetuation of the species at the expense of all else - believing this 
position to be logically incoherent. 
HILLEGAS has described the trilogy as a kind of Paradise Lost for the twentieth century, defending and instructing Christian doctrine in mythical form.'^ ^* The first 
book begins with the abduction of a Cambridge philologist (Ransom) by a survivalist 
scientist (Weston) and his ruthless accomplice. The trio journey by spacecraft to Mars, 
whose inhabitants Weston mistakenly believes to require a human sacrifice of some 
kind. Weston (who appears to be a caricature of Haidane) is driven by the desire to 
subjugate the universe to humanity, and envisages the conquering of a 'primitive' 
civiUsation. Ransom escapes, however, and discovers that the three distinct races of 
'Malacandrians' are denizens of an unfallen worid, benignly ruled by the archangel 
figure of Oyarsa. Earth, or 'Thulcandra' has been subject to a sort of heavenly 
quarantine due to its fallen, sinful state, which Weston has broken through "enginry 
and natural philosophy". 
Perelandra is the story of a second Eve in another Paradise,'^ *^  and is perhaps the most 
self-contained novel of the trilogy. Ransom is sent to Venus to repel Weston, who has 
become an instrument of evil, and plays the part of the serpent in Eden. Ransom is 
successful, and the corruption of Perelandra is averted. 
Hillegas, M.R.; The Future as Nightmare, p. 133. 
^^^Ibid., p. 134. 
Ibid., p. 134. 
Urang, Guimar; Shadows of Heaven, p. 16. 
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It is the final book of the trilogy {That Hideous Strength) which is most explicitly anti-
utopian, and in which Lewis' most virulent attacks on scientific materialism are to be 
found. The dangers are represented by the seemingly benevolent N.I.C.E., a global 
institute dedicated to the betterment of humanity through science. Against the sinister 
(and diabolical) cosmic forces which it represents are ranged a small company of 
Christians, headed by Ransom. They are aided by the 'good' planetary spirits, who 
may now enter the tellurian arena through the breaking of the 'quarantine' by Weston. 
Into this story Lewis weaves elements of the Arthurian legend - Meriin awakes from 
his enchanted sleep to join Ransom, who is revealed to be the Pendragon of ancient 
Logres. The central characters of the book are a young married couple; Mark (initially 
an employee of the N.I.C.E.) and Jane Studdock, who has clairvoyant powers and 
aligns herself with the Christian company. As Urang observes, Lewis for the most part 
filters the narrative alternately between their two consciousness', to create a parable of 
sin, repentance and regeneration.'^ *^ 
HPHE conflicting philosophies of scientific materialism and the religious woridview 
X represented by Lewis were clearly antagonistic."" Haldane's antipathy towards 
Lewis' Christian faith was characteristic of the champions of scientific progress. H.G. 
Wells described Catholic Christianity as a "strange heap of mental corruption", which 
he saw as the chief obstacle to human readjustment.Haldane himself saw religion as 
incurably reactionary, and antagonistic to social change - describing Lewis as a "most 
useful prop to the existing social order".'^ ^^ The philosophy of Lewis' opponents could 
find no room for religious Utopia, in the form of a belief in life after death. The only 
hope of improving the lot of humanity, therefore, lay in the application of mind 
through science. The goal of this enterprise was the subjugation of nature, and the 
ability to control human evolution."^ 
There was certainly no place in this philosophy for objective value. Haldane believed 
human ideals to be products of natural processes that did not conform to them,"* and 
saw the traditional distinction between mind and matter as false (a belief he shared with 
Wells) .Science for the materialists was inevitably reductionist - committed to 
explaining the complex in terms of the simple - Mind was therefore a by-product of 
material and organic systems. 
Lewis attacked this philosophy on both practical and intellectual grounds. Firstly, he 
believed the logical consequence of a final conquest of human nature by science was a 
"Hell Incarnate"."^ Secondly, he believed the materialist account of thought to be 
Ibid., pp.24-25. 
Haldane compared his opponent to the substance Lewisite, a toxic chemical nullified by British 
Anti-Lewisite. Haldane hoped to perform a similar task in the mental sphere, negating the poisonous 
effects of Lewis' ideas, which, as he believed "muddied the stream of human thought". Haldane, 
J.B.S.; Everything has a History, p.259. 
Wells, H.G.; The Fate of Homo Sapiens, pp.154,169. 
Haldane, J.B.S.; Everything has a History, pp.232-233. 
Hillegas, M.R.; Op. Cit., p. 140. 
Haldane, J.B.S.; Possible Worlds and other Essays, p.310. 
Wells, K.G.; Mankind in the Making, p.75. 
Haldane, J.B.S.; The Causes of Evolution, pp.155-156,164. 
277 THS, p.204. 
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contradictory, inadequate, and in the case of the champions of scientific progress, 
plagued by double standards. 
FOR Lewis, "Man's power over Nature" inevitably had to mean the power of some men over other men, with Nature as their instrument.^ ^* The conquest of human 
nature must lead to the rule of the conditioners over the conditioned, of the scientific 
planners over the masses. As Lord Feverstone explains to Studdock in That Hideous 
Strength: 
"Man has got to take charge of Man. That means, of course, that some men have got to take 
charge of the rest."^" 
Feverstone goes on to emphasise the desirability of being among the former group -
one of those taking charge, rather than one of those being taken charge of This 
appears to be a satire on Haidane's quip that evolution was a process "more pleasant 
to direct than to undergo".^*" What this process will entail is suggested by Feverstone's 
outline of the aims of the N.I.C.E.: 
"...sterilisation of the unfit, liquidation of backward races, selective breeding. Then real 
education, including pre-natal education. By real education I mean one that has no 'take-it-or-
leave-it' nonsense. A real education makes the patient want it infallibly: whatever he or his 
parents try to do about it. Of course, it'll have to be mainly psychological at first. But we'll get 
onto biochemical conditioning in the end and direct manipulation of the brain. 
Haidane himself had suggested in scientific essays that the blind, deaf, feeble-minded 
and other disabled were of limited social value.^ '^^  "Doubtless," he concluded, 
"complete idiots should be prevented from breeding."^*^ 
' I ""HE surrender of the individual to the collective is a recurrent theme in both Utopian 
X and dystopian literature. For H.G. Wells the sense of individual self-hood was a 
biological illusion - once convenient, but now redundant in the search for a human 
superorganism.'^ *'* A revealing criticism that Haidane made of Out of the Silent Planet 
was concerned with the grammar of the Malacandrians. He suggested that 
linguistically, sinless beings should necessarily have no equivalents of T , 'my', or 
other personal pronouns and inflexions.'^ ^^ A dystopia utilising a similar idea that 
springs immediately to mind is Zamyatin's We. Lewis himself felt that Haidane was 
fijndamentally mistaken, and was unable to see that there were two opposite solutions 
to the problem of human selfishness. The first of these was the abolition of persons in 
materialist or totalitarian philosophy. The second (Christian) solution was love - the 
relation between persons. Nothing but a Thou ca.n be loved, and a Thou can only exist 
for an/.'*' 
-'^ AOM, p.35. 
THS, p.42. 
Haidane, J.B.S.; Possible Worlds and Other Essays, p.296. 
THS, p.42. 
Haidane, J.B.S.; Possible Worlds and Other Essays, p.23. 
Haidane, J.B.S.; The Possibilities of Human Evolution, p.8; 
Parrinder, P.; H.G. Wells, p. 13, 
Haidane, J.B.S.; Everything has a History, p.255. 
286oTOW,p.l08. 
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In Haldane's Last Judgement (which Lewis described as "brilliant, but depraved"^* )^, 
the individual is valued as negligible in comparison with the destiny of the human race 
in "eternity and in f in i ty" .Th is termite-like conception of humanity is also present in 
his essay The Inequality of Man. Haldane envisaged a eugenically engineered society 
of the future in which humanity is divided into castes with particular functions, much 
as Huxley imagined the citizens of Brave New World. It is here we reach the crux of 
the disagreement between C.S. Lewis and the proponents of scientific materialism. 
For Lewis, the fiandamental point of contention was the rival conceptions of humanity. 
The materialist must necessarily view an individual with a finite lifespan of several 
decades as subservient to the State or society, which will outlast him or her.^ *' For the 
Christian, the individual lives on in eternity, and is of incomparably more value than 
temporal institutions. Lewis pillories the materialist outlook in the character of 
Weston, who defends his philosophy to Ransom: 
"...infinity, and therefore perhaps eternity, is being put into the hands of the human race. You 
caimot be so small-minded as to think that the rights or the life of an individual or of a million 
individuals are of the slightest importance in comparison with this." '^*' 
We meet this issue again and again within the genre of anti-utopianism. Zamyatin's 
mathematician views the deaths of ten 'Numbers' in purely mathematical terms - as a 
minute diminution of the mass of society.^ '^ Orwell's totalitarians assert the fallible, 
mortal individual to be subservient to the collective, eternal S t a t e . I n Brave New 
World the Director's remarks on anti-social activities sum up well that philosophy 
which Lewis sought to attack: 
"...no offence is so heinous as unorthodoxy of behaviour. Murder kills only the individual - and 
after all, what is an individual?... We can make a new one with the greatest of ease - as many as 
you like. Unorthodoxy threatens more than the life of a mere individual; it strikes at Society 
itself." '^^  
The ideological shift which Lewis wrote against was in his view already present in 
contemporary language and practice. The most dangerous manifestation of that 
ideology (that humanity is to be regarded as so many specimens determined by impulse 
and conditioning), was to be found in modem understandings of criminal punishment. 
In 1949 Lewis pubhshed a paper attacking 'The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment', 
arguing against Haldane's assertion that an enlightened, scientific approach should be 
FST, p.88. 
Haldane, J.B.S.; Possible Worlds and Other Essays, p.312. 
Haldane himself was originally a Marxist, and published an introduction to Engels' Dialectics and 
Nature, in which he claimed that Engels had anticipated the progress of science in the sixty years 
since his death. He was therefore reluctant to accept the embarrassing verdict of Albert Einstein, the 
greatest scientist of the generation, upon Engels' work (Einstein described it as entirely worthless, and 
suggested that Engels himself would have found his own "modest attempt" ridiculous in the light of 
scientific advance). See: Hook, S.; Dialectical Materialism and Scientific Method, p.30. 
OSP, p.29. 
Zamyatin, Y. ; We, p. 104. 
-'^Orwell, G.;7PS^,p.214. 
Huxley, A.; Brave New World, p. 133. 
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based upon reform and deterrent, and not retribution.^^" In That Hideous Strength 
Lewis presents the N.I.C.E. as bringing about this state of affairs by propaganda -
Lord Feverstone explains to Studdock that it is only a matter of words: 
"...if it were even whispered that the N.I.C.E. wanted powers to experiment on criminals, you'd 
have the old women of both sexes up in arms and yapping about humanity. Call it re-education 
of the mal-adjusted, and you have them all slobbering with delight that the bmtal era of 
retributive punishment has at last come to an end." 
To do this, Lewis believed, was to remove punishment from the province of justice, 
and into the realm of the 'technical experts' - the psychoanalysts and behavioural 
specialists.'^ ^^ Thus society no longer kills or punishes bad people, but "liquidates 
unsocial elements".'^ ^^ The approach therefore has the effect of dehumanising the 
criminal. Instead of treating an offender as a rational being capable of free choice 
between moral alternatives, the modem tendency views crime as a sickness or disease. 
The logical conclusion could be far fi-om humane, as Mark Studdock discovers: 
...the Fairy pointed out that what had hampered every English police force up to date was 
precisely the idea of deserved punishment. For desert was always finite: you could do so much 
to the criminal and no more. Remedial treaunent on the other hand, need have no fixed limit; 
it could go on till it had effected a cure, and those who were carrying it out could decide when 
that was.^ '^  
The N.I.C.E. would soon control anyone who had ever been in the hands of the police, 
and ultimately every citizen. 
AS has been stated previously, Lewis felt that relativist accounts of thought were flawed. To answer 'yes' to the question: "Is the thought that no thoughts are 
true, itself true?", was to contradict oneself Knowledge of the universe is arrived at 
only by inference, and therefore if thought is vaHd at all: 
...we are not reading rationality into an irrational universe but responding to a rationality with 
which the universe has always been saturated. 
The materialists, for whom 'knowledge' and 'value' must necessarily be illusory, could 
have no rational reason for holding any ethic to be binding or authoritative, yet this is 
what Lewis accused them of The survival of the species was the supreme ethic, to 
which all else must be subjugated. For Haidane, characteristics such as pity or 
happiness were useful only insofar as they contributed to this end - the price paid by 
the individual was to the gain of the race.'^ ^ Thus Weston, when justifying the intended 
conquest of Malacandria before the angel Oyarsa, is made to say: 
Haidane, J.B.S.; "Scientific Calvinism" in Possible Worlds and Other Essays, pp.141-142. Haidane 
asserted in this essay that moral indignation was "out of date". 
FST, p. 104. Haidane himself suggested that such bodies as tiie Medical board, or the magistrates 
were "unfit to direct the evolution of the human race". Haidane, J.B.S.; The Inequality of Man, p.88. 
'^ ^ AOM, p.45. 
THS, p.69. 
AOM, pp.84-89. 
Haidane, J.B.S,; Possible Worlds and Other Essays, p.303. 
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"I may fall, but while I live I will not...consent to close the gates of the fiinu-e on my race. What 
lies in the future, beyond our present ken, passes imagination to conceive: it is enough for me 
that there is a Beyond." '^^  
Another feature of this belief which Lewis attacked was the deification of Mind. It was 
accepted scientific fact that the general tendency of natural selection was to 
degradation, not to 'progress'. Improvement in evolutionary terms was a rare 
exception. However, Haldane among others believed that for the first time it was 
possible for Mind (itself a product of evolution) to take charge of the process.^ *" 
Evolution could now be controlled by eugenics.^ "^  Despite protestations to the 
contrary, the scientific Utopians could perhaps be accused of a philosophical belief they 
often attacked - the dichotomy of mind and matter. 
The idea that organic life is somehow insanitary or 'inferior' appears in Wells' War of 
the Worlds, for example. The superior Martians have evolved to the point where they 
are almost pure brain, a "...selfish intelHgence, without any of the emotional substratum 
of the human being".^ "^ Martian sanitary science has eliminated all micro-organisms, 
and therefore disease, fevers, contagions and other morbidities. Other authors using 
this idea include Arthur C. Clarke, whose Overmind "long ago left the tyranny of 
matter behind".Another is Huxley, whose scientifically planned society of Brave 
New World exhibits distaste with such processes as childbirth, and much of whose 
energy is consumed in the sanitising of the human condition to an artificial, clinical 
conclusion. 
This theme appears in That Hideous Strength when the N.I.C.E. scientist Filostrato 
postulates the abolition of organic life, as a matter of simple hygiene. The impure and 
the organic, he suggests to Mark, are interchangeable conceptions: 
"In us organic life has produced Mind. It has done its work. After that we want no more of it. 
We do not want the world furred over with organic life, like what you would call the blue 
mould - all sprouting and budding and breeding and decaying. We must get rid of it."^°^ 
His work is concerned with the sanitising of human experience, with learning how to 
construct bodies directly with chemicals, and with removing copulation from the 
process of reproduction. When the Moon appears in the sky he exclaims: 
"There is a world for you, no? There is cleanness, purity. Thousands of miles of polished rock 
with not one blade of grass, not one fibre of lichen, not one grain of dust. Not even air."^"^ 
Here Lewis is alluding to certain post-Enlightenment forms of mentality that he 
characterised in his allegory. The Pilgrim's Regress.^'^^ Lewis warns against confusing 
OSP, p. 160. 
Haldane, J.B.S.; Possibilities of Human Evolution, p. 164. 
^"^Parrinder, R; Op. Cit., p, 10. 
Wells, H.G.; The War of the Worlds, p. 136. 
'^^ ^ Clarke, Arthur C ; Childhood's End, pp. 159-60. C.S. Lewis praised Clarke as '...an autlior who 
understands there may be things that have a higher claim on humanity than its own "survival".' 
^'^'THS, p.173. 
^°*THS, p. 173. 
These are first personified in the Tliree Pale Men; Neo-Angular, Neo-Classical and Humanist, 
whose ascetic fare is free from any "lingering flavour of the old romantic sauces" (PR, p. 125). Later 
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repentance of sin (his major theme) with its diabolical counterpart - perversion or 
disgust of human nature. Against the view that Nature is somehow impure, and from 
which humanity must break the ties of dependence, Lewis sets the Christian doctrine of 
the Incarnation. Thus the created order, though distorted and beset by sin, is seen as 
inherently good. As the angehc guide remarks to the pilgrim in the Regress: 
"Has no one told you that that Lady (Mary) spoke and acted for all that bears, in tiie presence 
of all that begets?...Be sure that the whole of this land, with all its warmth and wetness and 
fecundity, with all tiie dark and the heavy and the multitudinous for which you are too dainty, 
spoke through her lips when she said tiiat He had regarded the lowliness of his hand-
maiden."^"^ 
This theme appears in That Hideous Strength, in the scene where Venus hovers over 
St. Anne's. The mysteries of erotic love and of passion overtake both beast and man, 
somewhat offending the sensibilities of the rationalist MacPhee. Ransom's admonition 
to him echoes that of the angel of the Pilgrim's Regress, who suggests that whatever 
virtues are to be attributed to God, "decency is not one of them".^°^ 
I EWIS utilises other religious themes to demonstrate the inadequacy of materialism. -/One of these (famihar in his writings) is the idea that one needs 'eyes to see' and 
'ears to hear'^ ^" in order to perceive deeper realities than the material worid. This 
occurs throughout his imaginative works.^" When the Thulcandrians meet the ruling 
spirit of Malacandria (Oyarsa), their perceptive experiences are very different. The 
following is Ransom's apprehension of the angel: 
He never could say what it was like. The merest whisper of light - no, less than that, the 
smallest diminution of shadow...some difierence in tiie look of tiie ground, too slight to be 
named in the language of tiie five senses, moved slowly towards him. Like a silence spreading 
over a room fiill of people, like an infinitesimal coolness on a sultry day, like a passing 
memory of some long-forgotten sound or scent.. 
on in the tale, they take the form of Superbia, a skeletal dragon who has polished tiie land to a mirror-
like rock, "scraped clean of every speck of dust and fibre of lichen". This tough-mindedness is 
revealed as pride - the desire to be self-sufficient and a god to oneself "I have a mineral soul" 
exclaims Superbia (minerals eat no food and void no excrement): 
"So I, borrowing nothing and repaying 
Nothing, neither growing nor decaying, 
Myself am to myself, a mortal god, a self-contained 
Unwindowed monad, unindebted and unstained." (PR, p.235). 
'^^ ^ PR, p.232. 
PR, p.232, 
^"^Mk. 13:15. 
^" There are many examples of this in Lewis' children's books. Uncle Andrew, the pseudo-magician, 
hears the speech of the Talking Beasts of Namia as a cacophony of unintelligible noise, ironically 
because of his rationalistic prejudices {The Magician's Nephew). Only Lucy, of the four Pevensie 
children, can initially see Asian (a Christ figure) in Prince Caspian; the otiiers are only able to do so 
as their faith increases. The dwarves of The Last Battle, who could be described as religious sceptics, 
have so hardened their minds that they are unable to perceive heaven. Another example is found in 
Lewis' meditation on the afterlife - The Great Divorce. The liberal bishop has committed "sins of tiie 
intellect", which render him incapable of distinguisliing between religious jargon and realities which 
theological language can only hint at. 
^"OSP,p.l38. 
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Weston and his companion Devine fail to see Oyarsa completely. When the angel 
speaks, Devine conjectures that the Malacandrians have a loudspeaker, whilst Weston 
assumes the voice is the result of a witch-doctor's ventriloquism.'''^ The unfallen 
Malacandrians are aware of and relate freely to the 'eldils' or angels. Ransom, who has 
some faith, can dimly perceive them, but Weston and Devine have shut themselves off 
from the supernatural. Weston and the N.I.C.E. are products of 
"...a cold scientific intellect topped by dark superstition, helpless against the revenge of 
emotional depths ignored." '^'* 
The contrast between the opposing positions is fiarther established artistically within 
That Hideous Strength. The N.I.C.E. represents blight and perversion of the natural, 
which is suggested by the names of the major players within its inner circle - Wither, 
Frost and Feverstone. A twisted and distorted sexuality is represented by the 
masculine, sadistic, cigar-chewing head of the secret police (the "Faiiy"), and the 
effeminate, treble-voiced Filostrato. The employees of the N.I.C.E. exist in an 
atmosphere of uncertainty, secrecy, and undefined threats. '^^  
By contrast, the homely company of St. Anne's are an open, ordered community of 
merriment and good fellowship. Gunnar Urang draws attention to the two gardens 
described in the book. The one at St. Anne's, in its naturalness, reminds Jane of the 
garden in Peter Rabbit. The "Ornamental Pleasure Grounds" of the N.I.C.E. have the 
appearance of a municipal cemetery.'''* There are also, perhaps, echoes of Zamyatin's 
theme of the Country and the City, although not so neatly constructed. The opponents 
of the N.I.C.E. are characterised by a pervading mysteriousness which the 'good 
atheist' MacPhee is unable to penetrate.^ '^  The N.I.C.E. represents the regimented 
artificiality of totalitarianism, and its brutish disregard for the aesthetic. This is 
demonstrated by the destruction of Bragdon Wood, the village of Cure Hardy, and the 
pastoral way of life, for the utilitarian ends of the Institute. 
Ultimately Lewis is concerned to lay bare the sheer futility of the materialist 
woridview, which he saw as bereft of value, or of purpose other than 'survival' - itself 
meaningless in the light of Entropy. Stapledon hints at this cosmic fijtility in Last and 
First Men, when the remote descendants of humanity question the foriorn battle of 
Life against the approaching frost - "Our labour will at best sow for death an ampler 
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harvest". Haldane rather incoherently suggests that even if the worid is running 
'^^  OSP, pp. 146-47. 
'^•^  OSP, p.99. The element of devil worship portrayed in That Hideous Strength appears to draw on 
Lewis' earlier ideas in The Screwtape Letters. A senior devil writes to his junior that the perfect work 
of Hell would be the "Materialist Magician". Screwtape tells his nephew: "I have great hopes that we 
shall learn in due time how to emotionalise and m>thologise their science to such an extent that what 
is, in effect, a belief in us (tliough not under tliat name) will creep in while the human mind remains 
closed to belief in the Enemy. The "Life Force", the worship of sex, and some aspects of 
Psychoanalysis, may here prove usefiii." 
Urang, Gunnar; Op. Cit., pp.24-25. 
'^^  Ibid., pp.24-25. 
^"This character appears in another guise in Lewis' Till We Have Faces, as The Fox; a 
personification of rationalism whose philosophy is in itself is insufficient to unlock the mysteries of 
reality. 
'^^  Stapledon, O.; Last and First Men, p.352. 
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down, and is not governed by good and evil: "...it is up to us to inject some goodness 
into it."^'^ Lewis, meanwliile, asserts that: 
It is the creative evolutionist, tlie Bergsonian, or Shavian, or the Communist (those systems 
which place the whole meaning of existence in biological or social evolution on our planet) 
who should tremble when they look up at the night sky. For they are really committed to a 
sinking ship...For entropy is the real cosmic wave, and evolution only a momentary tellurian 
ripple within it.^ °^ 
FOR C.S. Lewis, therefore, the Utopian ideals of the champions of modem science held little attraction. The majority of people in most modem countries respected 
science and desired to be planned, he believed, and he therefore suspected that an 
invitation to Hell would appear under the guise of scientific planning.^ '^ It is often 
suggested that the rationalistic influence of Wells and others weakened the defences 
against totalitarianism and Hitler^^^ - Orwell once said that Wells was "too sane to 
understand the modem world of militarism and organised evil".^'" It is interesting, 
therefore, that Wells himself appears in the trilogy. He is caricatured as Horace Jules, 
the puppet director of the N.I.C.E.; a conceited fool, blind to the dangers of the 
science he promotes. A similar character on the 'other' side is MacPhee, who for 
Lewis represented the tradition of 19th century objective materialism."'* He can 
perhaps be compared to the 'genteel scientists' inhabiting the New Age of Reason 
described by Wells in Men Like Gods^^^ The inherited morality of that tradition would 
prevent them from "touching dirt", Lewis believed, yet once the notion of objective 
value had been discarded, only wickedness could result: 
What should they find incredible, since they no longer believed in a rational universe? What 
should they regard as too obscene, since they held that all morality was a mere by-product of 
the physical and economic situations of men?^ *^ 
For Lewis, Scientific Materialism represented slavery, perversion, and the destruction 
of anything resembling worthwhile meaning. To conquer human nature by science 
represented freedom from moral values - the conditioners would no longer be subject 
to, but would produce conscience."^ As far as Lewis was concerned, this represented 
emancipation into a void - human beings were either rational spirits obliged to obey 
absolute moral values, or they were mere nature (and therefore not human at all). 
Lewis concludes in The Abolition of Man: 
A dogmatic belief in objective value is necessary to the very idea of a rule which is not tyranny, 
or an obedience which is not slaverv'.^ ^^  
Haldane, J . B . S . ; Everything has a History, p.266. 
'^'^  G E ) , p.34. 
OTOW, p. 102. 
Parrinder, P.; Op. Cit., p.2. 
Quoted in: Parrinder P.; Op. Cit., p.2. 
T H S , p.203. 
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Conclusions 
IN summarising the present study, we should return to the observation of R.J. Reilly which we noted in the Introduction - that is, that the work of the 'Oxford Romantics' can be seen as a literary and religious construct. The purpose of this 
construct, writes Reilly, is to defend romanticism by showing it to be religious, and to 
defend religion by traditionally romantic means. The purpose of this thesis has been 
to investigate the nature of C.S. Lewis' defence of Christian orthodoxy, in the context 
of the lay discovery of orthodoxy in the mid-twentieth century. As such, Lewis can be 
seen as the foremost exponent of this literary and religious enterprise. I have attempted 
to illuminate Lewis' ideas by an investigation of some of the sources and influences 
which shaped his ideas, to outline the main tenets of his 'orthodoxy', and to 
demonstrate areas where I believe he had something distinctive to contribute. I shall 
now attempt to summarise this discussion, and suggest areas for further study. 
LEWIS was an anomalous figure in many ways, even among the movement of lay orthodox which we have been considering. Alone among the major figures of the 
Inklings, or the wider group which included Dorothy Sayers and T.S. Eliot, he was the 
only character with no real Catholic sympathies. From a Protestant point of view, 
however, he is a curious champion of orthodoxy, also. He seems to have been able to 
make little of Karl Barth (this may be due to Earth's initial lack of influence in Britain, 
as opposed to the continent), and he wholeheartedly embraced the romantic principles 
which the Protestant Barth and the Anglo-Catholic Eliot had rejected as part of the 
problem for modem Christian orthodoxy. 
As we have seen, Lewis often seems to see himself as primarily presenting a timeless 
deposit of Christian faith to a public he believed were being misled by the 
'professional' Christians - the theologians and the clergy: 
When I began, Christianity came before tlie great mass of my unbeheving fellow countrymen 
either in the highly emotional form offered by revivalists or in the unintelligible language of 
highly cultured clergymen. Most men were reached by neitlier. My task was therefore simply 
that of a translator - one turning Christian doctrine, or what he believed to be such, into the 
vernacular, into language that unscholarly people could attend to and could understand."° 
However, it is impossible to divorce Lewis from the 'history of ideas' which had 
preceded him and in which he wrote. His orthodoxy was of a very distinctive kind, and 
very definitely shaped by the context of philosophy and history in which he found 
himself Chief among these influences were the intellectual inheritance of the 1900s, 
and the Modernist and Idealist movements of the twentieth century. 
In the pre-Worid War I I period, a form of Idealism held sway in philosophy, 
represented by Bradley, Bosanquet and Green, among others, which radically rejected 
Realism. British Idealism was liberal in religion, and in figures such as Russell and 
Reillv, R.J.; Op. Cit., p.f 
" " T A H " , P . 1 1 7 . 
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Eyre, was explicitly anti-Christian. In contrast, orthodoxy of the Chestertonian type 
was implicitly anti-ideahst, and Chesterton himself was explicitly anti-idealist. The 
thesis of the religious strand of this form of idealism was that the primary spiritual 
reality was an all-inclusive experience of the Absolute - an Idealism which was 
essentially one of immanence rather than transcendence. For a Chesterton or a Lewis, 
Reahsm must be deeply bound up with Christianity - for otherwise a doctrine such as 
the Incarnation must be meaningless as traditionally understood. 
The appeal of von Hiigel lay in his emergence from the Modernist crisis as a 
protagonist for 'thoroughgoing supematuralism', as Lewis termed it. The common 
ground of Modernism in Catholicism and Anglicanism was in biblical criticism, but the 
entire attempt to bring Catholic belief into closer relation with contemporary 
philosophy, history and science was, as we have seen, inimical to Lewis. H.D.A. 
Major, a strategist of Anglican modernism, here expresses the gulf between the new 
trends in theology and what Lewis and his school believed to be 'real' Christianity: 
We believe that there is only one substance of the Godhead and the Manhood, and that our 
conception of the difference between Deity and Humanity is one of degree. The distinction 
between Creator and creature, upon which...tlie older theologians place so much emphasis, 
seems to us to be a minor distinction.''^ ' 
SO what was 'real' Christianity to C.S. Lewis? I have tried to show that his orthodoxy was a complex construct, and rests on several key tenets. The first of 
these is the affirmation of a real and basic distinction between the Natural and the 
Supernatural, between Humanity and Deity. Furthermore, there is basic to all human 
beings the experience of the 'ought' and 'ought not' of morality, and for Lewis, these 
are intuitions of an absolute Moral Law, and consequently of a Law-giver. Further to 
this, Lewis follows Otto in making the case for the 'numinous' as a fiandamental 
religious experience. In direct contrast to the 19th century characteristic of analysing 
religion by taking Christianity as the ideal. Otto reverses the approach, instead 
concentrating on the Holy or the numinous as the essence of religion - the enticing and 
fearfijl, the overwhelming. The numinous experience is common to Hinduism, 
Buddhism, Monotheism - i.e. to religions of pantheism, monotheism and religions with 
no specific deity, but interestingly, this 'sense of the beyond' is excluded from modern 
secularism. This, as I shall show later in my conclusions, has ramifications for my 
treatment of Lewis and modern Utopian literature. 
From these two religious 'givens', I would argue that Lewisian orthodoxy demands the 
assertion of'the Holy' as an a priori category, again following Otto: 
We conclude tlien, that not only the rational but also the non-rational elements of the complex 
category of 'holiness' are a priori elements and each in the same degree. Religion is not in 
vassalage either to morality or teleoIog>', 'ethos' or 'telos', and does not draw its life from 
postulates; and its non-rational content has, no less than its rational, its own independent roots 
in the hidden deptlis of the spirit itself 
It was from Chesterton that Lewis initially gained his sense of Heilsgeschichte, and 
thus this association of the rational and non-rational elements in the divine is seen for 
Quoted in Hooper, Walter; C.S. Lewis: A Companion & Guide, p.25. 
Rudolf Otto; Op. Cit., p. 140. 
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him in the context of the progressive revelation of God to the Jews, and finally in the 
joining of the parallel rivers of philosophy and mythology in the Person of Christ: 
With Otto...I would find the seed of religious experience in the Numinous. In an age like our 
own such experience does occur but, until religion comes and retrospectively transforms it, it 
usually appears to the subject to be a special form of aesthetic experience. In ancient times I 
think experience of the Numinous developed into the Holy only in so far as tlie Nununous (not 
in itself at all necessarily moral) came to be connected with the morally good. This happened 
regularly in Israel, sporadically elsewhere. But even in the higher Paganism, I do not think tliis 
process led to anything like fides. There is nothing credal in Paganism. In Israel we do get 
fides but this is always connected with certain historical affirmations. Faith is not simply in the 
numinous Elohim, nor even simply in the holy Jahweh, but in the God "of our fathers", the 
God who called Abraham and brought Israel out of Egypt. In Christianity this historical 
element is strongly reaffirmed. The object of faith is at once the ens entium of the philosophers, 
the Awfiil Mystery of Paganism, the Holy Law given of the moralists, and Jesus of Nazareth 
who was crucified under Pontius Pilate and rose again on the third day.^ ''^  
Essentially, then, Christianity is thus for Lewis not the conclusion of a philosophical 
debate on the origins of the universe; rather it is a catastrophic historical event 
following on from a long spiritual preparation of humanity. 
AS a specifically 'Romantic' theologian, Lewis revives Coleridge's assertion that Reason has two aspects, which includes the imaginative. Coleridge uses Reason 
(as does Newman) in a sense which includes the intuitive. Imagination is the perception 
of reality which is connected with the real - i.e. participating as a way of knowing. 
Lewis describes his experience of reading George MacDonald's Phantasies as a 
defining experience: 
I had already been waist deep in Romanticism; and likely enough, at any moment, to flounder 
into its darker and more evil forms, slithering down the steep descent that leads from the love 
of strangeness to that of eccentricity and thence to that of perversity. Now Phantasies...had 
about it a sort of cool, morning innocence... Wliat it actually did to me was to convert, even to 
baptise...my imagination.^ '^* 
Lewis was to describe the defining quality of Phantasies as 'holiness' - a synthesis, 
which, as we have seen, represented transcendent moral goodness. 
It is upon the assertion that imagining is a way of knowing, and therefore that good 
imagining is as important as good thinking, that Lewis embarks on much of his 
apologetic enterprise, and why, following Chesterton, he employs fiction as a way of 
conveying his beliefs. I have tried to demonstrate that Lewis reintroduces the doctrines 
of Heaven and Hell as not only important Christian truths, but central perspectives to 
the Christian life. In addition to this, I would argue that he transcends much 
theological debate through the use of imaginative fiction. The objections to a doctrine 
of Hell which McCord Adams cites, for instance, have the sense of non-questions in 
the light of an imaginative appreciation of The Great Divorce, or of Psyche's 
encounter with the Court of the Gods in Till We Have Faces. Michael Vasey argues 
that a major cultural reorienting of human Desire has taken place between the medieval 
period and the present, shifting in focus from God to sexuality, and in the light of this 
" ^ T A H , p.IOSff. 
Quoted in Hooper, Walter; Op. Cit., p.568. 
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discussion, I believe that Lewis has much to contribute to the debate both fi-om an 
imaginative perspective and fi'om the perspective of a medieval scholar. 
I E W I S ' engagement with the literary genre of Utopia, I believe, remains relevant _yand pertinent to many twentieth century human concerns. Not least among these is 
the preoccupation in literature with the rational and irrational sides of human nature, as 
explored in Zamyatin's We or Huxley's Brave New World. One can feel the sense of 
tension in much of Ernest Hemingway's writing - in Death in the Afternoon, for 
example. Hemingway concedes at the outset that the bullfight cannot be justified by 
what he dismissively terms 'Christian morality', and yet he is strangely and eloquently 
. drawn to its gore and beauty, its dark blood, high drama, danger, and death. In Brave 
New World, there seems an irreconcilable gulf between Huxley's ordered, logical, and 
antiseptic 'Utopian' society, and the passions, jealousies, violence, and superstitions of 
the Reservations - and yet the two seem curiously unfulfilled without the other. 
Zamyatin, again, through the character of 1-330, expresses to the incomplete rationalist 
D-503 the need to "tremble with fear, with joy, insane rage, cold...to pray to the fire", 
Here I would argue that, just as many see in the controversies of the Reformation the 
echoes of patristic disputes, so Lewis seems to suggest that this tension between the 
rational and the irrational in modem literature represents the pale secular shadow of a 
much greater dichotomy. To draw on the earlier discussion of transposition, the 
twentieth centuiy writers have mistaken the limited notation of human passions and 
moral intuitions for the greater Realities which they point towards. It is, for Lewis, an 
echo of the tension in religious experience between the demands of the moral law-giver 
and the 'dread' and numinous mysterium tremendum. The first without the second 
results in cold, emotionless self-righteousness, the second without the first in madness, 
obscenity, and barbarity. The reconciliation between the myth-makers and the 
philosophers is to be found in Christianity. 
Other issues raised by Lewis' secular contemporaries include cosmic fiitility, evolution, 
and the nature of Value. H.G. Wells raises these concems extremely skilfially in The 
Time Machine, and Zamyatin ultimately can find no logical solution to the stmggle 
between Energy and Entropy in his dystopia. Lewis was, of course, writing at a time in 
which the logical outworkings of a denial of absolute value seemed to be coming 
painfijlly to fruition in Nazi Germany and in the Soviet Union. Perhaps his achievement 
in this regard was to highlight the implications of our present scientific understanding 
of the universe, coupled with a rejection of traditional values and morality. His 
argument that a belief in absolute value was fiandamental to a just and humane society 
seems more pertinent than ever, in an age of tenuous pragmatism concerning human 
rights, and of continuing technological evolution, particularly in the field of genetics. 
T I I H E attempt to restate orthodox Christian belief is a concern in every age. C.S. 
I Lewis, in summary, represents the foremost exponent of a lay defence of 
JL orthodoxy which arose out of particular historical circumstances, and a 
particular ideological context. His apologetic approach was at once defensive - in the 
sense of removing misconceptions surrounding the Christian faith, aggressive - in the 
sense of a combative approach to his opponents and the logical conclusion of their 
own positions, and constmctive - in the sense of his distinctiveness. This 
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distinctiveness lay in the way in which he synthesised many disparate approaches into a 
coherent construct, which was at once romantic and rational. 
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